The border territories of the European Arctic are a political hot topic in the rhetoric of the U.S., the European Union and Russia. The evolving confrontation between Russia and the West is particularly evident in the neighbouring regions of north-west Russia, Finland and Norway. Until recently, the phenomenon of Russian-Finnish ‘good neighbourliness’ and mutually beneficial cooperation did not result in any idiosyncrasies within either society. However, today Finland and the other Scandinavian countries are NATO members and have adopted a stance of tough political, economic and military confrontation with Russia, which they are unlikely to abandon in the foreseeable future.
We believe that critical analysis of the national strategic planning documents concerning Russia’s border Arctic territories will facilitate the balanced social and economic development of these regions, which have encountered trade and economic challenges by turning to the East and South. The discussion topic includes the regions bordering the White Sea, namely the Republic of Karelia, Arkhangelsk region and Murmansk region.
Shall we take responsibility for introducing the concept of the ‘White Sea Region’ into scientific discourse—a unique border macro-region in north-western Russia, which will include the three aforementioned regions bordering the White Sea. This is of increasing importance against the backdrop of the dynamically developing infrastructure of the western part of the Northern Sea Route and the growing ambitions of NATO countries to contain the development of the Russian Arctic.
‘Arctic’ or ‘sub-Arctic’: Playing with Concepts in Strategic Documents
The current border of the Russian Arctic zone can be considered conditional. Spatial development strategies that take into account a range of economic, social, environmental, political and military factors must be implemented at the level of the Northwestern Federal District and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, some of whose municipal territories are not included in the Arctic zone. Therefore, it is necessary to return to the concept of the sub-Arctic territory.
Arctic territories are usually associated with conventional climate zoning. However, environmental factors do not always clearly define the Arctic zone as a separate entity. Considerations of state governance must be taken into account in the context of new challenges and threats to the national security and territorial integrity of our country in Northern Europe and the Arctic.
The introduction of the concept of sub-Arctic territory in relation to the border regions of the Northwestern Federal District should be accompanied by their recognition as geostrategic territories.
Western countries have imposed around 29,000 economic and political sanctions and continue to prepare new restrictions. Some of these will have a long-term impact on the Russian economy. For the export-oriented economies of the border Arctic and sub-Arctic territories of the Northwestern Federal District, the European Union market was a priority until 2022. In addition, Finland was the largest transit partner. In turn, domestic enterprises purchased equipment for the timber industry, metallurgy and other sectors of the regional economies of these territories from highly developed European countries, including Finland.
According to Eurostat database, trade turnover between the EU and Russia in 2024 was reduced by 73 per cent compared to 2021, due to the initiative of the West.
At the same time, judging by the structure of trade turnover in 2024, the European Union continued to import nickel and nickel matte from Russia, albeit at half the volume of 2021, but still in fairly large quantities (according to Eurostat, worth around €1 billion). The main Russian exporter is the Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company, part of the Norilsk Nickel concern. Trade between Karelia and the Arkhangelsk Region and the countries of the European Union has practically ceased. This has undoubtedly affected the economies, especially industry, of the border Arctic and sub-Arctic territories in Northwest Russia.
Dynamics of the industrial production index for 2021—January-February 2025 in the Republic of Karelia, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions (as a percentage of the previous year)
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | January – March 2025 in % to January – March 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Republic of Karelia | 98,3 | 99,2 | 99,2 | 99,3 | 97,1 |
| Murmansk region | 105,7 | 95,9 | 97,5 | 97,3 | 92 |
| Arkhangelsk region | 100,9 | 95,5 | 98,8 | 107,2 | 94,5 |
| Russian Federation | 106,3 | 100,7 | 104,1 | 104,6 | 101,1 |
Table: Compiled by the author based on data from Rosstat
The data presented reflects the consequences of Western sanctions on industry in the border regions of the Arctic and sub-Arctic territories.
It should be noted that the main sectors of the manufacturing industry are heavily dependent on imports. As the practice of enterprises shows, attempts to replace Western partners with equipment suppliers from China, other countries of the East and South do not always solve the problems.
It appears that Russia will need to establish and develop its domestic machine-building industry, including for the timber industry. A way out of the current situation can be found in the development of a new strategy for the development of the timber industry complex for the period up to 2035, closely linked to the Spatial Development Strategy of the Russian Federation and federal districts, in particular the Northwestern Federal District.
Russia’s Response to NATO Expansion in the Arctic
Following Finland (April 2023) and Sweden (March 2024) joined NATO, the United States and its allies began military and technical development of these countries’ territories.
Under the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the United States and Finland dated 18 December 2023, the United States gained access to 18 military facilities in Finland, including five in northern Finland. In response to the West’s desire to contain Russia’s development in the high latitudes, a decision was made to deploy the Leningrad Military District, create an army corps in Karelia, and strengthen the Northern Fleet. This involves the relocation of tens of thousands of military personnel and their families to the border Arctic and sub-Arctic territories of the Northwestern Federal District, the modernisation of existing military, technical, border, energy, transport and social infrastructure, and the development of new infrastructure.
New external challenges and threats to Russia’s national security and territorial integrity, unprecedented since the end of the Great Patriotic War, largely determine the choice of spatial development priorities for the western part of the Russian Arctic and the adjacent sub-Arctic territories.
Finnish Army Joint Terminal Attack Controllers overlook a firing range while providing targeting information to a US Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon flying overhead on 19 July 2022 in Grafenwöhr, Germany during Exercise Dynamic Front 22. Source: Flickr, NATO, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
The Russian Federation is gradually overcoming its deficit in strategic spatial planning. At the very end of 2024, the Russian Government approved the Spatial Development Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030 with a forecast up to 2036.
This Strategy undoubtedly reflects the current domestic issues of spatial strategising more deeply than the similar document of 2019. The main spatial priority is defined as a system of key settlements that form the settlement, infrastructure and economic systems of the Russian Federation and ensure the development of the territories adjacent to them.
Nevertheless, there are a number of strategic issues that have yet to be resolved.
Firstly, strategic planning at the federal district level has been discontinued since 2020.
The task of balanced spatial development of 11 constituent entities of the Federation in the vast territory of the Northwestern Federal District, covering 1 million 687 thousand square kilometres, formally remains within the competence of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation and, in our opinion, is far from being resolved in the best possible way. In practice, the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as a rule, do not seek to coordinate their strategic planning efforts even with their neighbours, limiting themselves to coordination with the federal authorities.
Interregional competition in a federal state is permissible. However, competition for preferences and investments often leads to the irrational use of resources. Today, when the border territories of the North-West are faced with the need to reorient cargo flows towards the East and South, the underdevelopment of the latitudinal routes of the interregional transport framework of the North-West of Russia is particularly evident.
There is an urgent need to make appropriate changes to the foundations of the Russian Federation’s regional development policy until 2025, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 13 of 16 January 2017. We propose that the Russian government approach spatial strategic planning in the White Sea region as a single economic space for the balanced development of infrastructure, interrelated industrial sectors and regional services.
Secondly, let us consider some significant issues concerning the development of the transport and logistics infrastructure in the Belomorsk region.
With its rich natural resources and solid industrial potential, the White Sea region plays a vital transit role.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR), originating in the ports of the White and Barents Seas, will provide for growing volumes of latitudinal cargo transportation in coastal mode (between Russian ports on the Baltic, White, and Barents Seas and domestic ports along the NSR route), as well as international and transit transportation.
On May 16, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Russian government, in conjunction with the Rosatom State Corporation, to develop and approve a financial, economic, and organizational model for the formation of the Trans-Arctic transport corridor connecting St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Vladivostok.
The importance of this route, also known as the Northern Sea Route, for the White Sea region cannot be overstated. At the same time, the President has set the task of increasing the capacity of the Murmansk seaport at least threefold in the coming years, with the prospect of achieving even greater figures in the future.
The Issue of Synchronising the Development of Railway and Port Infrastructure
The predicted rapid growth in coastal, international, and transit traffic on the Northern Sea Route, in order to avoid bottlenecks on the railways may, in the near future, necessitate a partial redistribution of freight flows to the port of Belomorsk (with a cargo turnover of at least 10 million tons per year), other ports on the White Sea, and the White Sea–Baltic Canal.
The White Sea–Baltic Canal can be seen as a backup route. It cuts down the time it takes to move medium and small ships from the North to the Baltic by a lot, without having to go around Scandinavia.
Thus, it is in the European part of our country that there is a unique intersection where two transport routes connecting East with West and North with South intersect—the Trans-Siberian Railway and the international transport corridor ‘North—South’. To these can be added ‘Belkomur’, the 1,160 km Arkhangelsk–Syktyvkar–Solikamsk railway line, which provides through connections between the industrial areas of the Urals and the ports of the Russian North-West. Belkomur connects to the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is important for Russia given the shift in export and import flows towards China.
AUTHORValery Shlyamin
Doctor of Economic Sciences
Petrozavodsk State University