The USA And Greenland#

The root of the U.S. interest in Greenland is the Monroe Doctrine, which viewed every entanglement by European (and, by extension, non-American) countries on the American continent outside of their current domains as a hostile act against the United States. Adopted in 1823, just after the independence of Brazil and of almost all Spanish American colonies, the Monroe Doctrine was originally aimed at preventing a new colonisation of Latin America; but, with time, it became a tool to assert a dominant position in the New World and to justify foreign meddling, military actions and even land grabbing.

A 1791 map of Greenland

The 1867 Alaska Purchase triggered an interest in Greenland, since the joint possession of Alaska and Greenland would have allowed the U.S. to control both accesses to the Northwest Passage, and as put by William H. Seward, the author of the Alaska Purchase, the U.S. “will flank British America (Canada) for thousands of miles… and greatly increase her inducements, peacefully and cheerfully, to become a part of the American Union” with Alaska to the west and Greenland to the east.

There were then some negotiations between Denmark and the U.S., and in 1868 Washington and Copenhagen were close to an agreement to sell Greenland for $5.5 million in gold. If the deal had been finalised, this would have been the largest land purchase ever made by the U.S., including the already massive Louisiana Purchase; but, in the end, no deal was made. The timing was unfavourable: the Civil War had just ended, the overall political climate was still very tense, and the Johnson Administration of which Seward was the Secretary of State was very unpopular. Therefore, the negotiations were cancelled. Only the First World War returned a possible Greenland Purchase to the forefront.

Just before the Great War, the U.S. tried to persuade the Danes to accept a complex deal which involved Denmark swapping Greenland and the Danish West Indies (now the U.S. Virgin Islands) with some islands in the Philippines, which in turn could have been swapped with Germany (which then controlled nearby Micronesia and Papua New Guinea) for Northern Schleswig. But after 1914, when Germany was starting to be seen as an enemy, the U.S. proposed Denmark just to sell Greenland and the Danish West Indies. At that point, Denmark not only wanted to keep the former, but also asked Washington to support their claim on the entire island; and, when the sale of the Danish West Indies was finalised, Denmark received not only $25 million, but also the de facto recognition of Greenland as a whole as Danish. It has even been said that Britain, which strongly opposed any U.S. claim on Greenland, had played a key role in making Washington accept this clause.

This, nevertheless, did not prevent the United States to try a takeover of Greenland again. In 1940, after Nazi Germany conquered Denmark after a swift operation, the American government relaunched this plan. Even if Washington was trying to stay neutral as long as possible (it entered the war one year and a half later, after Pearl Harbor), it was clear that, if they entered war, the U.S. would have been on the Allies’ side; and the possibility that Germany established a foothold in Greenland was already deeply worrying for Washington. And, since the German occupation of Denmark would have given the Danish collaborationist government a strong legal claim on Greenland, the U.S. started to occupy the island through pre-emptively discharged Coast Guardsmen, and on 9th April 1941 the then-Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed with the Danish Ambassador an agreement which de facto turned the island into a U.S. protectorate for the duration of the war.

After the end of WWII, the Danish government expected the Americans to abandon their military installations and leave the island; but, at that point, they had no intention to do so. With the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. had definitely abandoned the isolationism which characterised them during the First Postwar period, and Greenland, with its location midway between Washington and Moscow and at the entrance of the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap through which Soviet ships and submarines could have roamed into the Atlantic, was too important to be just demilitarised. According to some declassified documents, the U.S. even tried again to purchase Greenland, this time for $100 million in gold; or, alternatively, to swap Point Barrow in Alaska for some strategic locations in Greenland, where they could have built some military bases.

Like after the previous attempts, no sale followed up. Unlike the West Indies, which were just a colony in a faraway location with no historical or cultural connection with Denmark, Greenland was increasingly seen as intrinsically Danish, and in 1953 it was even elevated from a colony to a constituent country of the Danish Realm. This, nevertheless, didn’t imply a departure of U.S. troops, and under the 1951 Greenland Defence Agreement Washington was able not only to keep its military installations on the island (Avalon Project—Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark, April 27, 1951), but also to enlarge them and to build new ones where required.

The militarisation of Greenland by U.S. troops was such that one could have even argued that the island was a kind of unofficial U.S. trust territory, like the official ones in the Pacific Ocean, where the States could do whatever they wanted. To be fair, a trust-lite would be probably a better choice of words for Greenland, since it never hosted nuclear tests unlike the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (see Bikini Atoll); but the agreement with Denmark not to store nuclear bombs in Greenland was repeatedly violated, and the 1968 Thule Accident was a clear proof that Greenland stored U.S. nuclear weapons.

In the 70’s, under the Ford administration, the then-Vice President Nelson Rockefeller proposed to buy Greenland, this time mostly because of its natural resources, but, like the other times, the proposal didn’t follow up.

During the 90’s, with Moscow facing one of its worst crises in its recent history and Beijing mostly seen as a “world factory” by the then-dominant political elites, Washington lost much interest in what the Times called “the world’s largest stationary aircraft carrier”. The military presence on the island was gradually demoted, and after a 2004 agreement the only base kept open was the one of Thule (now Pituffik), with a military presence reduced to a just few hundred units from the almost 10,000 soldiers during the Cold War. The cleaning of the military waste left in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal is still a bone of contention between Washington, Nuuk and Copenhagen. In the meantime, in order to reduce its economic reliance on Denmark, the government of Greenland established new ties with other countries, especially China, whose imports from Greenland (mostly fish, in the future perhaps raw material) are now greater than that of the U.S.

China’s increasing presence in Greenland alarmed the United States, which started to fear that the island could fall under Chinese influence, especially if it became independent. This, together with the rising economic and strategic role of the Arctic region, triggered a new interest by Washington in the island, as shown by the claims made by Trump in 2019 and in 2025.

Just one of Trump’s many boasts, or is the U.S.’s claims on Greenland somehow here to stay? We’ll try to find out an answer in the third part. But, at this point, we are going to talk about a lesser-known appetite for Greenland: the one raised by the UK through Canada.

The UK And Canada#

In the wake of Trump’s renewed claims on Greenland, the former Danish Minister for Greenland Tom Høyem claimed that, according to a secret treaty signed in the wake of the negotiations for the purchase of the Danish West Indies, Britain would have a right of first refusal in case anyone wanted to buy or take the island. The existence of such document has never been proven, and it is possible to express serious doubts that anything like that was agreed or even discussed; but, regardless of that, there are no doubts that both the UK and Canada have some interests in Greenland and, while they have not emerged during the last decades, this possibility has been seriously considered in multiple occasions until WWII.

As put by the previous analysis of the UK policy, Britain’s conquest of Canada gave London a larger stake in the Arctic than ever before. As a settlement colony, Canada had a different status than most British colonies, and it achieved a certain degree of political autonomy while still remaining (and self-identifying) as a member of the British Empire. Moreover, Canadians were occasionally suspicious of Washington, fearing that it could turn Canada into a sort of a vassal or even annex it altogether, and this made them loyal subjects of the Empire until at least the first half of the 20th century.

This combination of ambitions and fears became particularly strong under Robert Borden, who won the 1911 Canadian Federal Elections thanks to his opposition to a trade deal with the United States which, in his opinion, would cause a shift “from imperialism to continentalism”, therefore leading Canada to accept a foedus iniquum with Washington.

Aiming to turn Canada into a powerful member of the British Empire, potentially able to rival the Mother Country, Borden started to eye a number of British and German colonies that could be turned into Canadian possessions, from the Turks and Caicos Islands to some West African colonies. But, thanks also to its geographical proximity, Borden’s main target was Greenland, considered a valuable prize both as a source of natural resources and as a strategic location.

John Douglas Hazen, Canada’s then-Naval Minister, pointed out that most maritime traffic between Canada and Britain sailed near to the southern tip of the island, and that Germany would have greatly imperilled it if it managed to occupy the island. But, while Germany was the main source of Hazen’s strategic concerns, a potential U.S. purchase of Greenland was also seen unfavourably: the States, at that point, were seen as a land-hungry country which were trying to take advantage of bankrupt Danes, and which could have achieved the exact scenario that Borden was trying to prevent if they managed to take Greenland, especially in the long term.

Borden’s proposal to take Greenland for Canada was met very positively at the 1917 Imperial War Conference; but, at the end of the day, no sale ultimately materialised. Denmark was not very willing to sell Greenland, and Washington itself would have opposed any sale of Greenland to a third party.

At the end of the day, both London and Washington had an interest in keeping Greenland Danish: the former to prevent Canada from being flanked by the U.S. on three sides, the latter because a British purchase of Greenland through Canada would have greatly strengthened the latter and violated the Monroe Doctrine. This, nevertheless, did not imply an end of British and Canadian interests towards Greenland.

In September 1920, Britain stated on Canada’s behalf that it should be consulted before any sale of the island, and during the first stages of WWII, when Denmark fell under Nazi Germany’s occupation, both countries considered the option to take it over, as Britain did for the Faroe Island and both countries did with Iceland, especially since Germany managed to establish four clandestine weather stations on the island. It should be noticed that, at this point, Canada was considered as independent state rather than just a British Dominion, despite its citizens were still classified as British subjects. But, on 9th April 1941, it was the U.S. which took over Greenland, de facto turning it into a protectorate of theirs until the end of the war.

As we said, after the end of the Second World War, British and Canadian (occasional) claims on Greenland faded away. The Empire’s heyday was over, the old imperial ties between the two countries became increasingly loose. Both Britain and Canada were now living in a post-historical universe, with no place for any quest of imperial glory. The remoteness of the area and the lack of a well-defined border caused a long-standing dispute between Denmark—through Greenland—and Canada known as Whisky War, centred on a small island located halfway between Greenland and the Ellesmere Island in the Canadian Arctic.

It took over 30 years to settle the dispute about the island, now almost evenly split between Canada and Denmark; but, given the peaceful (although passive-aggressive) nature of the dispute and an overall lack of the rhetorics based on national pride or historical grievances we saw on other analogous disputes (the one between Spain and Morocco on Ceuta, Melilla and the Plazas de Soberanía, which became violent in the case of Perejil, are an example of the opposite), the Whisky War should be interpreted as a merely administrative matter rather than one of national glory (let alone imperial one).

This, nevertheless, does not mean that Greenland is now irrelevant for the two countries. Neither Britain nor Canada support Trump’s claims on Greenland: the British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has backed Denmark against the U.S., while Canada, itself a target of Trump’s planned territorial expansion, has recently elected the Liberal Party candidate Mark Carney as Prime Minister also as an answer to The Donald (the Conservatives were originally the favourites).

Should the U.S. manage to take over Greenland, the relations between Washington and Ottawa would become even more hierarchical; and, although a full-fledged (although non-historical) country is way more difficult to annex than an island with almost the same population than Andorra but spread over a much larger territory, Greenland would now be a precedent. But, if the U.S.’s claims on Greenland became serious, would Britain and Canada be able to oppose them effectively?

What Can Be Drawn From History?#

During the last months, Trump has talked about Greenland several times, refusing to rule out to take it with military force and even starting to infiltrate Greenland to influence its public opinion. Still, it’s rather unlikely that Washington will manage to take over Greenland before 2028, the year of the next Presidential elections, especially if the island takes no further steps towards independence (Greenlandic independence is de facto a prerequisite to a U.S. takeover in whatever form). Unless he somehow manages to get a third term, therefore, Trump is highly unlikely to achieve his aims during his Presidency.

This, nevertheless, does not mean that the U.S.’s renewed interest in Greenland should just be dismissed as one of Trump’s blunders. While Biden Administration showed no interest in taking over new land, we must state that most of its members and functionaries—especially those dealing with foreign policy issues—were either neoliberals or neoconservatives, whose main aim was to protect the U.S.’ status as a sole superpower against what they called “revisionist powers”. In a contest where the transition towards a multipolar world order is not only inevitable, but is actually ongoing, such approach is increasingly unsustainable, the Monroe Doctrine—which has actually never died, even after the end of the Cold War—is making an official comeback as “fortress America”, and many of the tenets of Trump’s foreign policy are likely there to stay. Including, perhaps, the claims on Greenland.

It’s difficult to say which form could take a U.S. takeover of Greenland. As mentioned after Donald Trump Jr.’s visit to Greenland last March, it’s even possible that there will be no actual outright annexation, but that an independent Greenland would sign a Compact of Free Association with the U.S. akin to the one they signed with some now-independent former Trust Territories in Oceania, allowing the latter to use its military installations without constraints in return for economic benefits.

Whatever its form, a U.S. annexation of Greenland would be coherent with the Monroe Doctrine in its wider interpretation, the one which was used to justify pre-emptive takeover of land to prevent it falling into the hands of real or potential enemies (as it happened for Greenland itself during WWII). In June 2025, Greenland was transferred from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the unified military command responsible for North America. This transfer is not just an administrative matter, but it is a clear sign that Greenland is now seen as part of North America, and therefore it’s subject to the Monroe Doctrine in its latest version, aimed at fighting Chinese influence on the American continent.

READ MORE

The Battle for Greenland by Alexander Sergunin

Another lesson that can be drawn from the analysis is that the interests of Western countries are not always aligned. While a possible U.S. takeover of Greenland is officially aimed at preventing the island from falling under the influence of third parties, especially China and Russia (even if Washington and Moscow manage to reach a settlement on the Ukrainian issue and to normalise their relationships, some mutual suspicion will likely remain for a while), an inevitable side effect will be more tensions with a number of Western countries.

The United Kingdom is an interesting case in this point: while the times when Canada and Britain were held together by a British imperial identity are long bygone, the residual links between the two should not be dismissed as just symbolical (Canada is still a Commonwealth Realm, Mark Carney has long been the Governor of the Bank of England, and the political and economic clout of the British monarchy strides with the principle that “the King reigns but not rules”), and Starmer’s opposition to a U.S. takeover of Greenland may be interpreted as the sign that Borden’s aforementioned considerations somehow still apply. The more Washington strengthens its hold on the island, after all, the more it will also be able to increase its influence on Canadian affairs; and this will inevitably happen at the expense of Britain.

Neither Britain, nor any other Western country, are currently able to wage war to the U.S.; therefore, a war between the latter and other Western countries—even Denmark—for Greenland is unlikely. Still, Washington’s claims on Greenland in some form may be here to stay, and the enforcement of these claims will inevitably lead to some tensions.

AUTHOR

Giuseppe Cappelluti
Independent Expert