The recent remarks by Vladimir Panov, Special Representative of the Russian Government for Arctic Cooperation, supporting India’s deeper engagement along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), mark a shift in Russian Arctic policy, signalling that probably, Russia is seeking to recalibrate its Arctic partnerships beyond the traditional Arctic institutions. For India, this development presents a strategic opportunity. The Arctic could emerge as a new pillar of the long-standing India–Russia “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership,” extending collaboration into the polar, maritime, and energy domains. However, this shift also reflects Moscow’s intention to promote multilateral platforms such as BRICS, for collaboration, in order to counterbalance Western policies that overlook Russia’s interests in Arctic affairs.
President Vladimir Putin’s forthcoming visit to India in December 2025 is expected to formalise a bilateral Arctic Cooperation Pact, potentially a turning point in India’s Arctic engagement. Indian policymakers must prepare to leverage this development with clarity and foresight.
Background
Recently, in an interview, Vladimir Panov, Special Representative for Arctic Development at Rosatom, Russia’s state-run nuclear energy corporation and the infrastructure operator of the NSR, stated that Russia supports India’s active role in the development of the NSR, describing India as a “key partner for cooperation”.
This statement sounded like music to the very limited fraternity of Indian Russia-India Arctic engagement watchers. This is because traditionally, Russia has been reluctant to allow non-Arctic states to play a strong role in Arctic governance . For decades, Russia treated the Arctic as an exclusive domain before later softening its stance and supporting China’s observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013. Panov’s endorsement, therefore, potentially calls for a greater Indian engagement in the Russian Arctic.
This evolution must be understood as part of a broader Russian recalibration. Since early 2022, the Arctic Council’s seven other members, Canada, Denmark (with Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States, suspended cooperation with Russia following its special military operations in Ukraine. In response, among other actions, Russia halted its annual budgetary contributions to the Arctic Council in February 2024, declaring that “full and equal work” could resume only when all members re-engage.
Subsequently, in September 2023, Russia withdrew from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, underscoring its departure from Western-dominated Arctic frameworks.
In this context, Panov’s statement should be viewed as a strategic outreach, part of Moscow’s effort to circumvent institutional isolation by cultivating alternative partnerships through BRICS and the Global South. The statement necessitates an examination of the drivers of Russian outreach towards India as also an evaluation of the India-Russia engagement in the Arctic and the potential of trade between them through the NSR.
Drivers Of Russia’s Outreach To India
Isolation in Arctic Governance
Since 2022, the other seven members of the Arctic Council have suspended engagement with Russia. This has led to the emergence of proposals for new forums for Arctic cooperation from Russia, such as the BRICS. Russia’s Arctic overtures to BRICS states also suggest an attempt to create alternative institutional alignments, possibly establishing parallel mechanisms for Arctic scientific and logistical cooperation.
Balancing China
While Russia and China publicly portray a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in the Arctic, their cooperation has clear limits. Except energy projects, many Chinese investments and infrastructure proposals in Russian Arctic, such as a deep‑sea port in Arkhangelsk tied to the proposed Belkomur railway, have failed to materialise. Sanctions, divergent views over sovereignty and control of the NSR, and Russia’s preference for “national” rather than multilateral projects all constrain Chinese engagement. At the same time, Moscow is quite conscious of its growing dependence on Beijing and is looking to India as a way to diversify its Arctic partnerships and counterbalance China’s influence.
Economic Imperatives
Sanctions-induced financial constraints make India’s large-scale energy imports, investment potential, and skilled manpower, attractive for Russia’s Arctic industrial projects. India’s current investment in Russia stands at $15 billion in oil and gas projects.
Present Status: India–Russia Arctic Cooperation
Trade
Bilateral trade between India and Russia reached USD 70.6 billion in 2024, increasing by 9 per cent year-on-year, the highest between the two countries in modern history, with Russia ranking among India’s top four trading partners and India as Russia’s second largest. Russian exports to India reached USD 65.7 billion, rising by 8.4 per cent, driven by agricultural products, crude oil, and fertilisers, while Indian exports increased 21 per cent to USD 4.9 billion. However, this represents less than one per cent of India’s exports totalling USD 778 billion comprising merchandise exports valued at USD 437 billion and exports of services of USD 341 billion. Also, Russian exports to India primarily comprise energy products, including crude oil and natural gas, which make up about 88 per cent of these exports](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/3/how-much-do-india-russia-china-trade-and-what-goods-do-they-buy). India also runs a major trade deficit with Russia, importing [over 13 times more than it exports. The two countries have set an ambitious bilateral trade target of USD 100 billion by 2030.
Arctic, NSR And The CVMC
India’s Arctic engagement is anchored in its Himadri research station in Svalbard (2008) and its observer status at the Arctic Council (since 2013). Bilateral cooperation with Russia in the Arctic has expanded since 2024 through the India–Russia Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC), which established a Joint Working Group on the NSR, co-chaired by Panov and India’s special secretary in the shipping ministry. An MoU between Indian National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), and the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), on Cooperation in Research and Logistics in polar regions was signed during the summit meeting between PM Modi and President Putin, on July 09, 2024, in Russia.
At the Eastern Economic Forum (Vladivostok, 2024), Russia announced its intention to extend the NSR westward to St. Petersburg and eastward to Vladivostok, designating it as Greater Northern Sea Route (GNSR). This holds particular promise for India, which is already connected to both termini through the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor (CVMC).
The distance between Mumbai and the Russian port of St Petersburg, via the Suez Canal, is 16,066 km while the distance from Chennai to Vladivostok port, via the CVMC, is 35 per cent shorter at 10,458 km, significantly reducing freight costs and transit times.
Recent Indian Initiatives To Enhance Trade Through The CVMC
According to a feasibility study commissioned by the Chennai Port Authority to assess the viability of CVMC, the Chennai-Vladivostok sea route is 45 per cent shorter than the Mumbai-Saint Petersburg route, reducing ocean freight costs and transit time. The study identified Coal, Crude Oil, LNG, Fertilisers, and Containers as key commodities for trade.
In May 2023, Chairman, Chennai Port Authority & Kamarajar Port Ltd., presented the study’s findings at the 3rd India-Russia Joint Maritime Commission in Moscow. During the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in September 2023, Vladivostok, India’s Minister for Ports, Shipping & Waterways discussed CVMC’s operationalization with Mr. Alexey Chekunkov, Minister for the Development of the Far East and Arctic, Russia, and invited Russian officials to India for further collaboration.
Subsequently, Chennai Port Authority organised an Indo-Russia Joint Workshop on CVMC on 24th January 2024 in Chennai. The Russian delegation team, led by the Deputy Minister for the Development of the Far East and Arctic, participated in infrastructure, regulatory, and operational frameworks discussions. The workshop featured four sessions on Coal, Fertilisers, Crude Oil & LNG, and Containers.
To enhance Container movement potential, Chennai Port Authority conducted a stakeholder interaction on July 4, 2024 to analyse issues and challenges in container trade between India and Far East Russia. The session saw participation from Consul General of Russia, Indian Embassy officials, DGFT representatives, Indo-Russian Chamber of Commerce, APEDA, NAFED, Traffic Managers from Indian Major Ports, and key trade stakeholders. Discussions highlighted strong demand for electronic equipment, auto components, pharmaceuticals, plastics, iron and steel, organic chemicals, fruits, apparel, cattle feed, egg powder, mangoes, onions, and rum in Russia. Indian garments and rum, highly valued in Russia, were identified as key export opportunities.
On November 9, 2024, Dy. Chairman, Chennai Port met with Shipping Lines and Indo-Russian Chamber of Commerce to review trade progress, challenges, and strategies for enhancing container trade via EMC. Shipping Lines suggested that high-demand products should be prioritised, with policy support of port and vessel charges to ensure sustained container volumes and enable direct vessel calls to Chennai and Vladivostok.
Following these initiatives, an increase in the handling of Crude Oil and Coal at East Coast ports from Russia has been observed. There has been a significant increase in cargo volumes on the CVMC, with coal shipments rising by 87 per cent and crude oil transport growing by 48 per cent year-on-year in FY 2024–25.
Building on these initiatives, multiple rounds of discussions and high-level meetings have been held between ministries of both countries, aiming to further operationalise the Eastern Maritime Corridor and unlock its full potential as a key channel for India-Russia trade.
Two meetings of the Joint Working Group on the NSR, co-chaired by Panov and India’s special secretary in the shipping ministry, have been held (October 2024, New Delhi, July 2025, New Delhi). Following the first meeting bilateral agreements were signed to increase cargo shipments along the NSR.
However, despite sustained efforts the container volumes via the EMC remain modest. In order to translate potential into tangible trade flows, a more focused and structured institutional mechanism is required. Towards that, it would be worthwhile to examine the potential of trade between India and Russia, through the NSR.
Potential Of India-Russia Trade Through The NSR
In 2023, 94 million tonnes of various cargoes were delivered to Indian ports from the Russia’s Northwest by passing through the Suez Canal, including 63 million tonnes of oil and petroleum products, 21 million tonnes of bulk cargoes (coal, coking coal, mineral fertilisers) (cited from Talk delivered by the Ambassador of Russia to India, at Vivekananda International Foundation on 21 March 2025). On the other hand, in 2024, the entire cargo traffic through the NNSR amounted to 37.9 million tonnes while the volume of transit cargo was a little more than 3 million tons. Therefore, there exists a great potential for India-Russia trade to augment the NSR transit traffic. To mitigate the risks now present in the Red Sea, some of the India destined cargoes from Russia could be transported over the NSR whose safety is ensured by Russia as the state with sovereign rights to its waters.
Let us very briefly discuss three specific commodities which have the potential to be routed through the Northern Sea Route and the EMC.
Crude Oil
Since 2022, Russia has become India’s largest supplier of crude oil, accounting for nearly 36 per cent of India’s imports by 2024, worth more than USD 52 billion. These imports have so far been sourced predominantly from Russia’s western ports—Ust-Luga, Primorsk, and Novorossiysk—via the Suez Canal and Red Sea to India’s west coast refineries. However, there is considerable potential for expanding supply from Russia’s eastern ports such as Kozmino and Sakhalin, and eventually from Arctic terminals such as Varandei. This diversification would allow India to hedge against disruptions in the Suez and Strait of Malacca chokepoints while also securing long-term supplies of discounted Russian crude.
LNG
Liquefied natural gas is a smaller, but strategically important component of bilateral trade, holding enormous potential to be traded between India and Russia. Russia holds a significant share of the world’s LNG resources, accounting for nearly 25 per cent of global reserves. These reserves are primarily concentrated in the western and Arctic regions of the country. In comparison, East Russia, despite holding around 27 per cent of Russia’s LNG reserves, currently contributes only 5 per cent of the nation’s total production, amounting to roughly 25 MMTPA.
However, LNG production in eastern Russia is poised for a significant transformation. The Yamal LNG project, in northwest Siberia, has emerged as one of the world’s largest LNG production sites, with a capacity of over 16.5 MMTPA. The Arctic LNG 2 project, on the Gydan Peninsula, is expected to add another 19.8 MMTPA of capacity once fully operational and free of western sanctions. The Sakhalin-2 LNG plant, near Vladivostok, is already operational and undergoing expansion. In the coming years, the Russian Far East is projected to produce up to 40 million tonnes of LNG annually, marking a substantial increase in its share of national production.
India imported 22.14 million tonnes of LNG in 2023, valued at USD 13 billion, at an average price of USD 598.94 per metric tonne. Russia’s share in India’s LNG imports remained marginal being the seventh-largest supplier, contributing only 1.9 per cent (0.42 million tonnes) of total imports, valued at USD 300 million, at an average price of USD 702.91 per tonne.
Russian LNG has so far been less competitive, priced about 17 per cent higher than India’s average LNG import cost. However, the commissioning of Arctic LNG 2 and the development of future projects in the Russian Far East could enhance Russia’s export capacity and competitiveness. By 2042, India’s LNG imports from Russia could increase to 7–8 million tonnes annually, particularly if shipments are routed via the CVMC to India’s east coast terminals at Ennore, Dhamra, and Kakinada.
However, for India, to benefit from Russian LNG exports from the Far East, there is a need to increase the LNG terminals on the East coast. Currently, India has seven operational LNG terminals, all onshore, with an operational regasification capacity of around 170 MMSCMD (47.7 MMPTA) and a total investment of around Rs. 37,000 Crore. Of the seven operational LNG Terminals, only Ennore and Dhamra on India’s east coast, together accounting for 10 MMTPA capacity or 20 per cent of India’s annual LNG operational regasification capacity. The other terminal under development on the East coast is at Kakinada in Andhra Pradesh. Recent reports have indicated that Gazprom, the Russian state-owned energy entity is in talks to build a 5 million tonne LNG regasification terminal at Kakinada port on India’s east coast, a potential USD 600 million investment.
Coking Coal
Coking coal is another potential area of India–Russia energy cooperation, as it is a key raw material for the steel industry. India currently imports about 90 per cent of its coking coal requirements, with imports totalling 81 million tonnes in FY25. This demand is expected to rise to 135 million tonnes by FY30, up from 87 million tonnes in FY25, in line with India’s ambitious target of expanding steelmaking capacity to 300 million tonnes by that time.
At present, Russia accounts for only around 2 per cent of India’s coking coal imports, while Australia dominates with nearly 77 per cent. Yet, Russia holds significant potential as a supplier, possessing the world’s second-largest coal reserves, estimated at 160 billion tonnes (2020), or about 17 per cent of global reserves, ranking sixth globally in coal production at around 400 million tonnes per annum (MTPA). Over 80 per cent of Russian coal is mined in Siberia, primarily from the Kuznetsk Basin, which alone contributes 60 per cent (240 MTPA) of national output. A further 21 per cent (84 MTPA) is produced in eastern Russia, close to its Far Eastern ports, offering logistical advantages for exports to Asia.
According to projections, India’s imports of Russian coking coal could increase substantially, to as much as 28 million tonnes by 2042. This would represent around one-third of India’s total coking coal requirement, significantly reducing dependence on traditional suppliers and enhancing supply security through diversification
Fertilisers
Fertilisers are another area of dependence since they pay a crucial role in enhancing agricultural productivity. According to the Economic Survey 2024–25, agriculture and allied sectors contribute nearly 16 per cent to India’s GDP and supports over 46 per cent of the population. This makes agriculture a core pillar of the country’s economy, and continued availability and supply of fertilisers become critical.
In FY 2022-23, Russia overtook top suppliers like Canada, China, and the USA to become the world’s top exporter of fertilisers. The fertiliser production in Russia is poised for significant growth, with output expected to increase to 78 million tonnes by 2030, a 28 per cent increase on current production volumes. In 2024, Russia exported nearly 40 million tonnes of fertilisers, with 84 per cent of these shipments passing through Baltic Sea ports. Of this, Russia supplied 4.6 million tonnes of fertilisers to India, becoming the country’s main supplier with a 24.45 per cent share of the local market.
India’s total annual consumption of Fertiliser in 2023–24 was around 601 Lakh Metric Tonnes (LMT). 503 LMT was produced domestically in India while177 LMT came through imports. Russia has indicated its readiness to supply 5 million tonnes of fertilisers to India. India’s imports of fertilisers, as it aims of Visit Bharat by 2047, is only set to grow. Therefore, enhancing Russian Fertiliser exports to India and routing them via the CVMC would further enhance the trade potential of the trade corridor.
Implications For India
For India, greater engagement with Russia in the Arctic presents an opportunity. The Arctic could emerge as a new pillar of the long-standing India–Russia “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership,” extending collaboration into the polar, maritime, and energy domains. Some of the takeaways for India are mentioned below.
Energy Security
A long-term LNG supply agreement with Russia could play a strategic role in enhancing India’s energy security, helping to narrow the critical supply deficit, as over 50 per cent of the country’s natural gas requirements are currently met through imports. Such an arrangement would also contribute to diversifying India’s LNG sourcing portfolio, reducing exposure to market volatility and supply disruptions from traditional suppliers.
Rare Earths And Strategic Minerals
Deeper strategic engagement with Russia could extend beyond hydrocarbons to mitigate India’s critical dependence on imports of rare earths and other strategic minerals, thereby enhancing resilience across key sectors of India’s energy and industrial value chains.
Opportunity For Strategic Expansion
Greater engagement with Russia in the Arctic, including Indian investments in the Russian Arctic, creates a pathway for New Delhi to become an active Arctic stakeholder, with maritime, scientific, and energy dimensions.
Institutional Preparedness
India must develop Arctic shipping expertise and invest in ice-class LNG carriers, polar navigation training, and maritime and hydrographic data exchange. Partnerships with Russian academies could be formalised through an MoU on Polar Navigation Training.
Policy Synchronisation
Any Arctic cooperation framework should align with India’s Arctic Policy (2022) and its emphasis on science, climate change and environment, transportation and connectivity, sustainable exploitation of resources, and capacity building.
Need for Cautious Engagement
Given India’s consistently good relations with all Arctic stakeholders, it is well placed to serve as a “bridge,” helping Northern European countries better appreciate the value of continued collaboration with Russian scientists and enterprises.
Recommendations
First, prepare a policy paper
The Government of India (GoI) should prepare in inter-ministerial Policy Paper on India’s enhanced engagement in the Arctic. This policy paper should clearly articulate India’s position on Arctic engagement, identifying its scientific, economic, and maritime objectives in the region. It could include sectoral chapters on shipping, hydrocarbons, rare earth minerals, and climate research, supported by scenario analyses for India’s participation in Arctic governance frameworks. A dedicated task force under the Ministry of External Affairs could lead the drafting, drawing upon inputs from the concerned ministries such as the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES), Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways (MoPS&W), Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoPnG), Ministry of Mines, and the Minstry of Commerce, to name a few. This would mirror similar policy coordination frameworks used by China (the 2018 “China’s Arctic Policy” white paper) and South Korea (the “Arctic Policy Master Plan”) to consolidate their national Arctic strategies.
Second, negotiate a MoU on polar and ice navigation training
An MoU between selected Indian and Russian institutions could formalise training in polar and ice navigation. India could also deploy naval officers for short Arctic navigation courses under Rosatomflot’s nuclear icebreaker programmeme. Such cooperation would prepare Indian mariners for future operations along the NSR.
Third, Operationalise the Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor
Operationalise the Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor and integrate it with the INSTC and Russia’s Unified Deep-Water System. The CVMC, when synchronised with the INSTC and the UDWS, could establish a seamless logistics chain from the Indian Ocean to the Arctic. A pilot multimodal shipment, containerised goods from Chennai to Vladivostok via the CVMC, then onward to Murmansk and the NSR, should be operationalised to demonstrate viability. India could also explore the use of Indian-built coastal shipping vessels for Arctic transits, leveraging the Sagarmala initiative’s shipbuilding incentives. A joint logistics hub in Vladivostok, linked to the Eastern Maritime Corridor, could serve as the nodal point for Indian trade destined for Arctic ports.
Negotiate a Manpower Agreement
Negotiate a manpower agreement leveraging India’s demographic surplus to address Russia’s skilled-labour shortage in shipbuilding and Arctic navigation. Russia’s demographic challenges and exodus of skilled labour due to Western sanctions have created acute shortages in shipyards at Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Severodvinsk. India, with its surplus of trained engineers and maritime professionals, could offer workforce support through a manpower agreement between the two countries. This arrangement could model itself on the India–Japan Technical Intern Training Programme (TITP) and be executed through government-to-government agreements under the India–Russia Intergovernmental Commission (IRIGC-TEC). Such cooperation would not only strengthen bilateral ties but also contribute to India’s maritime capacity-building and technological exposure in Arctic shipbuilding facilities.
Establish a Rupee–Ruble Settlement Mechanism
Establish a Rupee–Ruble settlement mechanism and explore de-risked banking channels to support Arctic-linked trade. Given sanctions on Russian banks and payment restrictions under SWIFT, an operational Rupee–Rouble mechanism should be extended to Arctic-linked investments. The Reserve Bank of India could allow authorised Indian banks to open Vostro accounts for Russian entities engaged in Arctic energy and logistics projects. Additionally, both sides could explore cryptocurrency-backed or sovereign digital currency (CBDC) settlements under the BRICS framework to minimise exposure to secondary sanctions risks.
Engage Multilaterally
Engage multilaterally with BRICS and non-Western forums to ensure Arctic cooperation does not undermine India’s ties with existing Arctic Council members. India should use its influence within BRICS to promote an inclusive model of Arctic engagement that upholds scientific cooperation and environmental standards. Joint Arctic scientific missions under the BRICS Climate Cooperation Initiative could help integrate the efforts of Brazil, South Africa, China, and India in polar research. Additionally, Arctic Council Observer states such as Singapore, South Korea and Japan could be invited for collabourative research on Arctic shipping and environmental resilience. This approach would reaffirm India’s commitment to transparency and sustainability in line with its Arctic Policy 2022, while avoiding over-identification with any single bloc.
Dedicated Indo–Russian Arctic Science and Innovation Fund
This fund could co-finance joint R&D projects on Arctic energy efficiency, remote sensing, cryosphere monitoring, and marine biotechnology. The creation of this fund would align with the science-driven objectives outlined in India’s Arctic Policy 2022, enhancing India’s credibility as a responsible Arctic stakeholder.
Promote Green Shipping and Environmental Safeguards
Any expansion of India’s maritime footprint along the NSR must adhere to the principles of sustainable development. India could propose a “Green Shipping Compact” with Russia to promote LNG and hybrid-powered vessels, use of low-sulphur fuels, and strict compliance with MARPOL Annex VI emission norms. Collaboration with Russia’s Rosatom and private shipping firms could help retrofit Indian vessels for polar operations using eco-friendly propulsion systems. This would also complement the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) 2023 decarbonisation roadmap.
Conclusion
Vladimir Panov’s endorsement of India’s Arctic role represents more than diplomatic symbolism. It signals a strategic reorientation in Russia’s Arctic calculus. Driven by isolation within the Arctic Council, the suspension of its contributions, and a deliberate pivot toward BRICS-led multilateralism, Moscow now seeks partners who can validate and sustain its Arctic ambitions.
For India, this opens the door to a new frontier of strategic cooperation, in energy, maritime logistics, scientific research, and polar governance. Yet, the initiative must be guided by prudence, sustainability, and strategic autonomy. If approached with foresight, the Arctic can become the newest and most forward-looking pillar of the India–Russia partnership.
Senior Research Fellow
Vivekananda International Foundation