In the previous article, I analysed all the territorial claims on Greenland, including but not limited to Trump’s. There I reached the conclusion that, while it’s unlikely that Trump will take over the island during his current mandate, the claim is likely there to stay and it mirrors a U.S. retrenchment from the quest of global hegemony to the assertion of regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. But what are the reactions in Europe?
Washington’s refocusing on the American continent, which may outlive The Donald for a number of reasons, would inevitably imply a disengagement from Europe which has already started: after the possible cuts to the funds for the Baltic Security Initiative, the Pentagon has recently announced the withdrawal of an infantry brigade from Romania. Moreover, being the first new territorial dispute among Western or Western-aligned countries since the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, the U.S.’ claims on Greenland somehow break a taboo. This makes them not merely an American issue, but a “Collective Western” issue, and it’s not surprising that the main EU countries and political parties have usually taken a stance on it.
Reactions In Europe
The countries ruled by right-wing governments and the main political forces of the populist right, which are usually sympathetic to the current POTUS and often got the political backing of pro-Trump figures,1 have been either neutral or indifferent on these appetites (the only notable exception, for self-evident reasons, is the Danish People’s Party). Italy, for instance, has been mostly silent on this issue, with the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni ruling out a possible forceful takeover of Greenland—as well as of Canada and the Panama Canal—and stating that Trump’s declaration are just a forceful way to say that the U.S. “would not be indifferent to the perspective of other global players moving to regions strategically important for Washington”.
Likewise, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban maintained a low profile, contextualising these claims in the ongoing geopolitical changes, while the country’s Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto stated that they must be taken seriously, but at the same time he declined to take an official stance. At the same time, no notable reaction came from France’s National Rally or Germany’s AfD, two of the largest right-wing populist parties in Western Europe (and potential government parties in their respective countries), while Nigel Farage, the leader of the Reform Party (and, perhaps, Britain’s future Prime Minister), stated that there is “a 60 per cent probability” that Trump takes over Greenland, but he did neither endorse nor condemn these territorial ambitions.
On the other hand, the reactions of the leaders somehow related to the majority which elected the Von der Leyen II Commission have been much harsher. Ursula Von der Leyen herself has stated the following: “we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark” and “we strongly support their sovereignty and territorial integrity”. These statements have been closely mirrored by those of Kaja Kallas. The former German chancellor Olaf Scholz stated on 8th January that “the principle of the inviolability of borders applies to every country, regardless of whether it lies to the east of us or the west” and that national sovereignty is a “fundamental principle of international law and a key part of what we call Western values”, while his successor Friedrich Merz stated that “the principle of the inviolability of borders is enshrined in international law and is not up for negotiation”.
Trump’s claims have been also criticised by the Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and by the Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, while the UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy traced a somehow middle ground. As a member of a government whose political stance could hardly be more different than Trump’s, while still bound to Washington by the Special Relationship, Lammy is caught between a rock and a hard place. While not being a supporter of the White House’s Greenlandic appetites, especially given its potential repercussions on Canada, a Commonwealth Realm still closely aligned with London, he stated that Trump’s actions don’t necessarily match his words and that, at the end of the day, The Donald recognises that Greenland is “a kingdom of Denmark”.
Nearby France, on the other hand, has been a champion in supporting Denmark’s stance on Greenland. On 28th January 2025, the French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot stated that “if Denmark calls for help, France will be there”, with reference to the possible deployment of French troops on the Arctic island. And, on 15th June, Emmanuel Macron became the first foreign head of state to visit Greenland. During his visit to Nuuk, the French President did not mention again the possibility to send French troops, already ruled out on 30th January (just two days after Barrot’s statement), limiting himself to offer joint military training with Arctic countries within the NATO and the Nordic-Baltic Eight framework.
Still, Macron stated “France’s and the European Union’s solidarity” for “the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Greenland and added that trying to take someone else’s island “is not what allies do”.
”An Empire In Stand-by”
The French case deserves special attention in our analysis. Unlike most European countries, including Germany and perhaps even the United Kingdom, France can be considered an empire in stand-by. Its overseas territory, the last legacy of a much larger colonial empire, is pretty much as large as Northern Italy, while the former West African territories can be considered a sort of a French sphere of influence (nobody would say the same for Nigeria for Britain or Indonesia for the Netherlands), although the French grasp on the region has greatly decreased during the latest years. Moreover, the demise of Angela Merkel and the perspective of a U.S. withdrawal from Europe have opened a window of opportunity for Paris: the recovery of the old Napoleonic dream to acquire regional hegemony in Europe. Therefore, there is a trait-d’union between Macron’s activism in Ukraine, with the threat of sending French soldiers to Kiev and his request to take part to the peace talks with Russia, Ukraine and the United States, and the one in Greenland: in both cases, we are talking about land somehow included within the “European” space.
Will Macron be able to stand up for Greenland effectively? First of all, he has to turn France into a primus inter pares in the EU, and the capabilities to do so are disputable to say the least. France is certainly the only EU country with nuclear weapons, it has the ideological tools to provide the other EU countries with reasons to accept its leadership, and it lacks a credible alternative in the quest for EU leadership, since in nearby Germany Angela Merkel—de facto the EU leader for years—has been replaced by increasingly weaker and unassuming chancellors. But, at the same time, its military capabilities are limited compared to countries like the United States and Russia, the latest performances of the French Army in Africa have been rather disappointing, and Denmark itself has not officially requested the deployment of French troops in Greenland (the only thing which may deter Trump), perhaps in order not to further antagonise Washington.
Last but not the least, Macron is currently the least popular French President during the last 50 years, with an approval rating of just 11 per cent according to a poll published by Le Figaro last October; and, while military actions and diplomatic successes may create a “rally round the flag” effect, this is all but a given in these circumstances, and the French public is now overwhelmingly against new military adventures.
Conclusion
As a whole, the stances of European leaders on Greenland depend on a number of political and strategic considerations which often transcend Greenland itself. For Macron, Greenland—like Ukraine—is a sort of testing ground to assert European leadership; but, for most European leaders, the aim is to “keep Americans in”.
The gradual disengagement of the U.S. from Europe and the fresh territorial claim against another country of the “Collective West”, after all, frighten the current European ruling classes way more than the dispute itself (the claim on the Panama Canal, for instance, was barely noticed by the European leaders), and the idea of taking some land from Denmark is clearly representative of the idea that Trump sees the U.S. as a country with its own national interests (and aspiring for regional hegemony), rather than the leader of the “Collective West”.
The mild reaction of the likes of Giorgia Meloni and Viktor Orbán is motivated mostly by ideological affinities and, in part, strategic considerations (counterbalancing Paris and Berlin with Washington), especially in the Italian case, while Whitehall’s middle-ground position can be explained at best with a quote attributed to Churchill, according to which “Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing, once all other possibilities have been exhausted”.
Footnotes
Independent Expert