How Finland and Sweden’s Accession Is Reshaping NATO’s Arctic Posture#

The accession of Finland and Sweden has predictably changed the strategic configuration of NATO’s northern flank. One expert pointed out that the Alliance’s strategic focus is gradually shifting north, with a growing attention to Arctic issues, a development that reflects the legitimate interests of the new member states present and active in the region. Several signs point in this direction: NATO has updated its regional planning and reinforced its operational posture in northern Europe, and the Secretary General has recently visited northern Norway.

Still, the overall picture remains complex. While both Finland and Sweden hold significant portions of territory above the Arctic Circle, their strategic priorities lie primarily in the Baltic, which continues to be the core of their operational concerns. At the same time, several non-Arctic NATO members—including the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands—are expanding their capabilities in the North and are increasingly involved in missions and exercises across the region.

This growing external interest in the Arctic—and NATO can clearly be included among the external actors—raises questions about the future of the region’s traditional frameworks for cooperation, which have already been significantly weakened in recent years. The shift from an Arctic managed primarily by its coastal states to a region increasingly integrated into the broader Euro-Atlantic security architecture is one of the most significant developments currently underway.

What the Loss of Cooperation With Russia Means for Arctic Research#

One of the most relevant points raised during the discussion concerned the current state of scientific cooperation between some NATO countries and Russia. Since 2022, most academic channels of collaboration have been suspended, including those under the Arctic Council. This interruption has far-reaching consequences, particularly in the Arctic, where environmental data collection and analysis depend on full geographical coverage. Without access to the Russian sector (which accounts for roughly half of the Arctic at the global level) it becomes virtually impossible to conduct serious research on issues such as permafrost thaw, ocean acidification or ice sheet retreat.

Arctic research expedition. Source: Flickr, Faculty of Engineering NTNU, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

This is not just a technical problem. The Arctic is an interconnected system, and no research can be considered reliable if it leaves out half the region. Until recently, scientific cooperation was considered one of the few areas that had to remain relatively insulated from political tensions; it was true during the Cold War and continued to be so in the years that followed.

Today, that channel is largely closed. Exchanges have been reduced to a minimum, visa regimes have tightened, and the issuing of official invitations has become increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, some signs suggest that a partial reopening might not be entirely out of reach. In some circles, there is growing talk of rebuilding minimal ties, starting with joint climate monitoring projects.

Beyond these institutional considerations, one fact remains clear: without Russian data, Arctic research loses coherence. What’s at stake is the very ability to design credible climate adaptation policies in one of the most vulnerable regions on the planet.

U.S. Presence vs U.S. Rhetoric#

Another key topic discussed was the role of the United States in the region, and in particular the possibility of a U.S. disengagement from NATO’s deterrence architecture in Europe. However, according to the analysis presented, this narrative remains largely rhetorical. On the operational level, the United States continues to take part in joint exercises, maintains a stable presence in the region, and invests in strengthening Arctic security infrastructure. The gap between political messaging and what is actually happening on the ground remains clear. So far, there are no concrete signs of a weakening U.S. posture in the North.

U.S. Marines with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, conduct a joint live-fire training exercise at Fort Greely, Alaska. Source: Flickr, U.S. Army Alaska, CC BY 2.0

What seems more relevant is the possibility of a return to bilateralism. In other words, beyond multilateral frameworks, the United States might explore selective forms of cooperation with Russia on specific issues: natural resources, infrastructure development, scientific exchange or the management of environmental risks. In certain areas, overlapping interests—such as maritime safety or permafrost stability—could justify the reopening of direct dialogue.

One of the central issues raised during the webinar was the risk of an overly militarised approach to the Arctic. In recent years, security discourse in the region has focused almost entirely on deterrence, military deployments and great power competition. But there is no guarantee that this perspective reflects the actual priorities of those who live in the North.

How Human Needs Are Being Pushed Out of the Arctic Agenda#

Several participants pointed out how little attention is now paid to environmental, social, and human concerns. The impacts of climate change in the Arctic have largely disappeared from political debate, despite the fact that they directly affect daily life in local communities, from access to energy and food security to mental health. In some areas, suicide rates are rising and access to basic goods remains unreliable.

This imbalance is evident in infrastructure development as well. When “development” is discussed, it is almost always in military terms (roads, ports, airfields) and rarely in connection with the needs of Arctic populations. In other words, the problem is not only that the region is becoming more militarised, but that this is happening without the involvement of local actors. Arctic communities, many of them Indigenous, remain largely excluded from decisions that directly affect them.

Hypothetical external threats are treated as top priorities, while the protection of internal social and ecological systems, in other words what makes the Arctic liveable by people, is left in the background. And when Greenlanders, for instance, are asked what poses the greatest threat to their future, the answer is not “Russia” or “China”; it’s climate change. Given this growing gap between strategic agendas and local needs, some observers argue that it is essential to bring human security and sustainable development back to the centre of the debate and to do so by listening to those who actually live in and know the region.

The Arctic continues to be viewed through “external” lenses that often fail to capture its complexity. It is a region where the boundaries between cooperation and competition, local needs and global agendas remain blurry, unstable. Strategic posturing alone is not enough. Sooner or later, a different kind of engagement will be required, one that starts from the region itself, rather than being imposed on it.

AUTHOR

Tommaso Bontempi
Journalist
Osservatorio Artico