The British Navy's Failed Military Operation in the Arctic in 1941

To Threaten German Supply Lines in the Arctic#

Although Finland and Great Britain were not yet at war with each other in the summer of 1941, the British Air Force attacked Petsamo and Kirkenes on July 30, 1941. The aim was to weaken the German supply lines on the Arctic coast. The operation was motivated by Stalin’s hope that the British would also attack German targets in the north. Britain decided to launch an air strike on Petsamo and Kirkenes, even though the operation was risky.

Britain closed Finnish shipping from Petsamo on June 14, 1941. Relations between Finland and Britain were not immediately severed after Operation Barbarossa began on June 22, 1941. On the contrary, Britain increased the staff of its embassy, as it was now good to be able to investigate German activities.

From Finland’s point of view, the matter was embarrassing, and among other things, the British consulate in Petsamo was ordered to be evacuated from among the German troops that had invaded Lapland. On July 28, 1941, Finnish Foreign Minister Rolf Witting left a memorandum with the British ambassador, announcing that Finland was closing its embassy in London and proposing the closure of the British embassy in Helsinki.

Operation EF#

Churchill wanted to show Stalin that his support was concrete. As a result of this policy, British naval aircraft attacked Petsamo and Kirkenes two days later. At first, Finland thought that it was a quick response to Witting’s memorandum. Operation EF included 14 warships and an oil tanker, including aircraft carriers HMS Furious and HMS Victorious.

Force P#

On July 23 the carriers HMS Victorious and Furious, escorted by the cruisers HMS Devonshire and Suffolk and a destroyer screen, sailed as ‘Force P’ from Scapa Flow in Orkney for Seidesfjord in Iceland. After refueling, the flotilla headed for the Barents Sea on the 26th.

HMS Victorious in 1941

Embarked in Victorious, a new ship not fully worked up, were the 21 Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers of the Fleet Air Arm’s 827 and 828 Squadrons, commanded by Lt Cdr Stewart-Moore and Lt L A Cubitt, and a dozen Fairey Fulmar two-seat fighters of Lt Cdr Grenfell’s 809 Squadron. Victorious would attack Kirkenes.

The older and smaller Furious carried nine Albacores and nine Fairey Swordfish of 817 and 812 Squadrons, led by Lt Cdrs Sanderson and Waters respectively. Lt Cdr Wroughton’s nine Fulmars of 800 Squadron provided escort while four Hawker Sea Hurricanes of 880 Squadron ‘A’ Flight, under Lt Cdr ‘Butch’ Judd, making the type’s operational debut, would defend the fleet while Furious struck shipping in Petsamo.

Approaching Norway, the aircrews received a briefing, although notably the telegraphist/air gunners (TAGs) were not included. Pilots and observers in Victorious were told that 827’s Albacores were to strike targets in Langefjord while those from 828 were to hit any shipping found in the Holmengraafjord and around Renoy Island.

The Fulmars were to defend the biplanes, but take no part in hitting surface targets.

Aboard Furious, similar instructions were issued. Ominously, there was little accurate information about enemy defenses.

The air attack was launched on July 30. Its purpose was to destroy German supply lines on the Arctic coast. The naval detachment was then 150–200 kilometers northeast of Petsamo. It reached there under the cover of cloudy weather, but then the weather cleared. The planes from both carriers were scheduled to depart at 14:29. At 13:49 a German Heinkel He 111 aircraft was sighted, which the carrier’s Sea Hurricanes tried in vain to reach. Shortly afterwards, the German coastal ships cut off their radio communications. From this it was concluded that a surprise attack would no longer be successful.

Attack on Petsamo According to the British#

HMS Furious’ aircraft took off at 14:25–14:42. The ship was approximately at 70 degrees 42 minutes north latitude and 33 degrees east longitude. The planes flew about 20 kilometers west of Majakkaniemi, Kalastajasaarento. They flew low to the water to avoid radar and other detections. As they entered Petsamo Fjord, the planes gained more altitude. Squadron 812 took the lead, 817 followed, both at 2,000 feet. Squadron 800 followed higher. One Fulmar, with its engine smoking, had to make an emergency landing in the sea ten kilometers west of Heinäsaarte. The men were seen climbing onto a raft, but they could not be rescued. (After the attack, the ships considered sending a Walrus sea rescue plane, but it was considered too risky.)

The planes carrying bombs broke away from the formation at the mouth of Petsamo Bay. The torpedo planes continued in a line to Huutoniemi and turned south to attack from the east. They tried to take cover by flying close to the mountains and at low altitude. Squadron 812 was to continue to the Trifona anchorage, if there were targets there. Squadron 817 attacked Liinahamari. When Trifona proved empty, 812 also did the same.

An attempt was made to synchronize the attack of these torpedo squadrons with the bombers approaching from the west. The accompanying torpedoing drawing shows that 12 planes carried torpedoes and six planes carried bombs.

The Fulmar fighters patrolled quite far south of Liinahamari, between it and Petsamo airfield. They were instructed to fire machine guns at ground targets if no enemy air activity was encountered. A maximum of half of the ammunition was allowed for this.

The harbor of Liinahamari was coincidentally almost empty. There were no large targets to torpedo. There were only small coastal ships and German E-boats. All the Albacores and Swordfishes did their job. Torpedoes were dropped towards the piers and on one small ship for lack of a bigger one. The British listed two sure torpedo hits on pier no. 2 and two probable torpedo hits on other piers as the results.

Two small ships were thought to have been destroyed. The bombers were thought to have damaged the harbor’s oil installations, at least one tank was believed to have been destroyed. Fires and minor damage were caused here and there.

In addition to the Fulmar that went down in the sea, the British losses were one Albacore and one Fulmar. They were attacked by Messerschmitt Bf 109s at the beginning of the return trip. In addition, four planes were damaged by anti-aircraft fire. As they withdrew, the British fired on everything they saw (small craft, battle stations, cabins) along the fjord. The planes landed on the support ship between 16:15 and 16:58.

Finnish View#

Petsamo was already in German military control. There were only a few soldiers, airmen and civilians from the “Separate Unit Pennanen” and the 14th Infantry Regiment in Liinahamari. According to the port’s war diary, 15–20 aircraft carried out a low-level bombing raid on the Liinahamari port area at 3:25 p.m. The aircraft were identified as “mostly biplane reconnaissance and fighter aircraft”. According to the war diary, both ends of pier no. 2 were damaged and a Norwegian transport ship moored at one end sank (the Rodvaer had arrived with a cargo of rum).

Other damage was noted to the pier in Veneniemi, several oil port buildings and the ice warehouse in the fishing port, which had caught fire. Firefighting efforts had to be suspended because one unexploded torpedo was seen floating on the shore. The war diary sheds light on the causes of the British losses. They were German planes: “It was in action, but without success. The German fighters arrived 10–15 minutes too late”.

According to the war diary of the port of Liinahamari, there were four dead and one woman was badly wounded. According to some books about Petsamo, there were initially three dead (two German soldiers and one sailor) and four wounded. Of the wounded, one Lotta died later. An eyewitness, Lotta Pirkko Karinen-Salmelin, told Jaakko Alakulpi about this incident in 1996:

“The attack destroyed the Liinahamari docks and the oil port. A Norwegian ship sank. Lottakanttiini’s nurse, Ida Kasurinen, was wounded in the attack and ended her journey in a field hospital… The next day, the bodies of British pilots washed up on the beaches. It was terrible to see that the British were wreaking havoc in Finland.”

Attack on Kirkenes According to the British#

According to a report commissioned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet Tovey for the Admiralty, 20 Albacores left HMS Victorious at 14:00. All were carrying torpedoes. Half an hour later, 12 Fulmars took off after them. Nine of these caught up with and overtook the strike force, three remained to defend the ships.

The Fulmars crossed the coastline at an altitude of 4,000 feet northeast of Kirkenes and came under heavy anti-aircraft fire. They circled the area to attract the attention of the anti-aircraft fire. After about 10 minutes, at least three Bf 109s and six Bf 110s were seen coming towards Kirkenes from the direction of the airfield. This developed into an air battle, in which the British reported shooting down two certain Bf 110s and one Bf 109 and one probable Bf 110. Two Fulmars were lost, one was seen parachuting.

The Albacores approached Kirkenes, skimming the hills and fjords on the surface. The first wave attacked the ships in Båtsfjord. Five aircraft torpedoed the German gunnery training ship Bremse. It was believed to have received two hits. More detailed observations were prevented by fierce resistance from the German aircraft that arrived. During the withdrawal phase, the Albacores reported shooting down one certain Ju 87 with its front gun and one uncertain Bf 109 with its rear gun. Six Albacores were destroyed and the rear gunner of one support ship was killed. The second wave attacked two ships at the northern end of the fjord. Five planes were seen dropping their torpedoes, three were not detected. The Germans shot down five Albacores of the second wave. The British were surprised afterwards that there were also Stukas among the attackers.

At 19:00 the ships knew that there would be no more returnees. The British losses were two Fulmars in Kirkenes and no less than 11 Albacores. The total with the losses at Petsamo was therefore four Fulmars and 12 Albacores. The oldest and slowest Swordfishes all made it to the carrier. The entire air power of the strike group was lost in an instant. Only one plane from Squadron 827 made it to the carrier, and even then the rear gunner was dead. Eight Albacores landed on the carrier damaged.

There are several versions of the British casualties. So 16 planes were left on the way, of which four were two-seat Fulmars and 12 were three-seat Albacores. There were a total of 44 men on board. Some documents list 16 as dead and 25 as prisoners of war. The total of 44 is accurate, but as will be noted below, the Germans did not list that many prisoners and not nearly that number returned from captivity.

German Views#

According to the war diary of the German naval command, on July 30, 1941, aerial reconnaissance (the aforementioned He 111?) spotted ten enemy ships at 69 degrees 58 minutes north latitude and 34 degrees 45 minutes east longitude (about 150 km northeast of Petsamo), of which 1–2 were light cruisers and 1–2 aircraft carriers. Of these, Victorious was identified and the other was correctly assumed to be Furious. At 15:30, an air attack by 30–40 aircraft, mainly torpedo planes, came on Kirkenes and Petsamo.

The war diary mentions that the aircraft made numerous attempts to destroy the convoy leaving Kirkenes and the artillery training ship Bremse there. However, the torpedoes missed. Four German naval soldiers were killed in Kirkenes. The war diary also mentions simultaneous Russian high-altitude bombing. Petsamo is reported to have been attacked by 22 aircraft and that a pier and a Norwegian cargo steamer were destroyed there.

According to the war diary, German fighters shot down 25 aircraft, 2 by ship anti-aircraft fire and 2 by other anti-aircraft fire. 17 prisoners were taken, all from HMS Victorious. The German 5th Air Force and naval units later tried to track down the British convoy, but cloud cover and heavy rain obscured the target.

Despite the fact that the convoy was spotted before the support ships’ aircraft could set off, the attack may have come as a surprise also in Kirkenes. Karl-Friedrich Schlossstein, who participated in the battle, recalled much later (in 2000) that four Messerschmitt Bf 110s of JG 77 were escorting Junkers Ju 88s of KG 30 to Murmansk when the mission turned into a counter-attack in Kirkenes.

The report of the German Air Force High Command states that 9 Messerschmitt Bf 109s (unit 1./JG 77), 4 Bf 110s (Z./JG 77) and 9 Junkers Ju 87 Stukas (IV.(St)/LG1) were sent out specifically to counter-attack. The logical alternative would be that the Messerschmitts—or some of them—were escorting the Ju 87s when the alarm was raised. Some of the fighters flew to Liinahamari and were there about ten minutes later than in Kirkenes. The report of the high command lists 23 aerial victories and five British aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire. According to several sources, the German losses were:

• Junkers Ju 87B-1, s/n 5310, identification L1 + EF at a location 18 kilometers north of Kirkenes. The pilot Lt Karl Rommel and the rear gunner Ogfr Erich Czopik were missing.

• Messerschmitt Bf 110E-2 s/n 4394, identification LN + DR. After the Albacore’s rear gunner shot down the engines, Lt Schlossstein made a forced landing in the sea north of Kirkenes. He and rear gunner Gefr Heinz Gutsche could not reach the life raft and floated for two hours in 10-degree water wearing life jackets. Finally, the gunnery training ship Bremse noticed the flare fired by Schlossstein and picked up the men from the sea.

Of the German aerial victories, only the share of Bf 110 pilots is known. The war diaries of JG 77 have been lost and cannot be found in the Freiburg archives. 12 aerial victories have been recorded for the Bf 109 aircraft of the unit 14./JG 77, but identification is missing.

There is also an aerial victory for the day of the event by Fw Hugo Dahmer of 1./JG 77, but more detailed information is missing. It has not even been established whether the Bf 109s came from both Kirkenes and Petsamo. Z./JG 77, which flew Bf 110s and took off from Kirkenes, also scored aerial victories.

Reflections#

The losses of aircraft have been accounted for on both sides, and the air victories have been traditionally “air”. The Germans recorded almost 30 British aircraft shot down. The truth is half, or 15. The British reported four certain and two probable losses to the Germans. There were two certain, or again half. The ratio is probably typical in somewhat larger air battles in which anti-aircraft fire also takes part. Anti-aircraft fire did not shoot down any aircraft in Petsamo, because the anti-aircraft guns placed in the mountains were unable to fire sufficiently downward. In Kirkenes, the anti-aircraft fire probably shot down some aircraft.

The difference in the number of British prisoners of war, 25 versus 17, is probably explained by the fact that a significant number of the pilots died soon after the incident from gunfire injuries or from the cold sea. The number 17 probably reflects the number of survivors better. The FAA Archive lists all its prisoners of war on its website. There are 19 names of pilots from Squadrons 827 and 828, of whom 16 are reported to have returned from captivity in 1945.

The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the US Embassy on August 8, 1941, that 15 British naval pilots were held prisoner by the Germans, and it tried to find out their identities from the Finnish headquarters. The headquarters replied that it could not provide information because the pilots remained prisoners of war by the Germans on the Norwegian side of Kirkenes.

The diary of Malmi airport mentions that on August 2, a Junkers Ju 52 arrived from Kirkenes, taking 14 British naval pilots to Germany. Either that many were ready for transport at the time or could fit in one aircraft carrier. It is noteworthy that none of the downed Fulmar pilots survived.

The result of the bombing, i.e. the German losses on the beaches and on the ships, was meager. There were few fatalities. In addition to the damage to the Petsamo piers, only a small Norwegian steamer sank. The dead pilots raised on the Finnish patrol ship Turja mentioned by Leo Lahdenperä probably all participated in the Kirkenes attack. They were trying to head towards their support ships when they were shot down off the Petsamo Fjord.

As a result of the bombing, Finland had reason to break off its diplomatic relations with Britain, which were difficult for Germany. The measure was tried to be somehow mild, temporary and understood by both sides, but it did not lead to a result. Britain declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941.

Force P Withdrawal#

Having recovered, the surviving aircraft of Force P left the area with all speed to avoid a likely Luftwaffe attack, which in the event did not materialize. The following day, July 31, Dornier Do 18 ‘8L+DL’ of 3/KuFlGr 906 located the carriers, but was intercepted and shot down by a pair of Sea Hurricanes flown by Lt Cdr Judd and Sub Lt Dickie Haworth. This first ‘kill’ by Sea Hurricanes marked the end of Operation EF.

A diary entry for HMS Victorious dated August 8 mournfully recorded:

“The remains of the squadron flew off the ‘Vic’ bound for Hatston [Orkneys] for a rescrub—and by God we need it.”

More soberly, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John Tovey, wrote afterwards:

“The gallantry of the aircraft crews, who knew before leaving that their chance of surprise had gone, and that they were certain to face heavy odds, is beyond praise.”

He added, with more than a hint of irony at this politically motivated venture: “I trust that the encouragement to the morale of our Allies was proportionately great.”

Source:

• Sodanmuisti (in Finnish)
• Ilmailu Facebook group (in Finnish)
• Key.Aero