Searching For China’s Arctic Identity: Past And Present#

Historically, China’s identity in Arctic affairs has gone through three main stages: China’s non-opposition to its geographically determined positioning as a non-Arctic state (till roughly late 1990s), self-positioning as a “Near-Arctic state”, and, finally, the claiming itself as “an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs”. In the 1990s, China’s positioning of its identity was pretty much in line with how China was viewed by the world community—a non-Arctic state. At that time China was still at the initial stage of its economic rise and focused on pursuing its “reform and openness” policy. China lacked necessary financial and technological base for large-scale polar research, and as late as in 1999, she sent its first scientific research expedition to the Arctic. Although China participated in Arctic scientific research, its involvement in Arctic affairs was very limited. It did not fully realise the political, economic and strategic significance of the Arctic.

The constructing of China’s identity in the Arctic affairs began at a time when China was getting ready to apply for an observer status in the Arctic Council (Beijing first applied for observer status in 2007, but was only able to receive it in 2013) and was officially formalised in the 2018 White Paper “China’s Arctic Policy”. From the beginning of the 21st century until the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (held in November 2012), China’s identity in Arctic affairs was defined as a “Near-Arctic state”. Such an articulation was an attempt to break through the traditional identity of a non-Arctic state and to get closer in status to the Arctic countries.

However, defining its own identity as a “Near-Arctic state”, according to Chinese thinking afterwards, had some weaknesses and was not able to ensure full recognition of China’s Arctic identity by international audience. China’s “Near-Arctic” status was supported primarily by the characteristics of China’s geographical location, such as: China’s location in the Northern Hemisphere; the location in the northwestern part of the China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the source of the Irtysh River, which flows through Siberian rivers into the Arctic Ocean; the stop of the cold air flow from the Arctic Ocean on the northern slope of the China’s Taishan ridge. The construction of China’s Arctic identity based primarily on its geographical location seemed insufficient, it was necessary to link the identity with China’s national interests, its rights and responsibilities as a rising power.

Thus, since 2015, in addition to the “Near-Arctic state”, another identity of China has begun to form, which today can be considered the prevailing one—China began to call itself a “stakeholder in Arctic affairs”. In China they believe that the advantages of using the label of “stakeholder in Arctic affairs” in articulating China’s identity is that it signals China’s legitimate interests in the Arctic, which should be respected by other countries, and at the same time China’s willingness and ability to take on more responsibilities and make greater contributions to Arctic affairs for the benefit of all mankind.

As a matter of fact, China’s identity as a “stakeholder in Arctic affairs” is closely connected with such Chinese concepts as a “community with a shared future for mankind” and a “responsible great power”. Basically, China’s Arctic identity is a three-tier system, which includes the positioning itself as a “stakeholder in Arctic affairs”, identity of “responsible great power”, and the concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind”. This three-tier identity shows that China has the right to participate in Arctic governance, has the responsibility to support the Arctic governance system, and is driven by the belief in building an Arctic community with a shared future.

China’s Vision Toward ‘Community With A Shared Arctic Destiny’#

Due to ongoing international competition and geopolitical rivalry among great powers, as well as the limitations of the traditional Arctic governance with the Arctic Council at its core, international recognition of China’s Arctic identity is still very limited. In this regard, according to Beijing’s understanding, China’s construction of its Arctic identity should involve three levels:

• It should follow the path of “stakeholder in Arctic affairs”, highlighting China’s common interests and aspiration to establish more connections with other stakeholders, and strengthening the international recognition of China’s Arctic identity;
• It should emphasise the image of a “responsible great power”, take the initiative in assuming great power responsibility for Arctic governance, provide more public goods for the Arctic region, and enhance China’s authority in the Arctic governance;
• It should adhere to the diplomatic thinking of the concept of “a community with a shared future for mankind”, utilise the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in Arctic governance, so as to form the concept of a “community with a shared Arctic destiny” and build a new order of international cooperation in the Arctic centered on “stakeholders in Arctic affairs”.

Recently, Chinese experts became active in developing a concept of building a “community with a shared Arctic destiny”. They are trying to apply the broader concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind” to Arctic cooperation so to justify the need to introduce the principle of greater inclusiveness into the Arctic cooperation system and, accordingly, pave the way for China’s greater involvement in Arctic governance. They draw attention to the fact that the sustainable development of the Arctic region is inextricably linked with the common interests of the world community, and the Arctic region should not become the frontline of great power rivalry, but should become a region for the joint protection and joint development of all countries. Unlike the “individualism” of traditional Western thought, traditional Chinese philosophy, according to Chinese experts, emphasises unity and integrity and attempts to govern the world as a holistic political unit to achieve the common happiness of all people in the world.

The concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind” is based on traditional Chinese philosophy, which views the world as an organic whole that is interconnected and intertwined; it not only emphasises the interdependence of all members of the world community and the need for global governance, but also opposes unilateralism in global governance and emphasises the equality of countries. The concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind” embodies the dialectical unity of individual interests and group interests, and promotes the joint efforts of all countries to participate in the governance of “the key area related to the future survival and development of mankind” and promotes peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic.

The concept of “community with a shared Arctic destiny” is not the only one circulating widely in Chinese academic literature and directed to pave the way for China’s greater place in the Arctic governance. Another notable one is the concept of the “Global Arctic”. Chinese scholars argue that “global Arctic” refers to a set of countries of the world that have deep interests in the Arctic region in terms of politics, economics, the environment, culture, etc. Under the influence of climate change, international politics and the dynamics of economic cooperation, the indicators for defining the “global Arctic” will be dynamically adjusted, and its geographic scope will also change. For example, if a country’s domestic climate is abnormal due to changes in the Arctic environment, or if it deepens cooperation with Arctic countries due to changes in international relations and the geopolitical situation, it will gradually be included in the “global Arctic”.

Conversely, if a country’s geopolitical influence in the Arctic region declines, it will gradually exit the “global Arctic”. In this system, the countries of the “global Arctic” establish links through the development of natural resources, joint scientific research, infrastructure construction and other forms of cooperation, which in turn has a long-term and far-reaching impact on the Arctic region and the global environment.

Geopolitics Affects China’s Arctic Identity#

The current geopolitical situation in the Arctic region is seen in China as both facilitating and limiting the construction of China’s Arctic identity. On the one hand, the Arctic Council has turned into a field of confrontation between Western countries and Russia, and the existing Arctic governance system has been negatively affected. Within the Arctic Council, China and other non-Arctic observer countries are faced with a situation of ongoing division within the Arctic Council, and specific governance issues and the work of the working groups within the Arctic Council have been suspended to varying degrees. On the other hand, against the backdrop of the collective exclusion of Russia by other Arctic countries and the stagnation of the existing Arctic governance mechanism with the Arctic Council as the core, the possibility of Russia opening a new Arctic governance order is significantly increasing. Russia is expected by Chinese to become more open in its Arctic cooperation with non-Arctic states, including China.

Under current geopolitical situation China might pursue a number of policies and undertakings. At least they are widely advised in multiple Chinese scholarly articles as recommendations to Chinese government. China might focus on further enhancement of its image as a “responsible great power”, emphasising its capabilities, responsibilities and willingness to make proposals on Arctic governance, and seek greater recognition of its Arctic identity by other countries. By coordinating the positions of other non-Arctic states, China will try to form a cooperative community of interests on Arctic issues, thereby building a “community of a shared Arctic destiny” and creating the broadest “circle of friends”.

A model of the Chinese icebreaker vessel Xue Long displayed at the Hong Kong Science Museum, one of the key projects in Chinese Arctic research. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Mk2010, CC BY-SA 3.0

China will enhance its activities on international Arctic cooperation in various areas, such as the development of rules in the field of the environment and climate change, international maritime affairs and high seas fisheries management related to Arctic governance issues, working with other countries to promote the economic development of the Arctic region while simultaneously protecting the Arctic environment. China will intensify its scientific diplomacy and joint scientific research as it belongs to the low-policy area of Arctic cooperation. Chinese experts call for focusing on international cooperation in areas such as polar communication infrastructure, Arctic satellite navigation, cross-Arctic internet communications, construction of high ice-class vessels and icebreakers, dynamic monitoring of the Arctic climate, and continuing to increase investment in Arctic scientific research.

Given that the Arctic Council has not been fully restored after 2022 crisis, China is inclined to actively participate in other international institutions, governance mechanisms or professional conferences that run in parallel with the Arctic Council, such as, for instance, the International Arctic Forum hosted by Russia or the Arctic Circle Forum hosted by Iceland.

Finally, China will continue to build its Arctic identity by appealing to “stakeholder in Arctic affairs” notion and by searching for new theoretical frameworks that would secure for China and other non-Arctic states more place at the table of Arctic governance.

AUTHOR

Yana Leksyutina
Deputy Head
Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the RAS