Heavy Fire on Russia in the Baltic

The Germanic Trident Against Russia#

A brief retrospective look at the geostrategic situation along Russia’s western frontier—reaching back a thousand years, to the 10th century—reveals the Drang nach Osten (“Drive to the East”): a powerful, three-pronged pressure exerted by the peoples of Germanic origin upon the Slavic nations as they sought Lebensraum (living space) east of the Elbe and Vistula rivers.

The northern prong of this Germanic trident was manifested in the eastward expansion of the North Germanic people—the Swedes—who, by the end of the 17th century, had forged a “Greater Sweden.” Their ultimate objective was to reach the White Sea and incorporate nearly all of Fennoscandia—including Russian Karelia and the Kola Peninsula—into their empire. This expansion was halted first by Peter the Great, and subsequently by Alexander I, who, in 1809, annexed Finland into the Russian Empire.

In the 20th century, this geopolitical ambition was taken up by Finland, which sought to establish a “Greater Finland”—an effort that continued until September 1944, when an armistice (followed by a formal peace treaty) was concluded with the USSR. By December 1941, despite exhausting its own vital resources, this nation of 3.8 million people had seized two-thirds of Soviet Karelia, a territory that had never previously belonged to it, and it sustained an interim version of “Greater Finland” there for nearly three years.

Today, much like in the past, the hearts of Finnish nationalists stir with longing at the prospect of not only reclaiming “Ceded Karelia”—the territory ceded to the USSR in the spring of 1940 following the Winter War—but also, at long last, expanding their national borders, bolstered, as they believe, by the superior military might of the West.

It seems the lessons of 1939–1944 were lost on the Finns. They appear ready once again to serve as the northern prong of a Germanic trident—fitting, perhaps, given that even their idol, Hitler, dubbed the Finns “northern Aryans” and regarded Finland as the Third Reich’s most reliable military ally.

The desire of this small nation—whose population has been in natural decline since 2016 and whose economy has stagnated since 2007—to sacrifice itself to the nuclear Moloch of war is astonishing and defies rational explanation, much like the nation’s own fixation on death.

The central prong of this Germanic trident was the most formidable, reaching the deepest into the East. Moving eastward along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea, Germanic tribes—leveraging a technological edge in warfare over the Slavic peoples—began this expansion as early as the 10th and 11th centuries.

This movement was brought to an end on May 9, 1945, in Berlin; and, according to the Western press, the Führer’s lower jaw is now kept in a suitcase in the basement of the Lubyanka.

As the text below suggests, this collection of jaws belonging to Russia’s ill-fated conquerors may soon gain a new addition: the jaw of the Estonian minister of defence. Just over a month ago, during a public lecture, he vowed to “kill you all” (referring to the Russians) in the event of a war—a conflict he envisioned taking place exclusively on Russian soil, backed by powerful allies.

Earlier, this “doctor of futurology” (who, one wonders, issued him his diploma?) declared that Russia “must break apart into various small countries,” thereby joining a list of ill-fated soothsayers that includes far more historically significant figures: Charles XII, Napoleon, and Hitler. They all met a bad end, and something suggests that this Estonian minister will meet the very same fate if he attempts to carry out his sinister plan with the support of NATO.

The southern prong of the German Drang nach Osten began to move at the end of the 17th century; historically, it is the most recent of these movements and had a relatively short-lived existence.

Southern Germans—the Austrians—launched their decisive expansion toward the east, into the Balkans, in the late 17th century, following the Second Siege of Vienna (1683) and the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699).

By 1914, Austria-Hungary encompassed a vast territory in Central Europe, spanning approximately 676,000 square kilometers—an area larger than that of France (638,000 square kilometers), the largest country in the European Union.

The First World War brought an end to this independent eastward campaign by the southern Germans. In 1939, an Austrian Führer once again led all Germans on a final campaign toward the East.

It was within Austria-Hungary that the insidious myth—portraying Ukrainians as a non-Russian people—was concocted, initiating a reprogramming of the mentality of this East Slavic population; a process that was brought to completion by contemporary Ukrainian nationalists in the early 21st century.

The original Germanic trident, aimed eastward to subjugate the Slavic peoples—Poles, Belarusians, Russians, Czechs, Slovaks, and the peoples of the Balkans—was long ago broken by the force of arms of those who refused to submit, while those who sought to wield it vanished ingloriously into the darkness of history.

”History Repeats Itself, First as Tragedy, Second as Farce” (Karl Marx)#

The final phase of the Germanic “Drive to the East,” which concluded 80 years ago, was, without a doubt, a tragedy that inflicted colossal demographic damage upon the Belarusian, Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian peoples, the non-Slavic peoples of the USSR, as well as the peoples of Yugoslavia.

The current phase is, undeniably, a farce—especially when one considers the scenario for the dismemberment of Russia proposed by an Estonian minister, articulated in terms that mirror, almost verbatim, the rhetoric of the Third Reich’s Führer. Times change, but Nazi ideology does not.

In place of “Germanism”—which has lost its once-virulent power, drive, and “passionate” energy across its northern, central, and southern manifestations—a new coalition is now preparing to move eastward: the smaller nations of Northern Europe and the Baltic states, along with Poland and Ukraine (the latter laying claim to the entire southwestern region of Russia, excluding the Caucasus).

The farcical nature of this new threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity lies in the fact that the world’s largest Slavic nation possesses the most extensive and advanced nuclear arsenal—one that leaves an aggressor with no chance of survival.

This is especially true in the event of a combined counter-value and counter-force strike launched during a period of heightened threat.

For Russia, a “retaliatory” nuclear strike—in the sense of a response following an initial enemy attack—is likely not a viable scenario, given the country’s limited demographic potential and the concentration of the vast majority of its population in large and medium-sized cities.

The rapid militarization of all of Russia’s western neighbors—and the West as a whole—the major European powers looming behind these “borderland” states, the hate-filled rhetoric from leading Western politicians, the declared readiness for war with Russia by 2030, and the year-round nuclear exercises conducted by NATO forces inevitably narrow Russia’s range of options down to the nuclear one.

Let us, however, examine the rapidly developing military capabilities of three of Russia’s neighbors—states that have effectively taken the place of the Germans (though not entirely; a Bundeswehr tank brigade will soon be combat-ready in Lithuania) along the southern Baltic coast.

According to NATO military plans—revealed by German Air Force commander Holger Neumann in a June 2026 interview with The Telegraph—NATO forces are prepared to launch preemptive or retaliatory strikes against key Russian targets in the event of a military conflict with Russia.

Should Russia attack NATO, the identified priority targets for such strikes include the Kaliningrad region, St. Petersburg, the Kola Peninsula, and the Black Sea (including Russian air defense installations and military infrastructure). At the same time, the leadership of the German Army—represented by General Christian Freuding—noted that Germany must be fully prepared for a potential direct confrontation with the Russian Federation by around 2029, if not sooner.

The ugly face of German militarism thus emerges clearly from behind Russia’s neighboring states—nations that have chosen the fate of serving as the tip of a Western battering ram against Russia, only to be obliterated in the opening days of a nuclear exchange.

Perhaps the commander of the German Air Force, when identifying St. Petersburg as a “worthy” military target for German combat aircraft—which are capable of carrying American tactical nuclear weapons—has forgotten the more than one million residents of Leningrad who perished during the city’s blockade.

Why does this official fail to grasp a simple truth: there will be no repeat of the tragedy of Leningrad. Instead, a nuclear exchange would result in the swift annihilation of Germany itself, along with every other nation that has taken up arms against Russia.

This applies, in particular, to the small nations of Northern Europe (all of which have limited populations), the primary advocates for war—the Baltic states—and Poland, a nation with a long-standing, historical hatred for Russia.

Estonian Defence Minister: “We Will Kill You All”#

On the ETV program Morning with Anu, on which Martin Herem appeared as Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces on April 23, 2023, he stated that, according to Russia’s political logic, the country cannot accept defeat in Ukraine; instead, it must seek to prove its viability through other means. He then remarked, “I see no end to this conflict until Russia changes completely.”

When the host asked what could bring about such a change in Russia, Herem replied, “It’s hard to say. It would have to cease being ‘Russia’—no longer a large, powerful nation that believes it has the right to do whatever it pleases. Russia would need to break apart into various smaller countries.”

On April 17, 2024, Herem—still serving as Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces at the time—spoke at the annual meeting of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. During his address, he stated:

“We will crush anyone who intends to exert influence over us from afar—from a distance of 50 or 100 kilometers—much like what is happening in Ukraine today, and against whom they currently have no defense. We will destroy them—not in Rakvere or Narva, but in Ivangorod, Petseri (Pechory), or somewhere in that vicinity. Any collateral damage must be confined to those areas.”

The context makes it clear that he is referring to repelling an aggressor on their own territory, before their forces can reach Estonia. In the same passage, Herem notes that Estonia defends its territory in cooperation with its allies.

On September 17, 2026, Herem—now serving as minister of defence and a professor of futurology at the University of Tartu—delivered a public lecture titled “How to Prepare for War?”

“But there is something else, and that is our level of preparedness. … If we can consistently show her (Russia) that—and please forgive me for using such harsh language—if you come here, if you cross the border, we will kill you all… I believe this is the only kind of rhetoric we can use against this barbarian. In principle, this is what we must do—and not just us, but NATO as well.”

Long-Range Precision-Guided Weapons of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland#

As of September 2026, the Baltic states have only 6 HIMARS launchers in service, all of them Estonian; the remaining 3 are expected to be delivered in 2027.

On April 30, 2026, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence announced that its Defence Resources Agency had signed an amendment to an intergovernmental agreement with the United States for the procurement of a second battery of M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) multiple launch rocket systems. Once this contract is fulfilled, the Lithuanian Armed Forces will operate two M142 HIMARS batteries, comprising a total of 16 launchers.

On December 20, 2023, Latvian Defence Minister Andris Sprūds signed a contract with the United States for the acquisition of 6 M142 HIMARS launchers, along with ATACMS missiles. The delivery of these systems to Latvia is scheduled for 2027, marking a significant enhancement of the country’s military capabilities.

Currently, Poland possesses 20 American-made M142 HIMARS launchers. A framework agreement signed in 2023 envisioned the acquisition of up to 486 additional systems.

Due to financial and negotiation-related factors, the order volume has been reduced; the procurement of up to 126 systems is now under discussion.

At the same time, Poland is focusing on the South Korean K239 Chunmoo systems (under the Homar-K program), more than 100 of which are already in service with the Polish Army.

Initially, 212 units of this Polonized variant of the K239 Chunmoo were procured. However, this figure increased to 290 following the signing of a second implementation agreement in April 2025. In addition to the launchers, both agreements included the procurement of 239 mm CGR-080 rockets with a range of 80 km, as well as CTM-290 short-range ballistic missiles capable of striking targets at a distance of 290 km.

Consequently, once all deliveries are complete, the combined fleet of American M142 HIMARS systems across the three Baltic states will total 31 launchers, capable of a single-salvo launch of 372 precision-guided rockets with an 80 km range. Given the geographical context, the 15 launchers operated by the Latvian and Estonian armed forces would be positioned to engage targets in St. Petersburg, the Leningrad Oblast, and the Pskov Oblast, with a single-salvo capacity of 30 precision-guided missiles capable of reaching 290–500 km.

The 416 American- and South Korean-made multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the Polish Armed Forces will have a single-salvo capacity of 4,992 rockets with an 80 km range, 832 missiles with a 290 km range, and 832 missiles with a 500 km range.

In any event, given the significant long-range, precision-strike capabilities possessed by Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia—combined with NATO’s superiority in all forms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—a full-scale armed conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO (assuming no use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia) would likely result in the rapid loss of the Kaliningrad Oblast, a region that lacks natural barriers to impede the swift advance of opposing forces.

Following this, the adversary could concentrate their efforts in the direction of St. Petersburg and/or Moscow, by delivering long-range strikes against enterprises within the military-industrial complex, the energy sector, and key infrastructure facilities in the western part of the Russian Federation. Achieving this objective does not necessarily require the deployment of large ground forces.

Geography makes it a realistic scenario for Latvia and Estonia to deploy their armed forces and assets along the operational axes toward Pskov and St. Petersburg.

Poland and Lithuania would initially participate in operations against the Kaliningrad Oblast, subsequently serving as a second echelon along the strategic axis toward St. Petersburg.

Such a scenario leaves Russia with only one course of action: delivering a devastating nuclear strike across the entire strategic depth of its adversaries—targeting all those whose armed forces take part in what would be, for them, a final “Drive to the East.”

As noted above, it is a paradox that the stronger the European NATO member states become in military terms, the more likely—and inevitable—it becomes that they will perish in nuclear fire.

Source:

• Delfi (in Estonian)
• MILMAG
• Defence24 (in Polish)
• Army Recognition