The Arctic Century

Karelian Birch: How Belarus Became the Main Supplier of the "Karelian" Brand

Elena Kempi — Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Karelian birch in a northern forest. Source: iStock.com/Renewer

Karelian birch is listed today in the Red Data Book of the Republic of Karelia, and commercial logging of the species is banned. At the same time, the region promotes Karelian birch as a brand: souvenir shops sell every kind of article made from it—chess sets, jewelry boxes, stands. Where does the wood for all this splendor come from, when the price tags start no lower than 15,000 rubles (about $175)? The answer is almost funny: from Belarus.

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Why Is Karelian Birch So Hard to Grow?
Karelian Birch: How Belarus Became the Main Supplier of the "Karelian" Brand :::

Karelian birch grows not only in Karelia but also in the Leningrad, Pskov, and Yaroslavl regions and elsewhere across the European north of Russia, as well as in Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

The Republic of Belarus today holds the largest part of the species' range. Forestry there still runs on principles inherited from the Soviet Union, and it is Belarus that carries out the moderate harvesting, processing, and supply of the individual items that are then sold in Karelia at an enormous markup.

So why did Karelia give up its position? The influence of the Second World War, surprisingly, is still felt here. An irreplaceable part of the "native" gene pool of Karelian birch was lost during the German-Finnish occupation. Karelia did have a chance to grow Karelian birch on an industrial scale of its own, but the lawless nineties and human greed spared none of the rare plantings.

According to Natalia Laur, doctor of agricultural sciences, an enormous amount of breeding work was carried out in Karelia between 1987 and 2006, and 40 hectares of hybrid Karelian birch plantings with a high yield of figured wood were established.[^1] These valuable breeding sites now require regular maintenance, but the region allocates no funding for it. The single plus stand—one whose average indicators exceed those of ordinary stands—had been lost to illegal logging as of 2012, and the number of individual plus trees keeps falling: by 2012 only about 40% of all the plus trees designated in the region remained.

The habitats of Karelian birch have been designated regional nature reserves, sites under state protection where cutting Karelian birch is strictly forbidden. Regional authorities established a special legal regime within them, yet the breeding value of most plantings and natural stands has been lost: the markings are gone, and without maintenance the valuable species cannot compete and disappears from the stand.

Some reserves have been destroyed outright, and Karelian birch there is gone for good. A lack of funding for forest breeding, together with the closure of the Karelian Selection and Seed Production Center in 2008, led to the loss of 1,500 trees between 1996 and 2006.

The Problem Today

Karelian birch has been used in the landscaping of Petrozavodsk since the 1980s, though far from all residents support the practice, as they do not consider the species ornamental.

Karelia has now taken up the conservation and cultivation of Karelian birch as a commercial species once again. In September 2024, the first forest plantation of Karelian birch appeared in the Medvezhyegorsk District.

Plantation cultivation of forest plants is permitted in Russia but is nowhere near as widespread as it is abroad. Foreign plantation practice is highly profitable: in Germany, Poland, Finland, and a number of other European countries, fast-growing willow and poplar are grown for fuel chips. In Russia, very few households have boilers that run on fuel pellets, and firewood is often cheaper and easier to come by than pellets and the boilers themselves, which are extremely expensive to install and maintain, so Russian pellet production is oriented entirely toward export. In China, for example, poplar plantations are established for parquet board and cheap plywood, and the fastest-growing species in the world, eucalyptus, is grown on plantations in Brazil, Argentina, Portugal, and a number of other countries.

Forest plantations have not caught on widely in Russia, because the country's fuel needs are met by gas and firewood, which are relatively cheaper than boilers and pellets, and because domestic demand for timber at export prices is very low. Even so, the situation may well change before long, and plantation cultivation may take a place of its own in Russian forestry.

The leased land, the funding of the planting stock, and the obligation to maintain the Karelian birch plantation all fall to PJSC Segezha Group. Karelia's largest logging holding has clearly made a long-term "investment" here in the hope of harvesting Karelian birch, since under Russian forest law the ban on cutting a Red Data Book species does not extend to plantation cultivation.

Whether "test-tube" plants can form a full plantation is an open question, since a forestry asset of that value needs careful tending.

Conclusion

Conserving and reviving Karelian birch in Russia plainly calls for strong support from the state. Restoring the old reserves and creating new ones is overdue.

Breeding work in the modern world does not stop for a day—grocery shelves now carry grapes the size of a large date, and laboratories are experimenting with jellyfish genes in citrus—so why can the country not revive and develop the breeding of valuable tree species at home? The result of breeding Karelian birch will take decades to appear, of course, but it is worth treating as a long-term investment that will certainly pay for itself and benefit generations to come.

[^1]: N. V. Laur, Forest Breeding and Seed Production in Karelia: A Monograph, Petrozavodsk State University (Moscow: Moscow State Forest University Press, 2012), 160 pp.

Arctic Shield 2026 Is Underway

The Arctic Century — Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Chief of Defense Michael W. Hyldgaard visits the Arctic Shield exercise in Greenland. Source: Forsvaret

More than 400 soldiers from 11 countries are training for Arctic operations during the Arctic Shield 2026 exercise.

The exercise takes place on land, at sea, and in the air, particularly around the settlement of Narsarsuaq in southern Greenland, where the soldiers train a wide range of military skills under the demanding conditions that operations in the Arctic offer. The exercise is part of NATO's overall Arctic Sentry activity.

On the first day of the exercise, Minister of Defense Jeppe Bruus, Chief of Defense Michael Hyldgaard, Minister of Foreign Affairs Múte B. Egede, and the Commander of Arctic Command Søren Andersen visited the exercise, where they observed the training between the soldiers of the many countries.

Chief of Defense General Michael W. Hyldgaard was very satisfied with what he saw during the visit.

"The effort is purposeful and effective. There is good cooperation between everyone. Active soldiers, Home Guard soldiers, reservists, civilians and locals work together. It is great," says Michael Hyldgaard.

During the ongoing exercise Arctic Shield 2026, soldiers from the Nordic countries are training together with colleagues from Belgium, France, and Canada. Both Slovenia and Poland have observer contributions to the exercise, while Germany is also participating with observers and transport support.

"It is clear that the nations want to be here. That they consider the exercise important and are taking the opportunity to show that we are together on the task," says Michael Hyldgaard. "There is also really good cooperation with both the local authorities and citizens. That is also needed when we are going to solve the task."

During the exercise, the soldiers train for various types of land military operations in Arctic areas. This includes, among other things, French infantry units, drone units from Belgium, and special operations forces from Finland. The Danish Home Guard also plays a major role in the exercise, as well as units from both the Swedish and Norwegian Home Guards.

Arctic specialists from Canada are participating, sharing their experience and knowledge of the harsh Arctic conditions with allies from other NATO countries, and Canada is also supporting the exercise with transport capacity.

Dutch marines are also participating in the exercise, but they are conducting their training in the fjord system around Kangerlussuaq, which is north of the Arctic Circle.

Activities Across Several Parts of Greenland

The Defense Command and the Arctic Command are supporting the training activities on land with helicopters, ships, medical expertise, facilities, and logistical support for the participating nations.

In parallel with Arctic Shield 2026, other training and presence operations are being conducted in the Arctic as part of NATO's enhanced presence.

This includes, among other things, air operations in the Arctic, where Danish, Canadian, and American fighter jets train together, supported by several specialized aircraft types over Greenland.

Source: Forsvaret (in Danish)

EU Invests in Canadian Mining Company in East Greenland

The North Observer — Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Source: iStock.com/RHJ

Ursula von der Leyen's recent visit to Greenland not only marked the beginning of a new phase in relations between the sparsely populated, independence-seeking Arctic island, Denmark, and the European Union—a phase enshrined in a Joint Declaration that The North Observer will analyze shortly—but also yielded a significant tangible outcome.

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Amid the EU's preparations for a war with Russia—a conflict Euro-bureaucrats anticipate will begin in 2029—a united Europe has agreed to help finance a project to mine molybdenum-bearing ore from a major deposit in eastern Greenland.

As The North Observer had predicted, this unprecedented, high-profile visit by the EU leadership to Greenland served as the opening round of a ten-round professional boxing match. It is a contest with high stakes for former allies—the US and the EU—as they vie for the rich mineral resources of the northwestern North Atlantic, specifically the vast island itself and its surrounding waters.

In this bout, Canada—led by a reckless liberal elite that has failed to build a viable state and has instead succeeded primarily in paving the way for its collapse—plays the role of a "junior" fighter barred by the rules. It is the sort of fighter who sneaks into the ring to land a cheap shot on the US from behind, only to quickly scramble out of the ring and into the safety of the spectator stands.

However, the weary, aging visage of the European Union—the old fellow is more than 75 years old, counting from the moment of conception—bears a massive bruise covering the entire face; inflicted by tiny but proud Iceland—which, surprisingly enough, wished to preserve its independence and sovereignty—the mark has not yet had time to fade from dark blue to green or yellow.

Following this heavy blow, instead of a wide gateway into the resource-rich Arctic—so generously endowed by the Creator—the European Union was left with only a small wicket gate via Greenland, a territory still belonging to Denmark.

On September 7, Euro-bureaucrats attempted to hastily cement this temporary situation politically, mindful of their currently negligible presence in the Arctic.

The practical outcome of the EU leadership's trip to Greenland was the allocation of a modest €200 million for the 2026–2027 period to fund projects on the island—including the aforementioned molybdenum ore extraction project led by a Canadian company.

Although the European press makes no public mention of it, a primary consumer of this molybdenum will be the EU defense industry, rather than European housewives gazing fondly at their stainless-steel pots, knives, and forks—items that also rely on these same alloying metals during manufacture.

Molybdenum, chromium, and nickel are key alloying metals used to produce armor steel. The molybdenum content in the toughest armor plating can reach as high as 1%, and the extreme-hardness plates used for stopping high-velocity projectiles often use higher alloy mixes containing roughly 0.40% to 1.0% molybdenum.

Given the sheer weight of military hardware, the defense industry requires vast quantities of these metals; access to them dictates the production capacity of military manufacturing facilities.

Nazi Germany received approximately 13,000 tons of pure nickel from the Petsamo region (Kolosjoki mines) in northern Finland between 1940 and 1944. Nickel was vital for the German war machine to produce hardened armor steel, gun barrels, and aircraft engines. By 1943, Finnish imports accounted for roughly 73% of Germany's total nickel supply, rising to about 87% in 1944 prior to the Soviet offensive.

As is well known, the godfathers of the European Union were economists who had served in Hitler's SS during World War II—men who had planned to create a unified economic and political space under the leadership of Nazi Germany.

The European Union—the ideological heir to Nazi Germany—once again requires precious metals to manufacture weaponry for the rapid, large-scale militarization needed for the war with Russia planned for 2029.

NATO military officials and politicians—and European ones in particular—would do well to study Russia's updated nuclear doctrine before bedtime, rather than dreaming of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia in three years' time (will you actually manage to get ready by that time?).

Expensive military hardware—which will certainly be of no use to Europeans in the war with Russia they desire—will only burden the meager EU budget and deeply indebted national budgets, without bringing peace or security to Europe.

These alloying metals would be better used to make shiny, beautiful, stainless cookware—items that European housewives will continue to view with love and appreciation.

Greenland Resources has been designated by the EU as a high-priority project. Now the director talks about their cooperation with the Greenlandic government and Europe.

When the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was in Nuuk, she talked about the cooperation with Greenland on mining.

During her presentation in Katuaq, she mentioned, among other things, the Piiaaffik project at Malmbjerget, south of Mestersvig.

"This could become one of Greenland's largest enterprises. If we do it well, it could generate up to 90 million euros—672 million kroner—per year in value for the country," said Ursula von der Leyen.

Greenland Resources is the Canadian mining company behind the project. In June last year, they received their exploitation permit.

In the Greenlandic Government's Political-Economic Report for 2026, it is stated that the company is in the process of drafting the environmental assessment (EIA) and the social sustainability assessment (SSA).

KNR met the director, Ruben Shiffman, for a conversation after Ursula von der Leyen's press conference with Jens-Frederik Nielsen.

"I am very excited. This is teamwork, and the most important thing is the local community in Ittoqqortoormiit. We want to do a lot for them. It just has to happen at the right time and in coordination with the Greenlandic Government."

The Mine at Malmbjerget

The Canadian company Greenland Resources Inc. will extract the element molybdenum in a mine approximately 30 kilometers west of the coast at Mestersvig.

Molybdenum is used, among other things, in the steel industry.

The plan is for the mine to operate 24/7 for 18 years and extract 22,000 tons of molybdenum concentrate during this period.

The mine is expected to employ 300 to 500 people.

The Country's Largest Project

KNR has previously described how the company expects to mine 12.8 million tons of ore per year, which will be shipped abroad from a quay in Mestersvig during the ice-free months.

In addition, the company has previously said that they will rebuild the runway at Station Mestersvig so that it can be used for civil flights by the company and the rest of Greenland more frequently than today.

If the mine receives the final approvals, Ruben Shiffman expects that it will take four years to build the mine. He also expects that the mine could account for 30% of Greenland's gross domestic product through taxes.

"Everyone wants molybdenum from Greenland. You can't make defense-classified alloys without molybdenum."

Cooperation with Europe

Last week, Múte B. Egede, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Raw Materials of Greenland, was in Brussels to talk to EU politicians.

There, he asked for more European companies that can receive raw materials from Greenland and process them.

Ruben Shiffman says that Greenland Resources already has a large number of partners in the EU.

"We have binding purchase agreements with the largest steel companies in Europe. This is not a theoretical project, it is already an economic interest for European steel producers."

"Greenland can help the EU secure the supply chains of critical minerals, while you help Greenland diversify its economy. But for this to work, there must be European customers," said Múte B. Egede last week in the EU.

Here the Finnish company Outokumpu is mentioned, Europe's largest producer of stainless steel. The director says that the customer agreement is worth $2.4 billion for 10 years and can be extended for a period of 20 years.

"We also have binding customer agreements with Swedish SSAB, which is one of the largest defense-classified steel producers in Europe."

"They have just signed a large agreement with Rheinmetall, the largest defense company in Europe. So we have about 80% of the German market covered. The German government is very involved in the project," says Ruben Shiffman.

Relationship with the Government of Greenland

KNR has described since March how the American oil company Greenland Energy Company and the Government of Greenland have been in conflict with each other.

Ruben Shiffman will not comment on the other company. But he says that Greenland Resources has had a great collaboration with the Greenlandic government throughout.

"We have interacted with many authorities around the world. I must say that our experience with the Greenland authorities is very positive. They do a lot with the limited funds, and they really want the project to be possible."

Similarly, the director says that the high environmental standards and bureaucracy in Greenland are something that their partners in Europe see as a strength rather than a hindrance.

"The Government of Greenland has been very supportive, and the rules are very clear. In my opinion, the environmental standards are the highest in the world. This gives strong credibility to the Arctic. This is very important for the Europeans."

Local Communities

The final approvals are still missing.

Therefore, the director cannot be specific at this time about how the company intends to contribute to the various local communities in East Greenland.

In July, citizens in Ittoqqortoormiit took to the streets to demonstrate against the American oil company Greenland Energy Company and their handling of the cooperation with the Government of Greenland and the local environment. The director of the Canadian company says that they have a good collaboration with the Greenland government and local communities on the east coast.

"If this project becomes a reality, there are many really exciting opportunities that can come to the local communities on the east coast. But we will have to start the project before we can deliver on it."

The Canadian director is married to a Danish woman, and in the last sentence of the interview, which was conducted in English, he switches to Danish.

"We already have commitments, and our company structure is to share. As we say in Danish: 'We are good people'."

Source: KNR (in Danish)

Germany in the Arctic After Ukraine and Hormuz

Giuseppe Cappelluti — Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Source: iStock.com/gopixa

Between Ukraine and Hormuz

During the last four years, Germany's strategic stance and energy supplies were severely affected by two main events. The first one was the launch of the Special Military Operation and the consequent escalation of the Ukrainian Crisis into a wider confrontation between Russia and the so-called "Collective West." Albeit with some initial reservations, Germany fully adapted to the policy dictated by Washington and Brussels, and this led to the disruption of the previously profitable oil and gas partnership with Moscow, which supplied over half of Germany's gas needs in 2021.

The second one is the beginning of the Iran War, with the consequent Hormuz Strait Crisis. The slump in the traffic through one of the world's most important choke points caused an energy crisis which affected mostly Eastern Asia, but whose effects could be felt across Europe too. The first effect is the overall growth in oil prices, with the main indicators climbing from around $70/barrel to over $100/barrel in a few days. Oil prices have subsequently adjusted, but they remain above prewar levels, and transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains well below prewar volumes. The combined effects of the Ukrainian and Hormuz Strait Crises have already caused an economic slowdown and workforce cuts, such as those recently announced by Volkswagen, which could cause up to 100,000 layoffs.

The second effect was the jet fuel shortage. At the beginning of the Hormuz Strait Crisis, an Italian analyst foresaw that the main Western European hubs were in a much better position than Mediterranean ones, since they could rely on supplies through the Atlantic. Still, the crisis affected German aviation as well. Lufthansa had to cancel around 20,000 flights during the summer season, while Lufthansa CityLine, the German colossus's subsidiary for regional flights, was closed in April 2026. The local aviation sector also had to deal with the closure of the Middle Eastern airspaces, adding to those over Russia and Ukraine, and flights between Western Europe and Eastern Asia were forced to reroute through a narrow corridor over the South Caucasus. In spite of some improvements during the last few months, the situation around Middle Eastern airspaces is not yet back to normal.

These crises have also greatly influenced Germany's stance in the Arctic. Before 2022, the country's Arctic policy was focused mainly on environmental protection and access to the local raw material resources—particularly the gas deposits supplying the Yamal-Europe and the Nord Stream pipelines—while military cooperation took a backseat. Nowadays, military cooperation has become paramount, while Germany's former main oil and gas supply was defined as "a threat" by the 2024 Arctic Strategy. The situation remains fluid, given the ongoing reshaping of the world order and Washington's partial retrenchment in the Americas. Likewise, the German political system contains a "wild card" capable of unraveling most of the policies carried out since 2022. Still, the structural changes that followed Scholz's Zeitenwende Speech are likely to endure the next few years.

Oil and Gas

Since the country imported around 98% of its oil needs in 2024, Germany has not abandoned its interest in Arctic oil and gas: what has changed is its main supplier. In 2021, 55% of Germany's gas supply came from Russia, and the country aimed to become a hub for Russian gas in West-Central Europe (France, the Benelux, the Czech Republic, and potentially even the UK). In 2025, 45% of it came from Norway. Something similar applies for oil supplies. In 2021, Russia was Germany's main oil supplier, with a 34% share; three years later, the leader was Norway, which supplied 20% of its imports, followed by the US (18%) and Kazakhstan (13%). The Druzhba pipeline, which used to transport Russian oil, is now used by Kazakhstan.

These shifts have gone hand in hand with disinvestments from Russian assets. Unlike other companies, such as France's TotalEnergies, Wintershall (a subsidiary of BASF and one of the main shareholders of the Nord Stream pipelines) long resisted calls to disinvest from Russian oil and gas deposits. However, it ultimately quit its joint venture with Gazprom in the Russian Arctic in January 2023, partly as a result of strong political pressures. At the same time, Wintershall increased its presence in the Norwegian oil and gas industry—for example, with a minority share in the Snøhvit gas field—and in 2023 it was among the top three non-state oil and gas producers in Norway. Further developments, nevertheless, are hindered by the EU's ongoing ban on new Arctic oil and gas fields, although this policy may be reviewed in the future given ongoing geopolitical issues.

This does not imply that Russian oil and, in particular, Russian gas have disappeared from Germany. Many of Germany's gas imports come as LNG through countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark. Its origin is often difficult to trace, but we can state for certain that at least part of this LNG comes from Russia. Moreover, due to the Hormuz Strait Crisis, these imports are even increasing; in the first quarter of 2026, the EU as a whole imported 6.9 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, the highest level since 2022. Since pipeline imports have largely stopped, with the exception of those through TurkStream, most of these imports occur as LNG.

Last August, the EU eased planned restrictions on Russian LNG, allowing its members to buy and transport it even after January 1, 2027. The traditional German-Russian oil and gas partnership is unlikely to be reinstated soon. In January 2025, rumors circulated that American investor Stephen P. Lynch was planning to buy the Nord Stream pipelines. The restoration of these pipelines has also been proposed by the Alternative für Deutschland (henceforth AfD) party, the rising star of Germany's hard right. At the moment, nevertheless, this is highly unlikely, since the AfD remains firmly in opposition and the current government is set on an anti-Russian path.

Military Engagement

Germany's Arctic engagements have been influenced not only by the ongoing Ukrainian Crisis but also by Donald Trump's return to the White House. Trump's claims on Greenland have caused rather vocal reactions in Germany. Both Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz condemned them as a violation of international law, and in January 2026, Germany took part in the Arctic Endurance operation to protect the island. But this commitment was halfhearted, and the fifteen soldiers of its reconnaissance team were withdrawn on January 18, officially because their mission was complete.

Did Germany blink? Trump's threats against those countries which took part in the operation may have played a role in making Berlin back off, but the main reason may actually be different. As known, after WWII, West Germany had to accept a strong American military presence on its soil and to rebuild itself as a peaceful nation. The aim, of course, was to "keep the Germans down"; at the same time, however, this allowed the country to divert funds from defense spending to the welfare state and economic development. Die Wende didn't imply a return to militarism; on the contrary, it made this policy Germany-wide, and defense spending was further reduced.

At this point, it's reasonable to assume that the main concern of the German government was to "keep the Americans in." Trump's "America First" doctrine and his frequent criticism of Germany's low defense expenditures are a major concern for Berlin, and we should not be surprised that Merz is one of the least critical Western European leaders of Trump's actions, even if this implies self-evident double standards compared to his virulent criticism of Russia's actions in Ukraine[^1].

This brings us back to Russia. While its main source of tensions with Germany is not located in the Arctic but in Eastern Europe, most of Germany's military activities in the Arctic and Northern Europe are directed against Russia. This was the main aim of the 2026 Arctic Sentry mission—part of a wider effort to strengthen NATO's military capabilities in Northern Europe—to which the country sent four Eurofighter Typhoons. In 2023, the Bundeswehr also set up a permanent deployment in Lithuania; the 700 soldiers originally stationed there are expected to grow to 4,800 in 2027.

Last but not least, tensions are rising around the so-called "shadow fleet," which carries Russian oil and gas, bypassing Western sanctions and price caps. On January 10, 2026, for instance, Berlin denied one of these vessels the right to transit through its territorial waters. Later, on June 30, a German Coast Guard vessel nearly clashed with a Russian corvette when it approached a vessel of the "shadow fleet" near the Danish Straits, likely with the intention of seizing it. Unlike France and the UK, Germany hasn't seized any "shadow fleet" vessel so far. However, the deployment of military vessels to protect Russia's oil and gas trade is a clear sign that tensions are high and new incidents cannot be ruled out.

The AfD's Wild Card

Are Germany and Russia headed for escalated tensions or even war? The answer is complex. Throughout the centuries, Russia and Germany (along with Germany's main predecessors) have followed an almost regular pattern, making them friends in peacetime and enemies during major conflicts. For hundreds of years, they exchanged goods, raw materials, knowledge, settlers and even royalties; however, the last time Germany[^2] and Russia were allies in war was during the Boxer Rebellion. Furthermore, most German-Russian tensions have been triggered by a quest for control over strategic regions in Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Arctic and the Balkans. Since frictions exist in all these areas, the answer is seemingly yes.

This prospect is counterbalanced by other factors that mitigate the possibility of an open war. Rather than Germany, the Western countries that took the greatest advantage from the Ukrainian Crisis are Britain, the US, and some countries of the "New Europe," which managed to achieve a main strategic objective: driving a wedge between Germany (and continental Western Europe as a whole) and Russia. These nations never looked favorably upon the Nord Stream pipelines or the broader German-Russian oil and gas partnership. Additionally, the attack against the Nord Stream pipelines was also aimed at making the restoration of this partnership far more difficult once the Ukrainian Crisis is over.

Is it in Germany's interests to support Ukraine "until it prevails," or "to reach a just and lasting peace" if we use the more indirect language preferred by those politicians who don't want to change course but who are aware that their voters may not want a new Afghanistan or Iraq? In the "Locomotive of Europe," rearmament is seen as a possible way out of the ongoing German crisis, but militarization can be justified either by a rebirth of Germany's traditional power politics or by an external enemy. The latter is precisely the path chosen by the current German government and some mainstream opposition parties, especially the Greens.

The alternative way out is a restoration of ties with Russia. This solution is favored by Germany's two main populist parties: the left-wing Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) and the aforementioned AfD. Both have their strongholds in the former East Germany. While the BSW, after an initial rise, is slowly declining—though it may still be decisive in shifting the balance of power between the AfD and mainstream parties in some Eastern Länder—the AfD is constantly growing. Recent polls place the party just below 30%. The low popularity of Friedrich Merz, even compared to the Western European average, helps fuel this growth, and some recent scandals certainly do not help.

It's difficult to foresee whether Germany will head towards rearmament or mend its ties with Russia. In the recent Saxony-Anhalt local elections, the AfD exceeded even the highest expectations, and a new breakthrough is expected in the upcoming local elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. However, the Brandmauer implemented by the mainstream parties still curtails the AfD's influence. Even if it succeeds in becoming a governing force in its strongholds, the party could find itself in a situation similar to that of the Italian Communist Party during the Cold War—governing at the local level (especially in the "Red Regions" of North-Central Italy) but almost permanently kept in opposition at the national level. Nonetheless, the AfD's continuous successes in the former DDR might have a nationwide impact; according to some experts, it could lead to a marginalization of Merz within the CDU and to the rise of a new ruling class more open to the idea of governing with Alice Weidel.

[^1]: Merz declined to question the legality of Washington's actions in Venezuela and Iran, and he openly supported the United States and Israel's objectives in the strikes against Iran during a press conference on March 1, stating that the latter "should not be protected by international law." He even claimed he was informed in advance about the US and Israel's upcoming attacks against Iran, unlike any other European nation. We had to wait until the end of March, when it was clear that the initial objective of Operation Epic Fury could not be achieved, to see the German chancellor express doubts about the operation itself.

[^2]: Excluding East Germany.

Why Is Karelian Birch So Hard to Grow?

Elena Kempi — Wed, 09 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Karelian birch wood texture. Source: iStock.com/eugenesergeev

From knife handles to furniture suites in imperial palaces, Karelian birch is a name familiar to anyone who collects antiques or fine furniture. The mere mention of the material stirs a particular excitement, and collectors know that when Karelian birch comes up, they should brace for a very high price.

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Why Is Karelian Birch So Hard to Grow?
Karelian Birch: How Belarus Became the Main Supplier of the "Karelian" Brand :::

That is surprising in its own way. Karelian birch is a tree that grows on its own in certain parts of Russia. So how did the wood of a fast-growing birch come to be worth its weight in gold, while Karelia itself grows no richer on that "gold"?

What Makes the Wood Special

Karelian birch (Betula pendula var. carelica) is a variety of silver birch (formerly warty birch, Betula verrucosa), a widely distributed species of the family Betulaceae found across Russia.

Karelian birch wood is prized in cabinetmaking for its unusual texture: fibers that normally grow parallel to one another instead twist into strange winding patterns, no two alike, producing a marbled figure. Such wood is noticeably denser than ordinary silver birch and far harder in every direction, resistant to rot, and difficult to work.

Furniture of Karelian birch combined with bog oak once furnished the imperial palaces. The chairs and desks in Nicholas II's study were made of it, the Winter Palace and the Mikhailovsky Palace in St. Petersburg were fitted out with pieces in it, and the Pavlovsk Palace held an entire library furnished in the costly wood. That fashion—and the matching price of the material—earned Karelian birch the nickname of the tsar's tree.

Karelian birch takes five forms, ranging in appearance from a full tree closely resembling an ordinary birch to a shrub. The most common and most recognizable form looks as though it grew in a swamp: short, with a crooked trunk (sometimes more than one), and spherical swellings on the branches.

Karelian Birch in Industry

Growing Karelian birch commercially is not as simple as it might seem. A number of pressing problems follow from the biology of the tree. For its first ten years it shows none of its distinctive traits, and it does not live long—about 40–60 years.

The traits responsible for the curling of the wood fibers are poorly inherited through seed (roughly 2–20% under uncontrolled pollination and up to 50–80% under controlled hybridization), which is why Karelian birch almost never forms stable natural stands, and why there are no groves of the precious tree to be found.

In 2024, scientists at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences identified the gene responsible for the figured wood, and can now determine at an early stage whether a given tree's wood will be figured or not. The method is very expensive, however, and too laborious to use routinely.

Micropropagation

Geneticists and breeders appeared to have solved this problem too, through vegetative propagation—yet even cheap and quick grafting fails, because of differences in growth rate and genetic deviations in the birch. So the most reliable weapon in the breeder's arsenal was brought to bear: micropropagation. It works, with a guaranteed result, but it is expensive as well.

In the Republic of Karelia, micropropagation of Karelian birch is carried out by the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Major research on the species is also conducted at St. Petersburg State University, Voronezh State University, and the All-Russian Research Institute of Forest Genetics, Breeding and Biotechnology (VNIILGISbiotech) in Voronezh.

Micropropagation (in vitro) makes it possible to raise up to a hundred exact copies of a plant from a single bud of Karelian birch, each inheriting in full the winding grain and the appearance of the parent tree. Their survival, however, requires a sterile medium and purpose-built environmental conditions: an optimal balance of temperature, humidity, and light.

The main complication with this method of propagation is that young Karelian birch has no immunity. It is entirely unadapted to changing environmental conditions and to disease and pests alike.

A young plant needs hardening off and a strengthened immune system, so for several more years it is acclimatized first in greenhouses, then in fields, and only after that planted out. The survival rate of birches prepared this way is low and the planting stock costs a great deal, which often makes large-scale plantings of Karelian birch impossible. (And people being what they are—someone hears about a planting, drives out, cuts the trees down, and hauls them away.)

This is how Karelian birch acquires its high price. It is a very difficult species to grow, whether for landscaping or for commercial sale at scale. Proposals to plant this valuable tree around the republic and Petrozavodsk come up often, but in practice such initiatives prove unworkable.

The country needs to conserve the species and restore its protected stands—in many of them Karelian birch has survived only by a miracle—but the matter has been shelved. In Karelia, there is no talk of Karelian birch wood as a commodity with any real turnover.

Swedish Ninth-Graders Lost a Year of Reading

The Arctic Century — Wed, 09 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

In reading comprehension, Swedish ninth-graders have lost knowledge equivalent to one year of learning.

Swedish 15-year-olds have never had such poor knowledge in mathematics, reading comprehension, and science, the PISA survey shows. The other Nordic countries also show historically low levels.

It is mainly the knowledge of Swedish ninth-graders in mathematics and reading comprehension that has deteriorated, while knowledge in science remains at the same low level as the previous measurement in 2022.

The biggest loss is in reading comprehension, where Sweden loses 21 points.

"According to the OECD, this corresponds to about one year of knowledge for a 15-year-old," says Anna Castberg, head of the Swedish National Agency for Education's analysis department, at a press conference.

Similar Results in Other Countries

The other Nordic countries also show historically low levels, according to the National Agency for Education's compilation of the results.

According to the knowledge measurement, Sweden is still at the OECD average, and not below, as several countries are falling behind. Previously strong countries such as Singapore and South Korea are also losing ground, especially in reading comprehension.

"Overall, it is a bleak picture for 15-year-olds. It is clear that we in Sweden and in other countries will need to place a great deal of focus on each individual student," says Anna Castberg.

The OECD's Director for Education and Skills, Andreas Schleicher, writes in his analysis that the decline in reading comprehension may be partly due to increased reading on screens.

At a press conference, Minister of Education and Integration Simona Mohamsson focused particularly on screens.

"The effects of increased screen time and reduced reading have now hit home with full force," she says.

Mohamsson warns that Sweden and other OECD countries are now on the verge of having a "generation of functional illiterates" if screens do not disappear from schools.

"To put it bluntly: we are in the middle of a screen pandemic."

2022 Also Saw a Deterioration

PISA is an international study that measures 15-year-old school students' knowledge in the subjects of mathematics, reading comprehension, and science.

The survey is conducted every three years by the OECD. In 2022, the PISA survey showed that Swedish students had worsened their results in both mathematics and reading comprehension compared to 2018.

Source: SVT Nyheter (in Swedish)

France in the Arctic: A Commitment Without a Strategy

Lisa Bousba — Tue, 08 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

:::note[BACKGROUND] France's Arctic turn traced in full: The 2026–2030 Polar Strategy: Between Strategic Projection and the Structural Limits of Arctic Power :::

France's growing attention to the Arctic raises a legitimate question: does Paris have a genuine and lasting interest in the region, or is it primarily responding to geopolitical changes that have made the High North increasingly difficult to ignore?

The answer lies somewhere in between. French interest in the Arctic is real, long-standing, and relatively consistent in certain areas, particularly science and diplomacy. Its strategic and security dimension, however, is more recent, and appears to be driven to a greater extent by the region's rapid transformation.

France did not discover the Arctic with the deterioration of relations with Russia or with the renewed international focus on Greenland. Its scientific presence in the High North is rooted in the long term, as is its involvement in environmental issues and polar cooperation. That continuity shows that French engagement cannot be reduced to a purely opportunistic reaction.

What has changed is the way the Arctic is perceived strategically in Europe. It is no longer seen only as a space for scientific research, environmental protection, and international cooperation, but increasingly as an area of competition, security, critical resources, and strategic projection. This is precisely where the French approach becomes more ambiguous. France now appears to be interested in the Arctic partly because the region concentrates issues that are already central to its national and European concerns: strategic autonomy, continental security, great-power competition, access to resources, diversification of supply chains, and economic sovereignty. In other words, the Arctic is sometimes approached less as a region with its own specific dynamics than as the northern extension of broader strategic concerns.

France's Defense Strategy for the Arctic partly illustrates this shift, and the French Polar Strategy for 2026–2030 carries it further. The significant attention devoted to Russia, NATO, and Euro-Atlantic security is understandable given the regional context. At the same time, it shows that France continues to interpret the Arctic largely through the prism of European security.

It would nevertheless be excessive to conclude that French interest is artificial. France has genuine reasons to be concerned with the region. It is a European power, a NATO member, a partner of several Arctic states, and a recognized scientific actor. The environmental, military, and economic transformations taking place in the Arctic now have consequences that extend far beyond the region itself.

The real issue, therefore, is less the legitimacy of French interest than its depth. A sustainable Arctic policy cannot rest solely on strategic declarations or occasional diplomatic engagement. It requires resources, infrastructure, regional expertise, and the capacity to maintain a long-term commitment. This is precisely where the French position remains somewhat fragile. Paris has expressed its intention to strengthen its role in the Arctic, yet it remains dependent on partners for regional access and for part of its logistical capabilities. Science remains one of France's main instruments of influence, even though funding and infrastructure dedicated to polar research remain limited.

This situation is not necessarily contradictory. France neither needs nor intends to replicate the model of territorial Arctic powers. Its influence logically rests more on research, partnerships, diplomacy, military interoperability, and European cooperation than on a permanent presence.

Greenland illustrates this evolution particularly well. French interest in the territory is no longer based solely on its scientific or diplomatic significance. Since Paris and Nuuk agreed to map the island's mineral potential, that interest has also become part of broader European debates on critical minerals, economic sovereignty, and the strategic reconfiguration of the North Atlantic. France is not simply following a trend here; it is progressively adapting its policy to a region that has become more important to its own interests.

The real question, therefore, is not whether France is genuinely interested in the Arctic. It is. The question is whether this interest is now structured enough to develop into an autonomous, coherent, and lasting regional policy, or whether it remains largely dependent on external developments: tensions with Russia, NATO's growing focus on the North, American attention to Greenland, or the increasing importance of critical resources. At present, France still appears to be somewhere between these two stages. Its Arctic engagement has become more visible and more strategic, but it remains partly reactive.

The real test will probably come when the Arctic is no longer at the center of international strategic attention. If France continues to invest in research, partnerships, infrastructure, and regional expertise regardless of the geopolitical cycle, its Arctic ambition will appear much more solid. Until then, Paris has yet to demonstrate that its interest in the region runs deep enough to outlast the cycle that produced it.

The EU Opens Its Doors to Reluctant Greenlanders

The Arctic Century — Tue, 08 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Greenland must have a basis for deciding who it wants to partner with, the EU says.

On Monday, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented EU investments worth 200 million euros in Greenland. The amount corresponds to 1.5 billion Danish kroner.

Brussels is now seriously reaching out to Greenland, which is also sought after by US President Donald Trump and by investment-hungry China.

During his visit to Nuuk on Monday, EU Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela spoke about possible EU membership for Greenland after the signing of a new joint declaration between the EU, Greenland, and Denmark.

"It is up to the Greenlandic people to decide. Our task is to give them a good basis for deciding who they should be partners with," Síkela told Ritzau.

The joint declaration, signed during von der Leyen's visit, focuses on expanding cooperation between the EU and Greenland in areas such as critical raw materials, digital infrastructure, energy, housing, and tourism.

In other words, it does not directly envisage an imminent EU membership for Greenland.

Out of the EC Since 1985

Greenland was a member of the then European Communities until February 1, 1985. It chose to withdraw in order to maintain full control over its own waters, and because the population did not want political control from Brussels.

Greenland can choose to join the EU, but this would require an official application and subsequent approval from all EU member states.

Despite repeated threats from Trump, Greenland's prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, has so far refused to take the final step into the EU.

During the autumn 2025 session, Inatsisartut member Justus Hansen submitted a proposal to prepare a statement of the advantages and disadvantages of rejoining the EU. It was meant to result in a report that could be used for further work.

Opinions were divided on whether membership would be a good idea, but most parties agreed on strengthening cooperation with the EU. The proposal was later withdrawn from the session.

Nielsen did not comment on possible EU membership during the EU visit on Sunday and Monday. But in October 2025 he said: "We are not facing EU membership. But we are clearly facing greater, perhaps stronger and closer, strategic cooperation with the EU."

A New Arctic Strategy in the Autumn

From the EU's perspective, however, Greenlanders must be convinced to at least align themselves more closely with the EU than with Trump or China.

This is all part of the EU's work to strengthen its presence in the Arctic, which will take concrete form in a new Arctic strategy in the autumn.

"The Arctic directly affects Europe in terms of climate, security, and economy. Our new strategy must reflect this," Síkela said. "The previous EU strategy for the Arctic was primarily about climate and the people of the Arctic. But power politics in the world show that we must focus more on security and economic development."

Source: Sermitsiaq (in Danish)

Finland Sets EU Unemployment Record Again

The Arctic Century — Mon, 07 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Finland still has the highest unemployment rate in the entire EU, according to Eurostat's latest statistics.

According to the latest Eurostat data, the July statistics, Finland's unemployment rate is 10.5 percent. The highest unemployment rate in Finland this year was in May, at 10.8 percent. According to Statistics Finland, the May figure was even higher: 12.7 percent—the highest in Statistics Finland's records going back to 2010.

The unemployment figures from Eurostat and Statistics Finland differ from each other because the statistics are based on slightly different calculation methods and statistical processing.

Spain is second in Eurostat's unemployment statistics (10.0) and Sweden is third (8.6). The Czech Republic had the lowest unemployment (3.3).

The unemployment rate describes the share of unemployed people in the labor force of the same age group. The figures published by Eurostat are seasonally adjusted, meaning that the effect of seasonal variation has been removed.

This Is How the Situation Has Developed

Spain had the highest unemployment rate in the EU for a long time, until Finland passed it in November last year.

However, Spain has managed to reduce unemployment year after year. According to Eurostat statistics, Spain's unemployment rate stood at 13.2 percent in June 2022.

In Eurostat's monthly data since February 2022, Finland has been in the top ten throughout, until it rose to second place more permanently in February last year.

Otherwise, the top five in unemployment statistics have also included Greece, Sweden and France.

The Economy Is Growing, So Why Is Unemployment Rising?

Experts have found many reasons for Finland's unemployment situation.

One explanation is that the employment situation does not improve at the same time as economic growth. There is usually a delay of several months, but now the delay may be longer than usual, wrote MTV's journalist Ossi Rajala a little over a week ago.

The long low economic cycle and the long series of "shocks" that preceded it, from the coronavirus pandemic to the crisis in Ukraine and economic uncertainty, may have raised the threshold for companies to hire employees, Juhana Brotherus, CEO of the Association for Finnish Work (Suomalainen työ), previously estimated.

The labor market reacts to economic upheavals with a delay, Petri Malinen, chief economist of the Finnish Entrepreneurs, reminded in June.

Employment is believed to start rising as long as economic growth continues in Finland. Prime Minister Petteri Orpo also believes so.

"There are all the conditions for thousands of jobs to be created during the autumn, as long as strong economic growth continues," the Prime Minister stated on Tuesday on Kymmenen uutiset shortly after the budget debate was completed.

Orpo also confirms the delay in the labor market mentioned by Malinen.

"It happens that first, when the economy starts to grow, it starts to show in employment with a delay of about half a year to a year," Orpo stated.

Labore's chief researcher Merja Kauhanen told Yle that she sees comforting signs in the figures published by Eurostat. According to her assessment, the growth of unemployment in Finland has stopped.

High unemployment has also been explained by the fact that a lot of new labor has entered the labor market, but there are no jobs available for them.

Source: MTV Uutiset (in Finnish)

Iceland Loses Fight Against Organized Crime

The Arctic Century — Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The police would be given more leeway to investigate organized crime groups under the justice minister's new draft bill. Among other things, it would be easier to search phones, seize property and initiate wiretapping when there is a risk of losing important data. Karl Steinar Valsson, chief superintendent and head of the analysis department at the National Commissioner of Police, says the current law does not fit the way crime groups operate today.

Around 20 organized crime groups are believed to be operating in Iceland, and their number has increased by half in a decade.

Karl says the police have been concerned about this development for some time. He considers the draft bill that the Ministry of Justice published in Samráðsgátt, the government's public consultation portal, on Wednesday, September 2, an important step.

"The fact is also that the development in this area is so incredibly fast that we have fallen behind a bit."

Karl says almost all major police cases related to organized crime extend in some way to other countries. Crime groups respect no borders, and therefore the Icelandic police need to be able to work in a similar way to police elsewhere in the Nordic countries.

"There is nothing in this bill that is not already in the Nordic countries, either all or almost all in a very similar way," says Karl.

The Law Covers Crime Groups Poorly

One of the main changes in the bill concerns what is considered an organized crime group.

Today, it must be shown, among other things, that the main goal of a group, or a large part of its activities, is to commit serious crimes in an organized manner and profit from them.

Karl says that description no longer fits reality. Modern crime groups are often more loosely organized. They do not necessarily have a clear leader, permanent members or a formal division of labor.

"The provision as it stands now reflects a bit of what once was but is no longer. That's why we've had a very hard time using that provision."

According to the bill, a collaboration of three or more people could be considered an organized crime group even if the group was not formally structured. The members would not always have to be the same and their roles would not have to be predetermined.

However, the group would have to have been operating for some time and aimed to commit serious crimes. Random collaboration between several people on a single crime should therefore not automatically fall under the definition.

Nor would it always have to be shown that the purpose was to make money. A common purpose could, for example, be to use violence.

Only twice has anyone in Iceland been convicted of participating in organized crime. Asked whether a narrow definition explained that, Karl agreed.

"Yes, that's the narrow interpretation."

Up to Eight Years in Prison

The maximum penalty for making an agreement on an offense related to the activities of an organized crime group would be increased from four years in prison to eight years.

Penalties for other offenses could also be increased by up to half if they are committed for an organized crime group.

The same would apply when an adult gets a child or young person under the age of 18 to commit an offense, for example in return for payment or other benefit.

The police would also be given more time to investigate the most serious cases before they go to trial. Currently, pre-trial detention may not generally last longer than 12 weeks. The bill would extend that period to six months.

This does not mean that people would automatically be remanded in custody for six months. A judge would still have to approve the detention and regularly decide whether there was reason to extend it.

Clearer Authority to Search Phones and Computers

The bill gives police clearer authority to search for data on phones, computers, tablets, smartwatches and other devices that have been seized during an investigation.

The search could also include data that is stored elsewhere but is already accessible through the device. This could include photos, messages or documents in cloud services, for example.

However, police would not be authorized to create new accounts, hack into other systems or monitor data that is created after the search begins.

A judge's permission would be required before the device could be searched. However, if there was a risk of data being lost while waiting for such permission, the search could begin immediately and the case could be referred to a judge afterwards.

A similar rule should apply to wiretapping, information about calls and other communications, hidden cameras and location devices. If there was a risk of important data being lost, an operation could be started before a judge's permission is obtained.

The case would then have to be referred to a judge within 48 hours. If the judge did not approve the operation, it would have to be stopped and the data that had been collected would have to be destroyed.

A permit for such operations could be valid for up to eight weeks instead of the current four weeks.

Assets Seized Even If No One Has Been Convicted

Another major change is that assets considered to be related to criminal activity could be seized even if no one has been convicted of the crime that obtained them.

This could apply, for example, to money, cars or other valuable assets when there is strong evidence that they were obtained through crime but cannot be linked to a specific crime.

The police would have to present information about the case to a judge. The person who owned the assets would be given the opportunity to explain where they came from before a decision was made.

The judge would have to conclude that it is more likely than not that the assets were linked to criminal activity.

Facial Recognition and Cameras

The bill would also create the basis for a common police camera system.

Rules should be set for the use of facial recognition, body cameras on police officers and cameras that automatically read license plates.

Facial recognition should only be used when it is urgently needed. A computer system should also not be able to make a decision that would significantly affect an individual.

Cooperation between the police, other public institutions and companies should also be established. These parties could share information with each other if it was considered necessary to prevent the activities of organized crime groups.

"Plenty to Deal With"

A report by the National Commissioner of Police's analysis department states that around 20 organized crime groups are active in Iceland. The number of groups has increased by half in 10 years and their activities are said to have become more extensive in the past five years.

"We would not be taking such extensive action if we were not concerned about the development of organized crime, and we are trying to do everything we can to prevent it," says Karl.

He referred in particular to the numerous actions taken by the police in the summer of 2026.

Investigations into organized crime can take a long time. Data often has to be requested from other countries and the police may have to sift through large amounts of information on phones and other devices.

"These are complex cases, these are time-consuming cases, these are manpower-intensive cases."

Karl says the police have achieved good results in their operations in recent months. The next step is to ensure that they can work in the same way as police in neighboring countries.

"That's what we've been pointing out, that we can't lag behind other countries that we cooperate with."

Over a Hundred Cases

If we look at large-scale drug import cases, human trafficking investigations and other cases that the authorities have linked to organized crime, the number since the beginning of last year is well over a hundred.

In 2025, nearly 140 large-scale import cases were registered. Among the largest are the import of 106 kilograms of cocaine via Straumsvík, 43 kilograms aboard the ferry Norröna and 14 liters of amphetamine base aboard the container ship Dettifoss.

Eleven people were arrested in Iceland in an international operation against a criminal group that imported cocaine and laundered the proceeds.

Police also found 36 potential victims of human trafficking in 2025, and five people were arrested this summer in operations against organized prostitution.

Source: Vísir (in Icelandic)

Norway Plans to Drill Oil and Gas in the Exclusion Zone

The North Observer — Thu, 03 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Drying rack for stockfish in the village of Svolvær in the Lofoten Islands. Source: iStock.com/JimmyLung

Norway is the world's sole leader in offshore oil and gas production in the North Atlantic: in the North, Norwegian, and Barents Seas, and in the Arctic as a whole.

Total petroleum production (oil and gas combined) in Norway reached 239.2 million standard cubic meters of oil equivalents (Sm³ o.e.) in 2025.

By the end of 2025, there were 97 fields in production across the Norwegian Continental Shelf: 69 in the North Sea, 25 in the Norwegian Sea, and 3 in the Barents Sea.

The Johan Sverdrup field in the North Sea remains the anchor of high production, with a capacity of roughly 755,000 barrels per day.

Russia's only Arctic oil field, Prirazlomnoye, reached the 30-million-ton cumulative production mark in the first quarter of 2025 since commercial operations began in 2013. This is a tiny fraction of Norwegian production in the northern seas.

Canada is also a bottleneck in North Atlantic oil production. Canada's offshore shelf oil production centers are primarily on the Atlantic coast off Newfoundland and Labrador, contributing about 4% (roughly 0.2 million barrels per day) of the country's total oil output.

For various reasons, not least environmental ones, the United States has not yet launched oil production on the hydrocarbon-rich shelf off the northern coast of Alaska.

As the largest offshore oil and gas producer, Norway is also the largest polluter of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the North Atlantic, where low water temperatures slow photodissociation, dissolution, and biodegradation.

The remaining oil floats on the surface, evaporates, forms stable emulsions, or settles to the bottom and pollutes shorelines. Even frequent small oil spills in Norway's coastal waters have a long-term impact on marine ecosystems.

The largest oil spill occurred at the Norwegian Statfjord A platform on December 12, 2007, when approximately 27,500 barrels (4,000–4,400 cubic meters) of crude oil leaked into the North Sea. There have been many other smaller oil spills, which are not included in Norwegian statistics and are a major concern only for local residents, especially fishermen.

In 2001, the Norwegian government banned oil and gas production in the northern Norwegian Sea near the Lofoten Islands—the richest fishing ground in this part of the country's Arctic waters.

Pressure from a schizophrenic European Union, with one half of its brain demanding a reduction in production and the use of fossil fuels to save the planet's climate, and the other hysterically demanding that Norway quickly increase oil and, especially, gas supplies to the ailing economy of the Western Cape of Greater Eurasia, has forced the Norwegians to make a difficult choice, described in the publication below.

According to a competent Norwegian organization, Norway's oil and gas production will decline by 60% by 2050 without the development of new offshore oil and gas fields, as happened previously in the UK's North Sea.

:::note[BACKGROUND]

Oil and Gas Production Is Splitting Norway

:::

The loud slamming of the EU boot on Norway's door, as the publication below suggests, is forcing Norwegian politicians to forget the promises made 25 years ago and dust off the politically binding ban on hydrocarbon extraction, which threatens fisheries, especially cod, which in dried form is considered a powerful aphrodisiac in Southern Europe.

Older men in Italy, where dried cod, used to make an aphrodisiac soup, is almost deified, may forget about natural remedies for enhancing potency after a possible oil spill off the Lofoten Islands.

In this case, raising the birth rate in this dying country, where the total fertility rate by the end of 2025 fell to a record low of 1.14 children per woman, can be forgotten, as specialized pharmaceuticals are much more expensive than Norwegian cod.

One might wonder: why can't the European Union purchase oil and gas at market prices on the global market, which will have ample oil after the Hormuz crisis ends, and LNG supply will significantly exceed global demand in a couple of years, thanks to large projects primarily in warmer climates.

Around 422 million metric tons of LNG were traded globally in 2025, marking an increase of roughly 21 million metric tons from the previous year. Some 300 billion cubic meters per year (roughly 220.5 million metric tons) of new LNG export capacity is projected to come online globally by 2030. (Approximately 121.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas were sold or marketed from the Norwegian continental shelf in 2025.)

What's the point of increasing oil production, the consumption of which is rapidly reducing the development of a green economy globally, and gas, which will be abundant in just a few years in the vulnerable waters of the North Atlantic? To preserve the resource-based nature of the Norwegian economy and prevent its development as an innovation-driven economy?

Norway ranks only 20th in a 2025 ranking of the innovation performance of national economies. Its limited scientific workforce is focused primarily on research in oil and gas extraction.

It lags behind all of its Scandinavian neighbors and Finland in this indicator, with the exception of tiny Iceland with its handful of scientists and researchers.

The country essentially lacks a development strategy for the post-hydrocarbon era, the contours of which are already becoming apparent. In this regard, Norway lags even behind the oil monarchies of the Middle East, which in itself is humiliating and testifies to the low qualifications of its ruling class.

Summary

The energy minister will not reject oil and gas exploration outside Lofoten. The AUF leader expects the Labor Party to stick to its own party program.

LO, NHO, and Offshore Norway will make western parts of Nordland VI available for oil and gas exploration.

The Labor Party's program says no to oil activity in the area. Energy Minister Terje Aasland will not reject the proposal, however.

This prompts AUF leader Gaute Børstad Skjervø to send a clear message to his own party.

"It is out of the question to touch Lofoten, Vesterålen, and Senja for oil and gas drilling. The Labor Party has advocated for this, and we expect them to stand by it."

Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF), or the Workers' Youth League, is the youth organization of the Labor Party in Norway.

AUF Should Be the Guarantor

KonKraft believes that Norwegian oil and gas production could fall by more than 60% by 2050 if new measures are not taken.

KonKraft is a collaboration arena for Offshore Norway, the Federation of Norwegian Industries (NI), the Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA), the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), together with two LO members—the United Federation of Trade Unions and the Norwegian Union of Industry and Energy Workers (Industry Energy).

LO, NHO, and Offshore Norway believe that more exploration can secure Norwegian jobs, maintain gas supplies to Europe, and extend the life of the Aasta Hansteen field.

Skjervø acknowledges that Europe needs Norwegian gas, but rejects that it should be sourced outside Lofoten and Vesterålen.

He describes the disagreement with LO as well-known.

"This is a known disagreement between AUF and LO, and we tolerate that fine in our movement. But AUF is the guarantor that Lofoten, Vesterålen, and Senja are not opened to oil and gas."

NHO Believes That the Area Has Already Been Opened

Regional Director Hans Christian Hansson of NHO Nordland believes that the critics are presenting the proposal incorrectly.

"What we are advocating is not to open the areas outside Lofoten, Vesterålen, and Senja. This concerns an already opened area in the western parts of Nordland VI."

Nordland VI was legally opened for petroleum activities in 1994. The Stoltenberg government stopped the activity in 2001 for reasons of fisheries, climate, and vulnerable natural values.

The area is thus legally opened, but has been kept closed through political decisions.

KonKraft is now proposing that western parts of Nordland VI be included in the APA scheme. This is the annual round in which the government allocates areas to oil companies where they can search for oil and gas.

Hansson emphasizes that no one is proposing to start drilling immediately.

"In the very first instance, it is about gaining knowledge. This is a field that is close to Aasta Hansteen, where we already have infrastructure. What is proposed in the report is to see if we can possibly find resources in Nordland VI as well."

According to Hansson, Norway has a responsibility to maintain gas supplies to Europe.

"Norway is the largest supplier of gas to Europe. We are a reliable supplier, and with that comes responsibility."

Fishermen Fear Spills

In Lofoten, the proposal is meeting resistance from fishermen.

"I thought the matter was dead. That the area should be left alone for that type of activity," says Per Roger Vikten, a fisherman and leader of Flakstad Fiskarlag.

He is particularly afraid of what a spill could do to the spawning areas and fish resources.

"It is primarily possible spills and what significance they could have for the future of fish resources. We have fry sweeping past and fish spawning."

Fisherman Emil Elvebakk from Vikten also does not want oil and gas activities in the area.

"They should wait as long as possible, but preferably not do it. These are precious areas for us fishermen that must not be tampered with too much."

Aasland Will Consider the Proposal

The proposal from KonKraft will be considered in the work on the government's new petroleum report.

Energy Minister Terje Aasland describes Nordland VI as a controversial area, but will not reject the input from the industry.

"We have a great responsibility to safeguard environmental values, but also to further develop our oil and gas industry," says Aasland.

The government does not process individual inputs on an ongoing basis, according to the energy minister. He also emphasizes that it wants to develop, not dismantle, the oil and gas industry.

Skjervø expects the Labor Party to follow its own program.

"Here I trust that the Labor Party follows the will of its members. It has been crystal clear: Oil and gas extraction will not be opened in Lofoten, Vesterålen, and Senja."

The AUF leader believes that the industry is trying to reopen a debate that has already been decided.

"AUF won that battle. I wish those who fight a rematch good luck, but they will not win it."

Source: NRK (in Norwegian)

Sweden Buys Military Ships for Open-Ocean Naval Operations

The North Observer — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

FMV has signed a contract with the French Naval Group for the delivery of four new frigates to the Swedish Navy. The contract, which is worth approximately SEK 47 billion, also includes training systems, spare parts and associated equipment.

The deliveries are planned to take place between 2030 and 2034.

The frigates are of the FDI type, Frégate de Défense et d'Intervention, a proven design already used by the French and Greek navies.

The ordering of four frigates, large warships, by Sweden from France the day before yesterday, in the presence of the French President and the Swedish Prime Minister, with the last in the series to be delivered eight years later, in 2034, is an extraordinary event and contains many implications that clearly require deciphering by The North Observer.

The relative unexpectedness of the event and the flamboyant military rhetoric of the aforementioned senior officials aboard the sister French frigate to the Swedish capital are immediately striking, which in itself cannot help but alarm the anti-war public in Europe and around the world. In Stockholm, the war-cocks crow fiercely.

But it seems anti-war citizens can now rest easy—after all, Sweden will receive its last frigate only in 2034, by which time Europe should have militarily defeated its eastern adversary in a war the European elite has scheduled for 2029–2030.

Seriously speaking, the massive military contract signed on August 31, on the eve of the start of the school year in many countries, including Russia and France, will undoubtedly make the world a more dangerous place and greatly reduce the chances of six-year-old first-graders in geographical Europe surviving to adulthood.

Like distant Japan, which plans to transform itself into the military monster of 1941 and is openly exploring the development of its own nuclear weapons, Sweden is also quickly digging up the hatchet buried in 1809 and implementing a massive arms program that its ailing economy and impoverished subjects of the Swedish crown are unlikely to sustain.

The Swedish prime minister's speech makes it clear that the acquisition of the most powerful naval weapon in Sweden's modern history is needed for operations not in the cramped and narrow Baltic Sea, but beyond. The cited French publication explicitly names the operating area of these warships: the North Atlantic and the High North/Arctic, where they will strengthen NATO's naval group.

We are all witnessing the comically tragic, but undoubtedly fateful, divorce of the United States from the rest of NATO. The fading global hegemon, whose money-printing machine is showing alarming signs of imminent collapse, is repeating in Europe its trick of the late 1960s in Indochina, Vietnamizing the war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which would now be waged not by ordinary American soldiers and "McNamara's idiots," but by the South Vietnamese.

In effect, the United States is preemptively Europeanizing the future war in Europe, which the European elites are eager to wage so as not to waste the precious lives of American soldiers, but instead to make good money on military supplies to Europe, as they did in the First and Second World Wars. Why invent something new when the old works so well?

Sweden is one of the most anti-Trump countries in the West and detests Trump's claims to Greenland, which leads us to consider the use of future Swedish deep-ocean frigates as part of a coalition Eurofleet to create a peacetime military counterweight to the US in the North Atlantic, in cooperation with Canada. In the event of a military conflict between these still-NATO allies, the Swedish frigates would be a significant factor in repelling US aggression in the North Atlantic.

This part of the world's oceans is effectively a major power zone of tension, not because of a mythical Russian or even more mythical Chinese threat, but because of a burgeoning intra-Western conflict rooted in both different value systems and a primitive struggle for resources.

For Russia, the North Atlantic has never been a safe and secure waterway and is currently a dangerous transit zone for goods, teeming with European pirates who shamelessly violate international maritime law.

Sweden and France are among the most brazen violators of international law, with their navies having detained the largest number of merchant ships belonging to the so-called "shadow fleet"—a term that does not exist in international maritime law.

From this perspective, the European pirate fleet will soon be augmented by large Swedish warships, creating additional tension in the waters of the North Atlantic and diminishing the chances for peaceful cooperation in this region.

Sweden Is Becoming Cramped in the Baltic Sea

Sweden's purchase of four French frigates has been signed and finalized, with President Emmanuel Macron in Stockholm.

With this, the Swedish navy will receive larger ships that reach further and can be used in more areas.

"There is no doubt that the Baltic Sea is our home waters (...), but with this we are also increasing our ability to also be present in other places that may be interesting for Sweden," says Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson to TT, on board a French frigate, of the ordered model, which is visiting central Stockholm.

At a ceremony on board, Kristersson and Macron spoke about an ability to establish maritime control—for example, to keep shipping lanes open for commercial traffic.

Much Larger

Two agreements were signed at the meeting. One constitutes a deepening of the countries' defense cooperation, but no new information was given about how Sweden will in future relate to—or be covered by—France's nuclear deterrence capability. The countries have been discussing this since last spring.

The second agreement—the purchase of four frigates—is worth 44 billion kronor.

The first ship is due to be completed in 2030 and the so-called Luleå class will be the largest combat ships in the Swedish navy—much larger than the Visby corvettes.

Some experts have questioned whether the frigates are best suited for Swedish defense and have pointed them out as clear targets.

"Need Both"

How have you reasoned about the development of drone warfare in the lead-up to the decision to buy these frigates?

"That you need both. You need small, fast-moving and unmanned vehicles both underwater and in the air. And you need large platforms that can carry very, very heavy weapons and that can defend themselves against very, very heavy weapons," Kristersson answers.

The Luleå-class ships will be equipped with long-range air defense systems. To defend themselves against closer threats, they will receive, among other things, the Saab Trackfire system.

Swedish Systems and Air Defense

The ships will receive advanced air defense capabilities with Aster 30 and CAMM-ER, among other things. They will also be equipped with several Swedish systems, including RBS15, Torpedo 47, Giraffe 1X, 57- and 40-millimeter guns and Trackfire.

Kristersson believes he has received sufficient information that the ships will be able to handle, for example, swarms of underwater drones.

"Yes, these are adapted to be able to defend themselves against a lot of different things. Then there are constant updates. We are learning at a speed that we have not done before, not least from Ukraine."

Not Only Warships

During a visit to Sweden on August 31, Emmanuel Macron, alongside Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, participated in the signing ceremony for the contract for the acquisition of four Defense and Intervention Frigates (FDI). This major investment, valued at €4.3 billion, will allow the Swedish Navy to triple its current air defense capabilities.

The contract was signed between the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) and Naval Group. On this occasion, Catherine Vautrin, Minister of the Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs, and her Swedish counterpart, Pål Jonson, also signed a framework agreement aimed at strengthening operational, capability, and industrial cooperation between the two nations.

This acquisition represents much more than a simple industrial transaction: the four ships of the future Luleå class are intended to triple Sweden's air defense capabilities and constitute a significant contribution to NATO's integrated air and missile defense. In a strategic environment marked by Russia's rearmament and the strengthening of the Alliance's northern flank, Sweden has opted for first-rate ships capable of providing advanced air defense from the sea.

As Ulf Kristersson emphasized, this is one of the country's most significant defense investments since the Gripen fighter jet in the 1980s. The first frigate is scheduled for delivery in 2030, with the remaining three to be delivered progressively by 2034.

A Frigate Designed for High-Intensity Warfare in the North Atlantic

On a compact 4,500-ton platform, the FDI concentrates capabilities in the three main domains of naval combat: air defense, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. Designed to operate in contested environments, it is capable of countering a wide spectrum of threats, including high-intensity naval combat.

Naval Group particularly emphasizes its ability to operate in the demanding environments of the High North, the Baltic Sea, and the North Atlantic.

In its Luleå configuration, it is intended to enable the Swedish Navy to sustainably strengthen its naval capabilities, contribute to the defense of its territory and maritime approaches, and increase its interoperability with allied navies.

A Naval Capability Serving European Interoperability

The Swedish choice expands to a third European navy a capability already shared between France and Greece. The first of the five French FDI frigates, the Amiral Ronarc'h, was delivered to the French Navy in October 2025, while four other vessels are scheduled to join the fleet by 2032. In Greece, the HS Kimon, the first of the four FDI frigates ordered by Athens, was delivered in December 2025, with two more to follow in 2026.

With the four derivative vessels destined for Sweden, the FDI family is thus set to equip three European navies. This convergence goes beyond the purely industrial dimension: sharing the same family of vessels and systems promotes interoperability and cooperation between allied navies.

Source:

FMV (in Swedish)
Ministère des Armées (in French)

Oil and Gas Production Is Splitting Norway

The Arctic Century — Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Source: iStock.com/Bet_Noire

Supply industries in Norway are cheering that the industry and politicians want more oil exploration by 2050.

The environmental movement calls it a classic "Emperor's New Clothes" mentality.

More Oil Exploration!

That is the big message at the ONS energy fair in Stavanger, where optimism reigns in the supply industry.

"We feel that a change is underway, so that the Norwegian shelf will be able to withstand the coming decline and raise production to keep this important industry alive for a long time to come," says Ole Christian Meldahl, head of the supplier giant SLB in Norway.

Fears of a steep decline in Norwegian oil and gas production toward 2030 have led the industry to join forces during this year's energy fair to explore more oil and gas on the shelf.

Environmental campaigners, for their part, believe that the industry is closing its eyes to reality, where the consequences of climate change are becoming increasingly clear.

Must Work Differently

The Norwegian Offshore Directorate's latest resource report shows a steep downward curve for Norwegian petroleum production if no new discoveries are made.

In response to this, the three major Norwegian oil companies—Equinor, Aker BP and Vår Energi—have announced closer cooperation to explore more and find new, large oil and gas discoveries.

At the same time, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) submitted proposals to the government to open up exploration in highly disputed sea areas.

The leaders of the supply industry are delighted with the signals from the industry and politicians.

"There are great opportunities, but we can only take those opportunities if we work differently and work together," says the SLB head.

Aker Solutions also has strong faith in future assignments when it comes to the development of existing oil fields.

Paal Eikeseth, group director at Aker Solutions, says that exciting times lie ahead.

"What is important to remember is that for many years we have had a traditional way of having large developments. When we look ahead, we see that there will probably be more marginal discoveries on the shelf. They need to be developed in a completely different way than before," he says.

"So, this is very exciting, but it requires the entire industry to change."

Development of existing fields means smaller installations built by the shipyards.

Operations director at the Worley Rosenberg shipyard, Nils Arne Hatleskog, still believes that oil and gas give the industry a long-term perspective and security that makes it easier to invest in new, sustainable areas such as offshore wind and carbon capture.

"For our part, we have our feet in both camps. We are working particularly on offshore wind and strongly want it to come into place. In addition, we are looking at other energy sources," says Hatleskog.

"We as a company must seize both. Oil and gas give us long-term perspective and security going forward, and it also makes it easier for us to invest in new areas," he continues.

EU Warning

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was clear when she stated in a video speech at the opening of the ONS that dependence on fossil energy makes Europe more vulnerable.

That does not scare the supply giants.

Meldahl at SLB does not believe that continued high pressure on oil and gas will be an obstacle to the transition.

"Europe will demand that gas regardless, even if they achieve their absolute best forecasts," he says.

Eikeseth at Aker Solutions believes that experiences with heavy industrial projects can easily be transferred to new energy fields.

"The expertise you are developing now to become even better at oil and gas, that expertise you can build on in other things," he says.

He highlights that the company recently entered into a collaboration with Rolls-Royce SMR to build modules for small modular nuclear reactors in Sweden.

"The Emperor's New Clothes" Mentality

Plans for more oil exploration and the desire from LO, NHO and Offshore Norway to open new exploration areas off the coast of Nordland, however, are meeting strong opposition from the environmental movement.

"It is a classic 'The Emperor's New Clothes' mentality when the oil industry and politicians argue that we must search for more oil and gas to prevent a significant drop in production," says Norwegian environmentalist Frederic Hauge in a press release.

He points out that a drop in fossil fuel production is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for solving the climate crisis, and that this decline cannot be treated as an unexpected problem.

Hauge warns of a rematch if the industry tries to enter vulnerable areas in the north.

"LoVeSe is the world's most productive area for marine life. When the oil industry now tries to open the door to Nordland VI again, they must expect resistance. We will continue that fight," warns Hauge.

Source: NRK (in Norwegian)

Iceland's EU Referendum Exposes the Limits of the EU's Arctic Ambitions

Lisa Bousba — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT

On August 29, 2026, Icelanders rejected the resumption of accession negotiations with the European Union. According to the final referendum results reported by Reuters, 52.8% voted against reopening negotiations and 47.2% supported doing so, with turnout reaching 82.5%. The result closes, at least for the duration of the current government, a political process that had returned to the center of Icelandic politics during 2026.

At first glance, the result appears primarily domestic. Fisheries, sovereignty, monetary policy, and Iceland's relationship with the European Economic Area dominated much of the campaign. The sharp territorial division visible in the final results reinforces this interpretation: central Reykjavík supported renewed negotiations, while rural and suburban constituencies rejected them.

Yet such an interpretation risks underestimating what was strategically at stake.

Iceland occupies an unusually important position in the North Atlantic. The country lies at the center of the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap, the maritime passages connecting the Arctic Ocean and Norwegian Sea with the North Atlantic. In June 2026, NATO's Military Committee described Iceland as operating "at the heart of the GIUK Gap" while highlighting its growing contribution to the Alliance's posture in the North Atlantic and Arctic.

This geography matters increasingly. Russia's military buildup in the High North, Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO, the protection of subsea infrastructure, and renewed geopolitical competition surrounding Greenland have connected Iceland more directly to a wider transformation of European Arctic security. NATO now explicitly describes the Arctic and High North as increasingly important to collective security, while the European Union has simultaneously expanded its own security and defense engagement with Reykjavík.

For the EU, Icelandic accession would therefore have represented more than another enlargement. It would have brought another Arctic state directly into the Union, extended the EU's institutional geography further into the North Atlantic, and incorporated a country already deeply integrated into European regulatory structures.

The rejection of accession talks is consequently a real setback for the EU's Arctic ambitions. But it is a peculiar one.

Iceland has rejected further political integration while remaining deeply embedded in the wider European economic, regulatory, and security architecture. The referendum therefore exposes one of the central contradictions of the EU's emerging Arctic role: European influence in the High North is expanding, but some of the states and territories most important to that influence remain outside the Union itself.

The result limits the possibility of formal EU expansion into the North Atlantic. At the same time, it reinforces the alternative model through which European power already operates there.

An Arctic State Rejects Institutional Integration

The referendum did not ask Icelanders whether the country should immediately join the European Union. As the Icelandic public broadcaster explained when the referendum was announced, the question concerned whether negotiations suspended more than a decade earlier should be resumed. Any eventual accession agreement would still have required a separate political process and another public decision.

This distinction matters. Icelanders rejected the process through which membership terms could have been negotiated, rather than a concrete accession treaty.

The political consequence is nevertheless clear. At the government's post-referendum press conference, Prime Minister Kristrún Frostadóttir confirmed that the result would be respected. She acknowledged that "close to half of the country wanted to continue these negotiations" but that the majority had decided otherwise.

The government will therefore not pursue accession negotiations during the remainder of its mandate. The referendum has settled the immediate question without settling the deeper debate over Iceland's place in Europe.

Fisheries remained central to the split between Reykjavík and the rest of the country. According to Reuters' post-referendum assessment, the fishing industry contributes about 15% of GDP and around 40% of export revenue. For opponents of accession, the possibility that Icelandic fisheries could ultimately become subject to the EU's Common Fisheries Policy raised a sovereignty issue of unusual economic significance.

The referendum therefore reflects something more complex than straightforward Euroskepticism.

For a majority of voters, the relevant question appears to have been whether the additional political influence provided by membership justified reopening issues of resource control that Iceland's present arrangements largely leave under national authority.

The answer was no.

Geography Has Changed Faster Than Icelandic Politics

That conclusion is particularly striking because Iceland's strategic environment in 2026 differs substantially from the one in which accession negotiations were suspended.

The European Union's own Arctic security assessment now describes a region transformed by Russian military activity, strategic competition, and a structural change in transatlantic relations. NATO similarly emphasizes that the Arctic has become a gateway to the North Atlantic and a region where Russian and Chinese activity increasingly affects Allied security.

Its demographic and military weight is limited, but its location is not. During the NATO Military Committee's June visit to Iceland, Icelandic Chief of Defense Jónas G. Allansson stressed the country's role in enabling Allied operations and situational awareness in the GIUK Gap.

NATO's Deputy Chair went further, describing Iceland as "the eyes and the ears of NATO in the North." This should, in principle, have strengthened the geopolitical argument for deeper European integration.

The Icelandic government increasingly connected the EU debate to a deteriorating international environment. The pre-referendum analysis published by Reuters linked the revival of the membership debate to the war in Ukraine, economic uncertainty, and tensions surrounding Greenland.

Security cooperation between Reykjavík and Brussels was already deepening independently of the accession process. In March 2026, Iceland and the EU signed a Security and Defense Partnership covering Arctic affairs, maritime security, cyber threats, economic security, and support for Ukraine.

At the signing ceremony, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas summarized the strategic logic:

"From Russian threats to the seabed infrastructure, to China's growing interest in the Arctic."

She added that addressing such challenges together provided greater leverage.

Yet the referendum demonstrated the limits of this argument. The Arctic has become considerably more geopolitical, but Icelandic voters did not conclude that this required EU membership.

That may ultimately be more consequential than the precise margin of the result.

A Setback for the EU's Arctic Strategic Turn

From Brussels' perspective, the result should not be understated.

An Icelandic accession would have strengthened the Union's Arctic position in ways disproportionate to the country's demographic or economic weight.

Iceland already participates in the Internal Market through the EEA, belongs to Schengen, and takes part in major European programs. The extent of this existing integration is substantial: Iceland has incorporated thousands of pieces of EU legislation despite lacking a vote in EU institutions.

With Iceland inside the Union, the EU would have gained a member state occupying a central position in the North Atlantic at precisely the moment when the GIUK Gap, Greenland, critical infrastructure, and Arctic maritime security are acquiring renewed strategic importance. This makes the referendum more than a routine failure of enlargement policy.

As Reuters reported after the result, the government had explicitly connected European integration with both economic stability and Arctic security. Yet a majority of voters remained unconvinced.

At a moment when the EU increasingly presents enlargement as a geopolitical instrument, it failed to persuade a wealthy, democratic, and strategically located European country—already extensively integrated into its economic order—that formal membership offered sufficient additional value.

Brussels Loses a Potential Arctic Member, Not an Arctic Partner

Yet interpreting the result as a corresponding decline in European influence would go too far.

The European Commission's official reaction reported after the referendum was deliberately restrained. A Commission spokesperson stated, "The Commission respects the choice of the Icelandic people." The same statement stressed that Iceland remains a close partner of the European Union.

European Council President António Costa adopted the same logic. According to the account of his exchange with Kristrún Frostadóttir, both leaders expressed their intention to continue strengthening EU–Iceland relations.

This may appear to be conventional diplomatic language after an unfavorable referendum. In Iceland's case, however, it describes an institutional reality.

The country remains inside the EEA and Schengen. It remains a founding NATO member. It is closely aligned with European foreign and security policy and, since March, is connected to the EU through a dedicated security and defense framework.

The EU has therefore lost the possibility, at least for the foreseeable future, of converting Iceland into a member state.

It has not lost Iceland as an Arctic partner.

The EEA Emerges Stronger

One of the most significant post-referendum conclusions concerned precisely the resilience of Iceland's existing European relationship.

In her assessment of the campaign after the vote, Kristrún Frostadóttir said that "people are very satisfied with the EEA agreement" and argued that the agreement should be defended more actively in Icelandic politics.

This substantially changes the interpretation of the no vote.

The electorate did not choose disengagement from European integration. It appears instead to have endorsed a particular level of integration.

The EEA allows Iceland extensive participation in the Internal Market while keeping fisheries and agriculture outside important parts of the EU's common policy structure. The Council of the EU described the EEA in June 2026 as the "bedrock" of relations with Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein and stressed that these countries are deeply integrated into European value chains.

This model has clear advantages for Iceland. It provides extensive access to European economic structures while preserving greater national control over politically sensitive sectors.

For the EU, the balance is more ambiguous.

The EEA allows Brussels to extend substantial parts of its regulatory order beyond the Union's borders. But it does not transform participating states into members, nor does it incorporate their territories and strategic assets into the Union's political geography.

The EU's Arctic Power Depends on Outsiders

Iceland is not an isolated case.

Norway provides the clearest parallel. It is a major Arctic coastal state, an important European energy supplier, a NATO ally, and one of the countries most deeply integrated into the Internal Market without being an EU member.

Greenland creates an even more complicated situation. Denmark belongs to the EU, but Greenland itself left the European Communities in 1985 and now maintains a separate relationship with Brussels. The institutional map of the European Arctic therefore differs substantially from its strategic map.

Some of the states and territories most important to European security, critical resources, and North Atlantic access remain outside the Union. This does not make the EU powerless.

The Union possesses instruments that other geopolitical actors do not. Market access, regulation, research funding, infrastructure investment, and security partnerships allow Brussels to create dense relationships without formal membership.

The EEA is perhaps the clearest example of this capacity. In June, the Council explicitly described non-EU Western European countries as some of the Union's closest partners in building a stronger and more resilient Europe.

Security cooperation is extending the same logic into more strategic areas. The EU–Iceland Security and Defense Partnership institutionalizes cooperation on Arctic matters and maritime security without requiring Icelandic membership.

A separate secure-connectivity agreement concluded with Iceland and Norway also gives both countries access to EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS² capabilities relevant to crisis management, navigation, and resilience in remote regions.

The referendum therefore demonstrates the strength of this model. It also demonstrates its limit.

The EU can integrate Iceland without incorporating it.

Influence without Political Control

This distinction becomes more consequential as Arctic policy shifts from environmental cooperation toward security, critical infrastructure, and strategic resources.

Economic integration is relatively compatible with institutional flexibility. Geopolitical competition is less so.

The EEA can harmonize substantial parts of economic regulation. It cannot give the EU political authority over Icelandic fisheries, Icelandic territory, or Icelandic security policy.

NATO can provide collective defense, but NATO and the European Union are not institutionally interchangeable. Schengen can facilitate mobility, but it does not provide Brussels with the political relationship it would possess with a member state.

The current arrangement therefore produces dependence in both directions.

Iceland incorporates significant amounts of European regulation without possessing the institutional voting rights of an EU member. Brussels, meanwhile, depends on Icelandic cooperation in an increasingly strategic region without being able to internalize Iceland's geography within the Union itself.

The limitations of the EEA have already appeared in less dramatic areas. An EEAS assessment of EU–Iceland relations in 2026 noted that the agreement does not cover all EU policies and highlighted trade disputes as evidence of the boundaries of even very deep economic integration.

Those institutional limits matter even more when cooperation moves into security. The EU's Arctic presence is substantial, but its political geography remains fragmented.

The Limits of Geopolitical Enlargement

The referendum also challenges a broader assumption underlying contemporary EU enlargement policy.

Since the crisis in Ukraine, enlargement has increasingly been framed as a geopolitical instrument. Membership is no longer presented only as a process of regulatory convergence and economic development, but also as a means of consolidating Europe's strategic space.

Iceland should have been one of the most favorable cases for this argument.

The country is already wealthy and institutionally compatible with the Union. Its strategic environment has become less predictable. Arctic competition has intensified. Greenland has become a source of transatlantic uncertainty. Russia remains a major military actor in the High North.

Yet these pressures did not produce a majority for restarting accession negotiations. One explanation is precisely that Iceland already possesses alternatives.

NATO provides the central security framework. The EEA provides Internal Market access. Schengen provides mobility. The March security partnership adds a mechanism for strategic cooperation, and Nordic and bilateral relationships add further layers.

The marginal strategic benefit of EU membership is consequently less obvious than it would be for a country located outside these overlapping structures.

The referendum therefore does not demonstrate that geopolitics is irrelevant to enlargement. It suggests something narrower but more significant: geopolitical insecurity produces demand for deeper institutional integration only when existing arrangements are perceived as insufficient.

A majority of Icelandic voters evidently did not reach that conclusion.

A Different Model of European Arctic Power

This does not make Iceland less important to the European Union. It may make the management of the existing relationship more important.

The EU's developing Arctic agenda increasingly touches areas in which Iceland possesses considerable strategic relevance: North Atlantic security, maritime infrastructure, fisheries, energy, research, climate governance, and relations with Greenland.

The March security partnership and the parallel connectivity agreement show the relationship already moving in this direction.

The referendum therefore forces Brussels to confront a practical question.

If enlargement cannot provide the principal mechanism for consolidating European influence in the High North, what can?

The emerging answer is a model of networked Arctic power.

The Union will increasingly have to rely on overlapping mechanisms: the EEA for economic and regulatory integration, NATO for hard security, Schengen for mobility, European research and infrastructure programs for technical integration, and bilateral or sectoral partnerships for strategic cooperation.

This approach has genuine strengths.

It allows the EU to exercise influence beyond its territory. It reduces the necessity of membership as a prerequisite for deep cooperation. And it accommodates states whose domestic politics remain resistant to full integration.

But it should not be confused with the political power created by membership.

Networked influence remains conditional. It depends on the continued willingness of non-member partners to cooperate.

An Arctic Strategy Built around Non-Members

The August 29 referendum is therefore simultaneously a setback and a confirmation of the EU's Arctic model.

It is a setback because Brussels has lost an opportunity to incorporate a strategically located Arctic state at precisely the moment when the North Atlantic is becoming more important to European security.

It is a confirmation because Iceland's rejection of accession negotiations has not produced strategic disengagement from Europe.

Quite the opposite.

The government intends to preserve the EEA relationship, maintain extensive European cooperation, and continue deepening security ties with both the EU and NATO. Kristrún Frostadóttir's emphasis on satisfaction with the EEA suggests that the existing model has emerged politically strengthened rather than weakened by the referendum.

The result therefore exposes a structural characteristic of the EU's Arctic position: some of the actors most important to European Arctic ambitions are likely to remain outside the European Union.

Norway already demonstrates this on the European Arctic coast. Greenland demonstrates it at the intersection of North American and European strategic interests.

Iceland now reinforces it in the central North Atlantic.

This does not make the European Union irrelevant in the Arctic. Its economic, regulatory, scientific, and increasingly security-related influence remains considerable. Its ability to construct dense institutional relationships with non-members is itself an important geopolitical asset.

But neither should the limitation be obscured.

A European Arctic strategy dependent on non-member partners produces influence without full political control, access without sovereignty, and strategic alignment without institutional integration.

The Icelandic referendum did not create this contradiction. It made it considerably harder to ignore.

Iceland's Referendum: Small Country, Major Consequences

The North Observer — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The North Observer joins in celebrating the victory of those opposed to the resumption of Iceland's EU accession negotiations, which were halted in 2013. In several of our publications, we have noted the negative consequences of the accession of a country with a population of 0.1% of the EU's total.

:::note[BACKGROUND]

An alliance between the flea and the euro-elephant could only benefit the elephant, which needed Iceland's vast marine biological resources and the financial resources of this wealthy country by global standards to finance poor and gluttonous Eastern Europe, not to mention the massive euro-catastrophe that would follow if Ukraine were admitted.

While the informational and emotional dust from the referendum results has yet to settle, I will focus on the obvious geo-economic and geopolitical consequences of the Icelandic referendum, which are emerging right now, regardless of the expectations of those who voted yes or no.

A country of fishermen has emerged as a wild card in the global deck, unexpectedly shifting the balance of economic, political, and military power in the highly competitive North Atlantic, where dominance is contested between former NATO allies—the United States, on one side, and the European Union and Canada, on the other.

Great Britain, it seems, hasn't yet fully considered its own position in this region, attempting to simultaneously play the American banjo and the German/French accordion while awaiting enlightenment.

One thing is certain: beneath their hats, including cowboy hats, caps, berets, Balmorals, Glengarry caps, and most likely kilts, politicians on both sides of the ocean were sweating profusely yesterday. This small country has created very big problems for them, problems that must be addressed immediately.

The European Union, in its fatal standoff with the United States, which will certainly not end with Trump's departure in 2029, will not gain a convenient foothold for action in the Arctic in the coming decades, halfway to and against the United States.

Similarly, Europe's passionate liberal anti-American romance with Canada is losing its key link in the North Atlantic, and France's dreams of creating a semblance of a transatlantic state with Francophone Quebec (few doubt that this province will become an independent state) could pave the way to an imaginary world of fantasy and illusion.

If the United States establishes some form of control over Greenland, which is highly likely in the foreseeable future, the European Union will be left without an Atlantic dimension in the geopolitical sense of the term. And, of course, without the Arctic, especially if Norway does not join the EU (who can say what that would gain for it?).

In this case, the European Union will transform from an Arctic to a sub-Arctic union, similar to the current status of China, Japan, or the Republic of Korea, and will be deprived of the opportunity to operate economically in the Arctic, the only currently undeveloped part of the Northern Hemisphere with significant potential for economic growth, including mining projects, bioresources, and logistical benefits.

Already resource-deficient Europe will further increase its shortage of all types of resources in this new situation, thereby continuing its sad path to the dustbin of world history as a highly developed part of the world and as a new museum of antiquities visited by representatives of more developed countries, if that is still possible in the context of growing crime driven by rampant migration.

As a consequence of the Icelandic referendum, one can predict a strengthening of the Canadian-European love affair on a shared liberal foundation, which could soon evolve from foreplay to a full-fledged relationship, for which Canada will have to restructure its economy and logistics from a southern to an eastern direction.

Canada's great pivot to the East, however, could be thwarted by the disintegration of this quasi-state into several parts, with Quebec facing east, and independently determining the mode of communication between the other Canadian provinces and Europe. Europe's Icelandic fiasco, its Atlantic weakening, could in itself intensify centrifugal processes in Canada, with its lack of a national idea and powerful regionalism.

Europe is right now, before our very eyes, losing its Atlantic Lebensraum. This, coupled with its ailing, technologically backward economy, expensive energy, rapidly aging population, high debts, and deadly inclination toward remilitarization, leaves it with only one option for survival: replacing its defective political elite with its anti-human value system with a new one.

Below, The North Observer has compiled a selection of European press responses to the Icelandic referendum, which essentially amounts to the great cry of a wolf whose prey (Icelandic herring?) it already felt in its stomach has slipped from its jaws. And the most perceptible sentiment in the media is the unrealized Arcticization of the European Union.

Iceland will not enter into accession talks with the European Union, which became clear after the counting of votes in all constituencies in the country was completed this morning. More than 118,000 votes went to the no side, or 52.8%, while the yes side received more than 105,000 votes, or 47.2%.

As the polls had predicted, the battle was very close. For a while, the yes side led. After the final results were announced in the Reykjavík constituencies, which were the first to report final results, there were many indications that the no vote would prevail. As mentioned earlier, that turned out to be the case.

The election result must be considered a shock to the government, as it concerns one of its main policy issues—especially the Liberal Reform Party (Viðreisn). One of the government parties, the People's Party, has not, however, gone to the grave with its opposition to joining the European Union.

Media's Reaction

Media across Europe have reacted to the result of the referendum. Some are talking about Iceland closing its doors to the EU, others about the victory of the Independence Party, and still others about the stunning defeat of the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Reform Party.

"A Huge Defeat" for Pro-European Parties

The results of the referendum were covered in European media on August 30. Overall, the media agree on the main points of contention in the election campaign, with the yes side talking about the public's wishes while the no side is raising sovereignty and fisheries issues. Some media say that Iceland has "closed the door" with this, and others call the result a disappointment or even a setback for the EU.

Much has been said in foreign media coverage in recent weeks that the decision to hold a referendum is directly related to US President Donald Trump's threats against Greenland. The results have therefore received some coverage in Danish media.

Danes Consider the Greenland Angle

The Danish public broadcaster, DR, says that the election campaign has divided the nation into factions and the election results have proven this. It is also pointed out that other EU countries have avoided getting involved in the debate in the run-up to the elections. The coverage claims that this is a "tremendous defeat" for both the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Reform Party.

Jyllands-Posten then reports that voter turnout was the highest since the parliamentary elections held in April 2009, following the economic collapse. The newspaper puts Trump's threats against Greenlanders in context and reminds its readers that Iceland is actually closer to Greenland than to mainland Denmark.

Norwegians Are Concerned about EFTA

The issue has also attracted coverage in the Norwegian media, but for different reasons. If the yes vote had won here in Iceland, it could have had an impact in Norway, where, in addition to the two countries mentioned above, Liechtenstein and Switzerland together make up the group of four EFTA countries. It was therefore foreseen that cooperation would take a hit if Iceland were to become the 28th EU member state.

The Norwegian public broadcaster, NRK, has been running a news alert on its website. It says the debate in Iceland has created deep divisions. It is noteworthy that the original headline of NRK's report on the election results spoke of the "EU drama" in Iceland, but this has since been changed.

The Norwegian daily Verdens Gang (VG) reports that the Norwegian no-movement is delighted with the result and has congratulated Icelanders on it. The leader of the yes-movement, on the other hand, said in a written response to the media outlet that the result in Iceland should have no significance in Norway. It is not right to raise a debate on the current issue, since the passing of King Harald V of Norway is now the focus of the entire nation. Harald died on Friday morning at the age of 89.

Credit the Independence Party with the Victory

The French newspaper Le Monde reports that it was 3:15 a.m. last night that the no vote took over and the situation has not changed since then. The newspaper credits the Independence Party and the influence of the fishing industry in Iceland with the victory and says that the outcome of the voting is the result of differences of opinion between the two Reykjavík constituencies and the other four. Earlier this week, the newspaper had made the country's demilitarization a topic of discussion and how Iceland relies on NATO when it comes to defense.

Talk of "Flexibility" Was Not Enough

The Spanish newspaper El País says that Iceland has closed the door to further integration with Europe. The main issues of the election campaign were the people's choice, sovereignty, and fishing. The newspaper speaks of dashed hopes for the Union, which had envisioned adding a state that both provided greater access to the Arctic and had a strong economic position.

The majority of Icelanders refuse to sit down at the negotiating table in Brussels, says El País. The newspaper then highlights the fact that despite the promises of Costas Kadis, the EU's fisheries commissioner, and Marta Kos, the enlargement commissioner, about "flexibility" in fisheries matters, the Icelandic public has chosen to retain sole control over the country's economic zone.

Uncertainty in International Affairs and the Door Closed

The British public broadcaster, BBC, says that the Icelandic government has called the election due to tensions in international affairs, including US President Donald Trump's threats against Greenland. The BBC says that economic issues have been at the forefront of the discussion, but there are concerns in Iceland about increased Russian activity.

The Swedish public broadcaster, SVT, also says that Iceland is closing the door to membership. In a report analyzing the situation, it talks about a setback for Brussels, as a stone has been laid in the way of the Union's expansion plans.

Iceland's EU Decision Is a Loss of Reputation for the EU

The result was a loss of reputation for Iceland's Prime Minister Kristrún Frostadóttir, who has supported EU membership. The Prime Minister, representing the Social Democratic Alliance, has stressed that the matter will be decided by the Icelandic people.

More than half of Icelanders think that an economically prosperous, stable democracy does not need the Union for anything. Iceland does not have the same need to become a member as, say, Ukraine.

Iceland is already a member of the European Economic Area and the Schengen area of free movement.

The no side feared that membership would mean Iceland would lose its right to determine its own fishing waters and catches. Farmers believed they would be left behind in the EU.

The result was a loss of reputation for the EU. The Nordic country's intention to join would have changed the narrative of the Union's enlargement: it would have also reached out to the West, not just the East.

The Union's foothold near the Arctic sea routes, halfway to the United States, also remained a dream.

Sources:

Vísir (in Icelandic)
Vísir (in Icelandic)
Viðskiptablaðið (in Icelandic)
Yle (in Finnish)

The Battle for Uranium on the Kalix River

The North Observer — Fri, 28 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Kalix River basin, in the Swedish Arctic, is known not only as a protected nature area but also as the site of a never-to-be-fought battle between the entire Swedish army and the "Red Hordes" from the East, who never showed up on the battlefield despite being eagerly awaited.

Until the early 1990s, Sweden buried a significant portion of its national treasure in the area adjacent to the river to the west, in the form of military fortifications. Most Swedes over 55 still recall their military service on the frigid Arctic soil with a shudder and nostalgia.

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Kalix Line—The Most Powerful Arctic Defence Line

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Today, the Kalix River, with the fortifications of that expensive defensive line preserved as open-air museums, is becoming the site of a real battle between sensible citizens who love their country and corrupt politicians who have given permission to an American company of dubious origin to first conduct exploration and then, possibly, begin mining uranium ore in the lower reaches of the river.

The 2012 disaster in neighboring Finland at a waste disposal site for nickel production, which yields uranium as a by-product, just 300 kilometers from the planned uranium mining site in Sweden, could have served as a warning to the country's authorities. But apparently it didn't. To do that, you'd need a memory slightly longer than a sparrow's nose.

In 2012, a massive wastewater leak at the Talvivaara mine in Sotkamo, northern Finland, became one of the country's worst modern environmental accidents. A gypsum pond at the nickel mine ruptured, and metal-laden wastewater escaped into the surrounding environment. The consequences of this monstrous crime against northern nature are still being felt.

The plan to reinvigorate the country's nuclear energy industry by building small modular reactors and small lead-cooled reactors also fails to explain the Swedish authorities' push to mine uranium ore on their own territory. Both types of reactor require a different kind of nuclear fuel and a different degree of enrichment.

Sweden plans to begin building new nuclear power plants in the late 2020s, with the first new reactors expected to be in place in the first half to mid-2030s. Vattenfall is planning small modular reactors at Ringhals. The company Blykalla has submitted applications to build smaller lead-cooled reactors in both Norrsundet (Gävle) and at Untra in the municipality of Tierp.

The first case requires a different type of nuclear fuel: small modular reactors most often run on uranium-235 enriched to 19.75%, known as high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). Conventional large nuclear power plants use fuel enriched to only 3–5%.

Small and medium-sized reactors with lead or lead-bismuth coolants typically use mixed nitride uranium-plutonium fuel (MNUP).

Regardless of the Swedish authorities' real intentions regarding domestic uranium mining, we wish the opponents of this project, which is dangerous for the Arctic and the Baltic Sea, success in their fight against it.

In any case, grassroots democracy in Sweden has already fallen victim to the decisions of a corrupt parliament and a shady American company, as is clear from the Swedish press reports cited below. In 2029, the value of organized resistance from local residents and environmental organizations should become clear. The forces are clearly not equal, and it looks like Sweden may fail the democracy test.

It's already safe to say that the cost of uranium ore production in Sweden will be much higher than that of the world's uranium mining giants: Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, and Australia, which together account for roughly 83% of global production. The uranium market is part of the global economy, and countries with nuclear energy can readily acquire uranium ore, subject to price competition.

Sweden has no chance of becoming a major uranium ore producer, and no one in this market is expecting a newcomer the size of a flea that, moreover, lacks its own uranium enrichment facilities. Furthermore, flea-derived uranium will be very expensive given the cost of exploration and development of deposits, should any be discovered.

This suggests that the Swedes' daring venture in the Arctic is purely political and possibly military-economic in nature, as the project will inevitably be unsustainable and stillborn from an economic perspective.

With Trump's US ceasing to be a reliable ally for Europe, including in terms of nuclear deterrence, the Swedish uranium project could be part of a vast and secret effort to militarily nuclearize Europe—something even the French nuclear umbrella, stretched to the breaking point, would be unable to cover.

In this case, the actions of the Swedish authorities become clear: secret agreements must be observed, and a military-oriented raw material base must be secured, from which raw materials are sent to other European countries for enrichment to weapons grade, followed by the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In that case, the cost of Swedish uranium is irrelevant. Nor is Swedish democracy at the level of individual municipalities.

Background

Bergsstaten, the Swedish Mining Inspectorate, has granted Adelheid Holdings LLC, a company with no publicly available official website, two exploration permits in Kalix municipality: Pålänge No. 3 (decision June 23, 2026) and Kamlunge Väst No. 1 (decision June 25, 2026). Together, the permits cover approximately 1,650 hectares and are valid until 2029. The company wants to investigate the presence of uranium, yttrium, copper, nickel, and cobalt, including by drilling.

The permits are possible at all because on November 5, 2025, the Riksdag lifted the ban on uranium mining that had been in effect since 2018, with the repeal taking effect on January 1, 2026. On June 15, 2026, the Riksdag also decided to abolish the municipal veto for uranium mining, effective July 15, 2026. An individual municipality can therefore no longer stop a uranium mine through its own veto.

The area lies in the catchment area of the Kalix River, which is a national river and partly classified as Natura 2000. The Sami Parliament, Kalix municipality, and several affected property owners have objected to the applications, citing, among other things, reindeer husbandry, drinking water, and natural values. Under the Minerals Act, such conflicting interests are only fully examined when a mining concession is sought—not when an early exploration permit is granted.

Swedish Import Dependency

Six nuclear reactors are in operation in Sweden, divided between three nuclear power plants: Forsmark, Oskarshamn, and Ringhals. Sweden also hosts a number of other nuclear facilities for the production of nuclear fuel and the storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

The Swedish nuclear power plants use approximately 1,500 metric tons of natural uranium annually, purchased from the world market.

The imported uranium originally comes from Canada, Australia, Namibia, and Kazakhstan. It must be enriched before it can be used as nuclear fuel, and enrichment services are purchased mainly from France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.

Research and development are underway on a future type of nuclear reactor, "generation 4," which could use fuel up to 100 times more efficiently. These could also potentially run on thorium.

Swedish Uranium Deposits

Swedish uranium deposits are found in alum shale and in the bedrock.

In Sweden, it is mainly certain granites and pegmatites that have elevated uranium content, though high levels can also be found in other types of rock. Uranium-rich alum shale occurs in Skåne, Västergötland, Östergötland, Öland, Närke, and along the Swedish mountain range. This alum shale has uranium contents of 50–400 grams per metric ton, compared with normal contents in uranium-rich granites of 15–40 grams per metric ton.

The dark alum shales are the youngest deposits and also those containing the largest total amounts of uranium in Sweden. They occur in greater quantities in the peripheral areas of the mountain range, Skåne, Billingen in Västergötland, Östergötland, Närke, and on Öland. The alum shales formed on the seabed during the Cambrian period, about 500 million years ago.

In addition to uranium, the alum shales also contain organic material and metals such as vanadium, molybdenum, and nickel. The uranium content varies between areas, but also between layers in the shale at each location. The most uranium-rich alum shales are those found in parts of Billingen, which are 3.5 meters thick and have a uranium content of around 300 grams per metric ton.

The oldest uranium deposits in the primordial rock are more than 1.9 billion years old. Many of them are located in the northern parts of Sweden. In these deposits the uranium content is higher than in the alum shales, often around 1,000 grams per metric ton, but their size is more limited.

Uranium in Water—Long-Term Impact

Uranium is chemically a heavy metal. At the concentrations that often occur in aquatic environments, its kidney-damaging chemical toxicity is a greater threat to aquatic organisms than its radioactivity. Research shows that uranium can accumulate in the kidneys, liver, and skeleton of fish, affect the growth of bottom-dwelling insect larvae, and change the species composition in watercourses. Sensitive species such as dragonflies and damselflies are displaced by more resistant midge larvae.

Once uranium has entered the aquatic environment, it does not disappear. Some is diluted downstream, but much is bound to particles and stored in bottom sediment. The sediment becomes a growing layer that can release uranium during high flows, dredging, or changes in pH. This means emissions can have effects long after the original activity has ceased.

The Kalix River Is Already Burdened by Uranium

Measurements from the Torne and Kalix River Water Conservation Association show that uranium levels in several of the Kalix River's tributaries already exceed the Swedish limit value of 0.17 µg/l, with existing ore and iron ore mining alone:

Luossajoki (LKAB Kiruna): 18.17 µg/l—approximately 107 times the limit value
Lina River, downstream of LKAB Malmberget: 2.47 µg/l—approximately 14 times the limit value
Leipojoki, downstream of Boliden Aitik's clarifier: 0.55 µg/l—approximately 3 times the limit value
Kalix River, directly downstream of Rakkurijoki: 0.18 µg/l—already in the main channel

The Water Conservation Association assesses that uranium levels do not reach good status in the watercourses located in the industrial areas of the mines, and that the pollution is linked to the mining, not to the natural background.

At Kamlunge and Kalix, the Kalix River today reaches good status for uranium. This is probably due to the distance from the mining operations and dilution over just over 30 kilometers, not because uranium is harmless. A new uranium operation in the middle of this lower, relatively healthy part of the river would lack that protection and risk shifting the pollution problem to the lower reaches of the national river.

Experiences from Uranium Mining in Other Countries

International examples show that uranium mining often involves recurring leakage and very long-term cleanup needs, even in countries with extensive environmental legislation.

Talvivaara/Terrafame, Sotkamo, Finland

A nickel and cobalt mine where uranium is extracted as a by-product, about 300 kilometers east of Kalix. In November 2012, a gypsum dam burst and around 1.2 million cubic meters of metal- and uranium-bearing process water leaked out, of which at least 240,000 cubic meters reached surrounding lakes and watercourses. The incident has been described as a serious environmental crime. Uranium levels of up to 600 µg/l were measured in a pond near the mine—six times the limit value for drinking water. The company later went bankrupt and the operations were taken over by the Finnish state.

Church Rock, US (1979)

A dam at a uranium mine burst, releasing approximately 94 million liters of radioactive and acidic process water and 1,100 tons of uranium sludge into the Puerco River. In terms of radioactivity, the release was larger than the Three Mile Island accident that same year. Groundwater in the area is still not under control more than four decades later.

Wreaking Havoc Freely

An American mining company has received an exploration permit to look for uranium and other rare earth metals near the Kalix River. This has aroused anger among residents, writes TV4 Nyheterna.

Many see it as a first step toward mining and do not think the local community is allowed to be sufficiently involved in the process.

"We feel that the new mineral legislation means everything has been let loose and it will be like a Klondike—everyone will come here and mine and wreak havoc freely," says local businessman Einar Knudsen.

Minister for Energy, Business and Industry Ebba Busch says she takes the concerns of the residents of Kalix very seriously and that no one will receive a mining permit without meeting high environmental requirements.

A Permit for a Shady American Company

Adelheid Holdings wants to prospect for uranium near Pålänge and Kamlunge in Kalix after the ban on uranium mining and the municipal veto were lifted in Sweden.

Environmentalists such as Sven Nordlund and Siw Ahlfort are leading the opposition and warning of risks to groundwater and the Kalix River already during test drilling.

Bergsstaten said yes to Adelheid Holdings LLC's application to begin exploration for uranium in Pålänge and Kamlunge in Kalix municipality. The decision means the company can search across a broad area; if it wants to proceed, a new application is needed for the specific area.

Susanne Andersson, municipal councilor, says the decision from Bergsstaten is worrying. She is disappointed given that Kalix municipality had described the situation, including the proximity to the national river, several national interest areas, and Natura 2000.

"It is regrettable that the Riksdag first lifted the ban on uranium mining and then abolished the municipal veto so that the municipalities cannot influence it in that way," she says.

Kalix municipality will invite representatives from Bergsstaten to a meeting on the matter this autumn.

The Process Should Be Stopped Right Now

The parties that agree to say no to uranium mining in the affected areas will also act nationally, including through a joint debate article on the issue.

"If the company is granted permission to proceed with the exploration plans, that is, if Bergsstaten says yes to their plans in the next step, only then can the municipality appeal the decision," says Susanne Andersson.

Sven Nordlund says the entire process should be stopped at the first stage.

"I know that landowners and others are mobilizing against continued investigations," he says.

For the Kamlunge area, the Kalix concession Sami village has also pointed out that the area is of national interest for the reindeer industry, and that affected Sami villages should have the right and the opportunity to influence decisions when land in the area is affected.

Many who own properties or are otherwise affected in their immediate area are against the exploration. They are worried that water quality could be negatively affected. There is also concern that tourism, fishing, hunting, and other outdoor activities could be damaged or disappear if the permit is granted.

For the Pålänge area, property owners affected by the application have pointed out that there are ancient remains in the area; another property owner opposes encroachment on his property, and another opposes the establishment of a mine along the Kalix River.

According to Bergsstaten's decision, different interests are not to be weighed against each other when considering whether to grant an exploration permit.

Green Party–Led Protest

Sven Nordlund, group leader for the Green Party in Kalix, and Siw Ahlfort, regional candidate for the Green Party in Norrbotten, are protesting against the company's plans.

They do not want to see further investigations, such as test drilling, because that alone poses a threat to the environment.

"We are trying to gather those who think like us; if we get massive resistance it will be difficult for the company to push through its plans," says Sven Nordlund.

"There are suspicions that our groundwater source has water veins that come from Kamlunge. If the Kalix River, our national river, is contaminated from the test drilling or uranium mining, we are talking about damage that will remain for thousands of years."

A microscopic suspicion that this could happen means the plans cannot become reality, Nordlund says.

Siw Ahlfort says a test drilling a couple of kilometers down into the bedrock involves risks, and that even very small concentrations of certain elements and various minerals are harmful in low doses.

"The big risk is when the substances reach the water and affect animals, nature, and people," she says.

Behind the changed legislation is the view that Sweden should mine its own uranium. Uranium is mined primarily for use as nuclear fuel in nuclear power plants for electricity production.

Ahlfort says new mines are the absolute last step, when other options are lacking. Nordlund says there are mines already operating in Canada with large amounts of uranium.

"It is about the government wanting to build nuclear power at all costs," says Sven Nordlund.

Would a mine in the Kalix area provide a lot of new jobs?

"We don't have a huge shortage of jobs here; we rather have a shortage of labor. That can also lead to concerns," says Sven Nordlund.

Sources:

SGU (in Swedish)
NSD (in Swedish)
NSD (in Swedish)
Miljöpartiet Norrbotten (in Swedish)
Omni (in Swedish)

Denmark Delays Construction of Arctic Patrol Ships

The Arctic Century — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Royal Danish Navy inspection ship Vædderen during a search and rescue exercise with the US Coast Guard on March 25, 2008. Together with the cutters Tigershark and Spencer and Coast Guard Air Station Cape Cod, the crews searched for "Oscar," a dummy used to train rescue personnel. Source: Wikimedia Commons, US Coast Guard, Public Domain

According to DR, it has been 573 days since the Danish government presented a plan to build new Arctic patrol ships for Greenland. A contract with a supplier has still not been signed, and according to Greenland's government leader, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, this is "not satisfactory."

:::note[BACKGROUND]

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A year and a half ago, the government presented a plan to build five new Arctic ships. Nielsen says in an interview with DR that he is not satisfied that the Danish side has yet to sign with a supplier.

"I think that when you have decided to build inspection ships because the current fleet is already old, you should speed it up. But that is a discussion I will have with the Danish government and not via the press," he tells DR.

The plan is for the five new ships to replace the current, worn-out inspection ships patrolling Greenland.

Waiting on the Technical Specifications

The Ministry of Defense announced in a press release in February that a state assembly factory will be built in Frederikshavn, which will assemble the five Arctic patrol ships.

The release stated that contract negotiations can only begin once the so-called technical specifications for the ships have been determined.

At the same time, the ministry stated that there must be a military-professional approach to what the ships should be able to do, and that an agreement must be reached on who will build them.

Pressure from Nuuk

Several politicians have previously criticized the fact that no agreement has been made with a supplier.

The fact that shipbuilding has not yet started also arouses dissatisfaction among politicians in the Greenlandic parliament. According to DR, the chairman of Inatsisartut's Foreign and Security Committee, Pipaluk Lynge, is calling on Denmark to pick up the pace and get shipbuilding started.

The new ships are to eventually replace Denmark's four Thetis-class inspection ships, which are worn out and almost 40 years old.

The plans to invest in new ships for patrolling off Greenland were presented as part of a new defense agreement on the Arctic in 2025. The agreement is meant to strengthen Denmark's presence in the Arctic and the North Atlantic, among other things.

Source: Sermitsiaq (in Danish)

France's 2026–2030 Polar Strategy: Between Strategic Projection and the Structural Limits of Arctic Power

Lisa Bousba — Wed, 26 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT

On July 2, 2026, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs published the updated French Polar Strategy for 2026–2030, entitled Balancing the Extremes by 2030 (Équilibrer les extrêmes à l'horizon 2030). Presented as a mid-term revision of the strategy first adopted in 2022, the document is structured around three objectives: ensuring regional stability while preserving French freedom of action, restoring France's position as a leading polar scientific power, and maintaining the environmental sustainability of polar regions.

At first glance, the strategy appears to consolidate the traditional foundations of French polar policy. France continues to define itself through scientific research, environmental protection, international law, and multilateral cooperation. The document also preserves the "bipolar" approach developed in 2022, addressing both the Arctic and Antarctic within a common framework and presenting France as a polar nation rather than simply an external actor interested in the High North.

Yet such an interpretation risks underestimating the broader transformation taking place within French Arctic policy.

The 2026 strategy incorporates a much more explicit language of strategic competition, military access, surveillance, economic security, and freedom of action. The Ukraine crisis, Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO, growing American attention to Greenland, and the increasingly strategic framing of China's Arctic activities have altered the environment in which French policy operates.

This raises a central question: does the 2026–2030 Polar Strategy mark France's emergence as a genuine Arctic power, or does it primarily represent an attempt to compensate for the structural limitations of a non-Arctic state through science, alliances, technical expertise, and European influence?

Both interpretations contain some validity. France is expanding its engagement through its Defense Strategy for the Arctic, scientific investments such as Tara Polar Station, and closer relations with Greenland. Yet it remains geographically external to the region, dependent on Arctic partners for access and infrastructure, and confronted with a persistent gap between strategic ambitions and available resources.

The significance of the strategy therefore lies less in proving that France has already become an Arctic power than in the particular model of influence it attempts to construct: one based not on sovereignty over territory, but on knowledge, partnerships, military interoperability, international law, and European integration.

From Polar Cooperation to Strategic Competition

The updated strategy must first be understood against the transformation of the Arctic since the publication of France's first Polar Strategy in 2022.

For much of the post-Cold War period, the Arctic was frequently interpreted through the concept of "Arctic exceptionalism." Despite broader tensions between Russia and Western states, cooperation continued in scientific research, environmental monitoring, and regional governance. The region was never free from military competition, but institutions such as the Arctic Council supported the perception that Arctic affairs could remain partially insulated from wider geopolitical confrontation.

The crisis in Ukraine fundamentally weakened this assumption. Cooperation with Moscow within several Arctic frameworks was suspended or reduced. Finland joined NATO in 2023 and Sweden in 2024, leaving Russia as the only Arctic Council member outside the Alliance. France's Defense Strategy for the Arctic explicitly interprets this transformation as a strategic shift, describing the region as increasingly shaped by competition over military positioning, resources, transportation routes, and access.

This has consequences for France even though it possesses no Arctic territory. The defense strategy recalls that France could be required to support an ally in the region through NATO's Article 5 or Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union. The security of Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, and the United States therefore gives the Arctic a French strategic dimension through alliance obligations rather than geography alone.

The new Polar Strategy does not abandon environmental protection or scientific cooperation. Instead, it superimposes security upon them. This creates a more ambitious but also more contradictory framework.

France wants to reinforce NATO's northern posture while preserving multilateral cooperation. It advocates keeping Arctic hydrocarbons underground while becoming more involved in strategic mineral networks. It presents science as an instrument of peace while simultaneously investing in the knowledge and surveillance capabilities required to operate in a contested environment.

The strategy is therefore not based on a choice between cooperation and competition. It is an attempt to navigate both simultaneously.

A Polar Nation without Arctic Territory

This approach is partly explained by France's unusual geographical position. According to the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs' overview of French Arctic policy, France has maintained a scientific presence in Svalbard since 1963 and today operates the Franco-German AWIPEV station in Ny-Ålesund alongside the Jean Corbel station. French scientists contribute to all six Arctic Council working groups, while France ranks eleventh internationally in terms of scientific publications concerning the Arctic.

This gives France genuine Arctic legitimacy, but not Arctic sovereignty. France possesses no territory, exclusive economic zone, or permanent population within the region. Unlike Norway, Russia, Canada, Denmark through Greenland, or the United States, it cannot build its policy around territorial jurisdiction and direct control of resources.

Its influence therefore necessarily operates through other mechanisms. Scientific infrastructure provides long-term presence. NATO creates military access. International law gives France a role in maritime and environmental governance. The European Union multiplies its economic and regulatory weight. Bilateral relationships with Arctic partners provide access to territories and institutions that France does not itself possess.

French Arctic power is therefore fundamentally relational rather than territorial. That dependency is a structural weakness—French access remains contingent on cooperation with others—but it is also the organizing principle of the strategy.

Rather than attempting to reproduce the territorial power of Arctic coastal states, France concentrates on areas where it possesses comparative advantages: science, diplomacy, military technology, regulation, and institutional networking.

The relevant question is therefore not whether France can become an Arctic state. It cannot. The question is whether it can make itself sufficiently useful and sufficiently present across different Arctic networks to become difficult to exclude from decisions concerning the region.

From Arctic Observer to Security Provider

The clearest evolution concerns defense. France adopted its first dedicated Defense Strategy for the Arctic in 2025. Its objectives include contributing to regional stability, protecting French and European freedom of action, and developing military capabilities to operate in the region.

"Towards, within and from the Arctic."

The wording is significant. The Arctic is no longer simply an area whose stability France supports diplomatically. It is becoming an operational environment within which French forces are expected to maintain competence.

The strategy consequently emphasizes operational knowledge, bilateral defense partnerships, NATO interoperability, equipment adapted to extreme conditions, intelligence, and satellite capabilities designed for high latitudes.

Russia constitutes an obvious factor. Its extensive Arctic coastline, northern military infrastructure, and strategic facilities on the Kola Peninsula make the European Arctic inseparable from wider questions concerning North Atlantic security and nuclear deterrence.

But the French approach remains selective. Paris does not envisage establishing a large permanent Arctic military presence. It does not propose a dedicated Arctic command or an icebreaker fleet comparable to those of regional powers. Instead, it relies on exercises, temporary deployments, allied infrastructure, and specialized capabilities.

This creates a distinction between presence and access. France does not need to reproduce Norwegian, Canadian, or Russian infrastructure if it can obtain reliable access through partners and provide valuable capabilities in return. Such an approach reduces costs and corresponds to France's wider military model.

Yet it also produces a paradox. The strategy repeatedly emphasizes French "freedom of action," while effective military action in the Arctic would remain highly dependent on allied infrastructure, logistical arrangements, and geographic access.

The defense strategy itself acknowledges that France's long-term position will depend on adequate "budgets, infrastructure and military means."

France is therefore unlikely to become a territorial military power in the Arctic. Its more realistic ambition is to become a high-value security contributor whose participation matters to the Arctic members of NATO.

Science as a Source of Power

If defense represents the most visible change, scientific research remains the most important foundation of French legitimacy.

The strategy's objective to "become again" a world leader in polar research is particularly revealing. The wording implicitly acknowledges that France's historical reputation has not always been matched by sufficient investment in its scientific capabilities.

The CNRS Polar Research Prospective 2025–2035, published in 2025, was specifically intended to translate French polar ambitions into scientific and budgetary priorities. It identifies fifteen interdisciplinary challenges and emphasizes the importance of long-term observations, research infrastructure, and international cooperation.

For France, however, science performs more than a purely scientific function. Knowledge creates access. Oceanographic observations, satellite data, geological mapping, and climate monitoring are particularly valuable in a region where physical access remains difficult and expensive. Research programs also create durable relations between institutions and governments. For a non-Arctic state, these networks can partially substitute for territorial presence.

This logic is particularly visible with Tara Polar Station. The drifting research platform left France in July 2026 for its first expedition into the central Arctic Ocean. Its program is expected to extend through the 2040s, while the French state contributed €13 million through France 2030 toward a total budget of approximately €21 million. The Ministry of Higher Education and Research explicitly connects the project to implementation of the new Polar Strategy.

Tara Polar Station during the CONTRASTS expedition. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Evgenii Salganik, CC BY 4.0

Tara illustrates the French model particularly clearly. France possesses no territory in the central Arctic Ocean, but a French scientific platform can nevertheless produce long-term presence there. By bringing together dozens of laboratories and international partners, it also creates a scientific network partly organized around French capabilities.

The project demonstrates how scientific leadership can generate visibility, institutional relationships, and ultimately political influence. Yet it simultaneously reveals the weakness of the model. A major foundation-supported project cannot replace a sufficiently funded national research infrastructure.

Ambition versus Resources

The financial position of the Institut polaire français Paul-Émile Victor (IPEV) therefore represents one of the most important tests of the strategy's credibility.

A Senate proposal for a polar programming law warned that insufficient human and financial investment could reduce France's capacity to influence polar affairs. It proposed approximately €449.4 million in additional spending through 2030, covering research programs, infrastructure, staffing, and maritime capabilities.

The same document highlighted a particularly significant weakness: France lacks a dedicated ice-capable oceanographic research vessel. This restricts access to marine research areas in both polar regions and leaves French researchers dependent on foreign or shared capabilities.

Budgetary tensions continued during the preparation of the 2026 Finance Bill. An amendment concerning the IPEV referred to a €4.3 million structural deficit in 2025 and rising costs in energy, freight, and infrastructure maintenance. Financial difficulties had already contributed to the cancellation of a ship rotation, with significant consequences for scientific deployments.

These problems concern French polar research as a whole rather than the Arctic alone. Nevertheless, they expose a central tension: science is presented as France's principal comparative advantage in the Arctic, while the logistical system that makes this science possible remains vulnerable.

The 2026 strategy recognizes the need for stable financing and improved infrastructure. Yet the government itself states that a subsequent operational roadmap will still have to define the necessary resources.

The strategy therefore identifies the capability gap but does not yet close it. France possesses the scientific expertise and diplomatic credibility; what remains uncertain is whether these assets will be supported by the long-term infrastructure needed to convert them into durable Arctic influence.

Greenland: A New Point of Entry

The growing importance of Greenland is another illustration of France's network-based approach. Historically, France's most established Arctic presence has been located in Svalbard. Greenland now appears increasingly important to French diplomacy, science, and economic strategy.

The territory combines several dimensions that are central to the 2026 strategy: climate research, critical minerals, North Atlantic security, and rapidly evolving relations between local autonomy and external powers.

The March 2026 cooperation agreement between the BRGM and Greenlandic mineral authorities illustrates this shift. It covers geological mapping, mineral-resource evaluation, three-dimensional modeling, and other subsurface technologies.

Formally, this is technical cooperation. Strategically, it allows French institutions to become involved in the production of knowledge that may influence future mining investment and Greenland's position within European critical-mineral supply chains.

For Greenland, improved geological knowledge may increase its capacity to negotiate with foreign investors. For France, the gains include technical access, institutional relationships, and participation in an increasingly important Arctic economic sector.

The French government has also explicitly identified closer scientific partnerships with Greenland as a priority of its renewed Arctic engagement.

These initiatives do not give France a privileged position in Greenland. American security interests remain much deeper, Denmark retains key responsibilities in defense and foreign affairs, and the European Union is itself expanding its economic and political engagement.

Their importance is instead cumulative. France is creating several points of entry into Greenlandic affairs: diplomacy, science, geology, and strategic cooperation. Where Svalbard offers historical continuity, Greenland offers opportunities for expansion.

Resources and the Environmental Contradiction

Greenland also reveals one of the central contradictions within French Arctic policy. France has adopted a clear position on Arctic hydrocarbons. In its June 2026 response to the Senate, the government stated that hydrocarbon resources still underground in the Arctic should remain there.

Critical minerals, however, are treated differently. Rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel, and graphite are increasingly connected to European technological, industrial, and defense autonomy. France's Defense Strategy for the Arctic explicitly links Arctic mineral resources to European security of supply.

The distinction is understandable. Hydrocarbons prolong fossil-fuel dependence, while critical minerals are required for batteries, renewable energy technologies, electronics, and defense systems.

Yet from an Arctic environmental perspective, the distinction is less simple. Mining infrastructure can affect ecosystems, water systems, permafrost, and local populations. Improved geological knowledge and stronger environmental assessments may reduce risks, but they cannot eliminate the structural tension between expanding resource extraction and preserving highly vulnerable ecosystems.

French policy responds through the concept of responsible extraction: better regulation, stronger scientific knowledge, and involvement of local populations. This may mitigate environmental costs, but it does not remove the trade-off.

The more critical minerals become connected to European strategic autonomy, the stronger the incentives to prioritize access and supply security may become.

The French strategy therefore contains a broader contradiction shared by much of European climate policy: reducing dependence on fossil fuels and external suppliers may require new extractive dependencies elsewhere.

The strategy does not resolve this contradiction. It seeks to manage it.

Maritime Routes: Preparing for Potential Rather than Reality

A similar distinction between current reality and future strategic potential appears in discussions of Arctic shipping. Sea-ice decline has increased interest in the Northern Sea Route along Russia's Arctic coast. The French defense strategy notes that the route could shorten journeys between Europe and Asia and is already important to Russian LNG exports.

Yet it also acknowledges that commercial traffic remains marginal and that major uncertainty persists regarding the feasibility of large-scale development.

This caution matters. Shorter geographical distances do not automatically produce commercially competitive routes. Arctic navigation continues to face high insurance costs, unpredictable ice conditions, limited infrastructure, extreme weather, and significant search-and-rescue constraints.

Current geopolitical conditions add another obstacle: European operators would remain dependent on Russian coastal regulation and infrastructure along much of the Northern Sea Route.

The route is therefore unlikely to replace Suez-based trade in the foreseeable future. But France does not need this to happen for Arctic maritime change to become strategically relevant: even limited increases in navigation can affect Russian exports, military mobility, pollution risks, and maritime regulation.

The strategy therefore appears to be preparing less for an imminent Arctic shipping revolution than for the possibility that gradual accessibility will increase the geopolitical importance of the region.

International Law and Europe as Multipliers of French Influence

France's position in the Arctic also relies heavily on multilateral governance. The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs identifies the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the central legal framework for activities in the Arctic Ocean. France also supports the IMO Polar Code, marine protected areas, the BBNJ Agreement, and stronger regulation of human activity in fragile polar environments.

This normative approach is particularly useful for a state without Arctic jurisdiction. France cannot regulate another state's exclusive economic zone. It can, however, participate in the production of international and European rules affecting shipping, biodiversity, and environmental protection.

Multilateralism therefore serves not only as a diplomatic principle but also as a source of power. An Arctic dominated exclusively by territorial sovereignty would structurally favor coastal states. An Arctic governed partly through international law, scientific institutions, and common standards creates more room for France.

The European Union serves a similar function. European research funding, environmental regulation, industrial policy, and economic weight allow France to amplify positions that would have more limited impact at the national level alone.

But this also creates dependence. Norway and Iceland are not EU members, while Greenland has a separate relationship with the Union. France therefore seeks strategic autonomy in an Arctic environment where both national and European influence remain heavily dependent on external partners.

This is not necessarily a weakness that can be eliminated. It is a structural characteristic of French Arctic policy.

Between Strategic Signaling and Material Transformation

The 2026–2030 Polar Strategy therefore possesses a dual nature.

It is first an instrument of strategic signaling. It tells Arctic allies that France intends to remain involved. It identifies the High North as relevant to European security. It presents France as a scientific and technical partner to Greenland and other regional actors. It also seeks to shape the direction of future European policy.

But it is not purely declaratory. France now possesses a dedicated Arctic defense strategy. French forces regularly train in northern environments. AWIPEV provides a permanent scientific foothold in Svalbard. Tara Polar Station is beginning a long-term Arctic program. Cooperation with Greenland is expanding, while the CNRS has established scientific priorities for the coming decade.

These initiatives are concrete, but their cumulative effect remains uncertain. A research platform can demonstrate technological ambition without resolving the wider financial fragility of the scientific system. Military exercises can increase interoperability without creating permanent operational capacity. Technical cooperation with Greenland can deepen relationships without guaranteeing future economic influence.

The strategy should therefore be interpreted neither as rhetoric nor as evidence that France has already become the Arctic power it seeks to be.

It is more accurately understood as a process of incremental strategic positioning. France is accumulating relationships, access points, scientific assets, and operational experience whose value may increase as the region itself becomes more strategically important.

What Kind of Arctic Power Can France Become?

The 2026–2030 Polar Strategy demonstrates that France's ambitions in the Arctic have expanded significantly. The region is no longer approached primarily through science and environmental diplomacy. Security, strategic resources, military access, surveillance, and European autonomy are now part of the same policy framework.

Yet the strategy also reveals the limits of conventional French power projection. France cannot reproduce Russia's Arctic infrastructure, the United States' military position in Greenland, Norway's maritime presence, or Canada's geographical depth.

Its strategy therefore relies on a different model, built on legitimacy, access, interoperability, and normative influence rather than on the control of territory. It is a weaker form of power, but not an insignificant one.

The central weakness remains resources. If France maintains scientific investment, strengthens the IPEV, improves its polar infrastructure, and converts bilateral cooperation into durable regional networks, the new strategy could meaningfully increase French influence.

If financial constraints persist, the document may instead illustrate a familiar discrepancy between strategic ambition and material capability.

What is new in 2026 is therefore not France's claim to be a polar nation, but its attempt to translate that identity into a broader form of strategic relevance.

France is unlikely to become an Arctic power in the same sense as the states that possess territory there. Its objective is different: to ensure that French institutions remain present across the scientific, military, legal, economic, and diplomatic networks through which Arctic transformation is governed.

Whether that presence becomes durable influence will ultimately depend less on the ambitions stated in the strategy than on the resources committed to implementing them.

Illegal Exploitation of Foreign Workers Flourishes in Finland

The Arctic Century — Wed, 26 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Labor-related exploitation has taken root in many industries in Finland, and it particularly affects immigrants employed in low-wage sectors.

"The most egregious cases concern foreign workers in particular. Especially those who have recently moved to Finland to work or who work in Finland temporarily and do not know their rights," said Rolle Alho, who holds a doctorate in political science, in a morning broadcast on MTV Uutiset.

According to Alho, many cases have come to light in the restaurant and cleaning industries and at shipyards, in the long subcontracting chains of shipbuilding.

"Mainly low-wage sectors where many foreigners work," Alho says.

The language barrier is central to the issue.

"If you do not understand Finnish or know English, it is very difficult to find out about your own rights here in Finland," Alho explains.

A Social Problem

According to Alho, this is a social problem in which not only the workers but also honest companies and the state lose out, the latter through forgone tax revenue.

Alho also highlights the gray economy.

"In some cases, this is related to crime and, in the worst cases, corruption, as has been seen in wild berry picking."

Are Cases Staying Hidden out of Fear?

There are no ready-made solutions to combat the phenomenon. A recent analysis by Teollisuuden palkansaajat (Industrial Wage Earners) proposes tightening legislation, for example by criminalizing underpayment.

Alho calls for significant consequences for those acting improperly. He notes that the phenomenon is also linked to the question of residence permits.

"If people come to Finland with a work-based residence permit, raise problems at the workplace and lose their job as a result, it is easy for them to also have to leave the country and lose their right to live in Finland."

"We should do everything we can to encourage victims to dare to bring this phenomenon to light. Because if this remains hidden, it will be very difficult to solve," Alho concludes.

Source: MTV Uutiset (in Finnish)

Gasoline Hits $26 per Gallon in a Northwest Alaska Village

The Arctic Century — Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT

It's not a typo. The price of a gallon of gasoline in the northwest Alaska village of Shungnak was $26.82 on Friday, local residents and regional officials said, likely giving the community the dubious honor of having the most expensive gasoline in the United States.

"It is very much real," said Glenda Douglas, who manages the store in Shungnak and posted a picture of the price on Facebook.

Across the United States, the average price of a gallon of regular unleaded gasoline was $4.10 on Thursday.

Flown in Twice This Summer

Shungnak is about 280 river miles east of Kotzebue, up the Kobuk River, or 150 miles as the airplane flies. Air travel is the only reliable, year-round form of transportation.

In summer, the river is usually navigable by boat. In winter, residents travel by snowmachine. Last fall and for parts of this summer, water levels on the Kobuk were low enough to interrupt barge traffic, which contributed to the high price of gasoline.

"We sell groceries, diesel and gas," Douglas said via Facebook message. "We had to get gas flown in twice this summer since [the] barge isn't able to make it this way because the river water levels [are] too low. Just yesterday, the price was 13.99, but now it is 26.82."

Prices Expected to Rise Again

Shareholders in NANA Regional Corp. are eligible for a discount—they can buy gas for $21.46 per gallon.

Albie Dallemolle is NANA's vice president of economic development and sustainability.

"Confirmed, Shungnak gasoline price is $26.82 per gallon, which had to be flown into the community," she said by text message. "This price does reflect the highest cost for gasoline in the region... for now. Unfortunately, prices for gasoline and diesel are expected to increase once communities receive their fall barge deliveries."

That's because the current price is based in part on an average of the air-delivered fuel and cheaper barge-delivered fuel. New barge-delivered fuel, bought after the Iran War began, is expected to be more expensive than fuel bought before the war.

Shungnak frequently endures some of the highest fuel prices in Alaska.

In 2007, regular unleaded was already $8.11 per gallon, so costly that the Wall Street Journal used the village as an example of what rural Alaska was experiencing that year. By 2022, the price was $14.03 per gallon, according to figures from the Northwest Arctic Borough.

A Hard Season for Hunters

In a message, Douglas said one thing that particularly concerns her is the fact that the hunting season has arrived in the region.

Many people in the region practice a subsistence lifestyle, hunting and fishing for food they use to survive.

"[That price] is really going to hurt our hunters that pay for gas to hunt."

Source: Alaska Beacon