The boycott of cooperation with Russia, initiated by Western countries because of the special military operation in Ukraine, is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the turn of Russia’s Arctic policy to the East looks reasonable. However, in the East, despite the general interest in the Arctic, not all countries are ready to cooperate with Russia. A number of different conditions have a deterrent effect, including political will, the level of funding for Arctic policy, scientific and technological competences, involvement in Arctic policy mechanisms, and the depth of military-political cooperation with the United States. Recently, much attention has been paid to the prospect of developing international scientific cooperation in the Arctic through BRICS, primarily with China and India. But cooperation is also possible with quite pro-Western states.
Several circumstances create this perspective:
- The futility of Western sanctions against Russia, which is becoming more and more obvious;
- It became clear that solving global problems related to the Arctic is impossible without the participation of Russia, which occupies almost half of the Arctic;
- The open hegemony of U.S. policy, which rigidly imposes its demands on any opponent (states, international organisations), including sanctions or forceful actions for disobedience;
- The growing contradictions within the West along the lines of “USA-Western Europe” and “USA-NATO”;
- The erosion of international law, which is further aggravated by the Western policy of introducing a “rules-based order,” i.e., international legal norms are being replaced by arbitrarily imposed directives addressed to non-Western States;
- There is an increase in state-centric trends in world politics, which means a decrease in the of international organisations effectiveness and the degradation of state alliances in favor of temporary pragmatic partnerships.
The downward trend in Western cohesion, which is being accelerated by the Trump administration, may well lead to situation when traditional allies of the United States may start to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic if it concerns the national interests. Such political behavior is demonstrated not only by the Arab states (Qatar, Saudi Arabia), but also by South Korea.
The Objectives And Pursuits Of South Korea In The Arctic Region
The Republic of Korea, like many other Asian countries, considers its involvement in the Arctic as an element of increasing its international status. But participation in Arctic policy also opens up access to resources and transport routes. Korea’s main interests in the Arctic are cargo transit, exploration and development of energy and other minerals, and marine bio-resources. The Transarctic Sea Route (from Murmansk to Vladivostok) is of particular importance for the Republic of Korea for the diversification of supplies of LNG and other goods. This is especially relevant due to instability in the Middle East, because up to 80 per cent of oil is imported to South Korea through the Gulf of Hormuz. Korea is actively involved in the development of scientific diplomacy for studying climate change, mapping the Arctic seabed, and deep-sea energy extraction technologies, including methane hydrates.
The high status of Korea as a stakeholder in Arctic policy is determined by the fact that about 2/3 of the entire global market of gas carriers were built at Korean shipyards in different years. Russian companies Novatek and Sovcomflot also placed orders for a series of 15 ice-class tankers for the Yamal-LNG project, taking into account the technologies and capacities of Korean shipyards. It is worth to remind that the world’s first ice-class LNG tanker was built at the Daewoo shipyard in Busan. In comparison with other non-Arctic states, South Korea has the most developed competencies not only in the design and production of ice-class vessels, but also equipment adapted to Arctic conditions.
Korea’s current Arctic strategy is aimed at multilateral economic cooperation, which meets Russia’s interests.
Since gaining permanent observer status in 2013, South Korea has viewed Russia as its main partner in the Arctic. Before the start of Russia’s special military operation, Korea has implemented three programs to engage in Arctic policy, including extensive cooperation with Russia. Unfortunately, cooperation was suspended. But the Russian leadership appreciates the non-confrontational nature of the Republic of Korea’s Arctic policy and takes into account that it has stopped cooperation with Russia under strong pressure from the United States.
The first ice-class tanker Christophe de Margerie, Sovcomflot’s vessel built at Daewoo shipyard in Busan. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Kremlin, CC BY-SA 4.0
Solving A Number Of Problems Is Essential To Continue Cooperation
However, there are problems of cooperation that do not depend on the relations between Russia and the West which require the attention of Russia and South Korea.
First, one should expect economic rivalry between China, Japan, and South Korea over the privileges of using the Trans-Arctic Sea Route, as well as in other areas of Arctic policy. Given the possible rivalry, it is more profitable for the Republic of Korea to start promoting its technologies and business proposals for use in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation right now, using the existing advantages in technologies focused on the Arctic. It should be taken in mind that in the future China is interested not only in actively using the Trans-Arctic Sea Route, but also in integrating it into the Eurasian transport corridors together with Russia. For example, there are projects to redirect some of the cargo along the future transport corridors White Sea-South Urals, Yakutia-Amur and further to China. If China’s activity is concerned, in 2024, Chinese companies made 14 cargo voyages along the Arctic route and transported 176 thousand tonnes of containerised cargo, which is two times more than in 2023.
Second, the problems between Russia and South Korea may arise due to Seoul’s close cooperation with Washington in the defense field. In the event of an escalation in relations between China and the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea are likely to participate in blocking China’s access to the high seas from the Yellow and East China Seas. Such a scenario would run counter to Russia’s economic and defense interests.
Third, deep cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Russia in the Arctic may be hampered by the interpretation of the legal status of the Northern Sea Route (it runs from the Kara Gate to the Bering Strait). The Northern Sea Route is the most important part of the Trans-Arctic Sea Route. Russia considers the Northern Sea Route as a historically established national transport artery. Many observer countries are objectively interested in raising their status in the Arctic, so they support the view that the Arctic is the global commons. Accordingly, the Northern Sea Route should receive international status in the future, i.e. all states should receive equal access rights. This point of view will not be supported by Canada and Russia. The United States has a special position as they didn’t signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and support the principle of freedom of navigation, but only in relation to themselves, their merchant and military fleets.
Fourth, sensitive issue for cooperation is the tariff policy for the services during the passage of ships, as it affects the final cost of transportation. According to surveys, half of Korean transportation experts would prefer the Trans-Arctic Sea Route if the cost of transportation is 120 per cent of the cost of the Suez Canal. And if the costs were 70 per cent, almost 96 per cent of respondents would prefer the Arctic route. However, the Russian side has not yet been able to develop a sufficiently transparent tariff policy mechanism, which makes it difficult for foreign partners to economically plan transportation.
View on Busan, one of the key transport hubs in South Korea
Many foreign partners believe that Russia is overcharging, and there is no easy solution due to economic considerations. Possibly, tariff reductions will be possible when the Russian side moves to long-term planning for the development of the Arctic with a planning horizon of 40-50 years. Among other things, tariffs are not so easy due to the lack of foreign investment, which has been blocked by the West led by the United States.
Investments are needed to develop infrastructure along the entire Trans-Arctic route. Additional risks for Russia arise from the fact that up to 70 per cent of the infrastructure in the Arctic seas is located in an area with a high probability of permafrost thawing. This leads to non-transparent and higher tariffs.
Fifth, the U.S. sanctions negatively affect the development of cooperation between all non-Arctic states and Russia. The situation with sanctions against Russia remains uncertain due to the unpredictability of the Trump administration’s policy and the open anti-Russian policies of many Western European countries.
Thus, Russia’s potential partners, including Korea, will have to choose between their national interests in the Arctic and allied relations with the United States, which are certainly important to them.
The Russian political leadership understands this and leaves the doors open for cooperation, including for the Republic of Korea. But the Korean side should take into account that the sanctions against Russia were imposed illegally, and South Korea, having joined them, still has the status of an unfriendly state.
Prospects For Russia-Korea Cooperation
Understanding the prospects of mutually beneficial cooperation helps to overcome existing difficulties. What are the prospects?
First, joint Russian-Korean development (or implementation of Korean technologies) for safe navigation in the Arctic.
There are two ways here—gradual modernisation, or the creation of “breakthrough technologies”, i.e. fundamentally new solutions. It is beneficial for Russia to continue localisation of Korean technologies at the Russian shipyard Zvezda.
It should be noted that China is rapidly increasing its shipbuilding capabilities, and Russia can transfer its orders to China or India. In turn, Korea benefits from cooperation with Russia in the creation of container ships using a nuclear propulsion system. Only Russia has these competencies and proven technologies.
Secondly, quite feasible at least a partial return to the plans for Korea’s practical cooperation, which are called Nine Bridges. The plans envisioned bilateral cooperation on a wide range of issues, but were postponed by the Korean side after to the start of a special military operation in Ukraine. Nevertheless, South Korea has a long-term vision of Arctic policy, reflected in the document Polar Vision 2050. The document implies not only the strengthening of international partnership, but also the participation of Korean business in Arctic projects. Among them, the most obvious is participation in the development of transport infrastructure along the entire Transarctic Sea Route.
Thirdly, scientific diplomacy in the Arctic, which means that the state creates conditions for the implementation of important scientific projects, and scientists help to make scientifically grounded political decisions. The main directions for technological cooperation are: gas liquefaction and transportation technologies, compact transportable nuclear installations, hydrogen energy, hybrid power plants, robotics, Arctic medicine, biotechnologies.
It is also important to recall that for Korea, scientific cooperation with Russia is possible even in the context of the military conflict in Ukraine.
This is evidenced by the 2017 Agreement on Enhanced Arctic Scientific Cooperation. This agreement provides for the assistance of states in organising international scientific projects.
What Inspires Optimism?
It seems that Russia and South Korea are entering a new phase of Arctic cooperation.
This is evidenced by the position of Lee Jae-myung, the recently elected president of South Korea (June 4, 2025), who believes that in the modern geopolitical environment, access to the Arctic not only promises economic benefits to the state, but is a strategic goal for further socio-economic development. This is also evidenced by the beginning of probing through Korean diplomacy about the resumption of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The government and parliament of Korea are discussing how to organise the management of Arctic policy at the state level.
Korean experts (Korean Institute of Polar Research, Korean Maritime Institute, the Northeast Asian Logistics Research Institute at Incheon University, and the Institute of Logistics in the Arctic at Yongsan University) point out that for various reasons, the importance and capacity of the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz are decreasing. At the same time, the Korean economy is critically dependent on shipping. In their assessment, the Northern Sea Route and, more broadly, the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor (Murmansk-Vladivostok) will become a safer and economically profitable route in the future.
Korea may become the main hub (ports of Busan, Pohang) for the entire Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the development of the Arctic objectively requires long-term investments and long-term planning with a horizon of 40-50 years. Here, the points of view of Russian and Korean experts and politicians coincide, which also inspires optimism about the prospects for cooperation. This is the only way to implement South Korea’s plans for cooperation with Russia in the construction of infrastructure along the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, in shipbuilding, in technology development and in scientific activities.
AUTHORValery Konyshev
Professor of International Relations
Russian Academy of National Economy & Public Administration