On January 16, the Italian government issued the latest white paper for the Arctic, named Italy and the Arctic: The Value of Cooperation in a Rapidly Transforming Region. The strategy has been issued at a time of great changes both for the Arctic macroregion and the world order as a whole…

American unipolarism is drawing to a close, partly because Washington is less willing to enforce it, and the idea of a “rules-based order” has increasingly been acknowledged as an illusion—even described by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney as a “useful fiction” in a widely noted speech at the latest World Economic Forum. In this shifting global landscape, the Arctic region is taking on increased importance, driven in part by the impacts of climate change. Therefore, a new strategy is necessary to address and catch up with these evolving realities.

From a geopolitical point of view, one of the main features of Italy’s latest Arctic strategy is that it doesn’t mention Russia as a “threat” in the way Germany, Canada or the UK do. True, both center-left and center-right governments traditionally implemented positive relations with Russia, although for different reasons. Relations remained fairly cordial even after 2014, in spite of growing tensions. But, after Mario Draghi became Prime Minister in February 2021, the Italian government’s stance towards Russia hardened, with accusations of “violating human rights” and the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine. This line was followed also by his successor Giorgia Meloni, whose criticism towards sanctions and whose pro-mediation attitude on the eve of February 24 was replaced by a substantial alignment with Draghi and the “Collective West” after the launch of the Special Military Operation.

Still, the White Paper looks more like a picture of the Arctic how it is rather than a nostalgic elegy for some old state of affairs. There is no reference to some “Arctic exceptionalism”. The Arctic is described as a region where great powers have always competed, and its geographic position made it already play a key role in nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Likewise, February 24 is mentioned mainly as a trigger of a series of events which affected the area, such as the breakup of the Arctic Council’s activities, the growing cooperation between Russia and China in the region and NATO’s enlargement to Sweden and Finland. Trump’s claims on Greenland are mentioned as a further example of this growing competition.

This lack of a strongly anti-Russian attitude has both geographic and cultural roots. As put by the prominent French historian and demographer Emmanuel Todd, if we exclude those Russian neighbors with a long story of tensions with Moscow such as Poland, the core of European Russophobia lies in the (former) Protestant countries of Northern and North-Western Europe. Germany is a case sui generis, while Italy is outside of this core. The Italian public opinion, on the contrary, is probably the most peace-oriented in the West.¹ And the white paper just reflects this. We should also add that Italy is not an Arctic country, and therefore it would not be directly affected by a confrontation between Russia (or China) and Western countries in the Arctic.

This, nevertheless, does not imply a return to the Pratica di Mare spirit anytime soon.² True, the center-right coalition has traditionally aimed to build positive relations with Russia while keeping an Atlanticist foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of integrating the latter within the Western economic and security framework. This occurred under both Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Salvini, the current Prime Minister’s predecessors to the center-right leadership. This spirit, nevertheless, is currently on standby. Likewise, there is no reference to a possible resumption of the long-standing Russian-Italian cooperation in the Arctic.

Moscow is not an enemy, but neither a partner, for example in the supply of oil and gas and rare earth. The Italian government follows Trump, rather than the Coalition of the Willing, and it doesn’t want to be involved in a wider war like its infamous predecessor. And a certain desire of reinstating the once-flourishing economic relations with Russia is tangible. But, in spite of this, the Meloni Government doesn’t want to do leaps forward towards Moscow as Orban did in July 2024. This is also reflected in the White Paper, which admits that the interruption of the activities of the Arctic Council adds instability and unpredictability by reducing the opportunities for dialogue among the Arctic countries, but which doesn’t propose their reinstatement. The priority is given to the security cooperation with NATO and the EU.

The US, on the other hand, is mentioned in the White Paper as Italy’s main Arctic partner together with Canada. This is a clear by-product of the geopolitical preferences of the ruling coalition, since the center-right coalitions have always been US-leaning and occasionally Eurosceptic. This point of Italy’s Arctic White Paper may be reviewed should the Campo Largo win the next elections, due to take place in 2027, with a greater emphasis towards cooperation with the EU and its core countries (especially France and Germany) and perhaps some criticism towards Trump’s America First.³ This, nevertheless, is not very likely to happen. Government parties still enjoy a relatively high consent, and Italian center-left coalitions are usually less stable than center-right ones. Unless there is a breakup of the center-right coalition, therefore, the pro-US orientation of Italy’s Arctic strategy is unlikely to change for the time being.

The White Paper seeks also to identify other areas of cooperation with Arctic countries, with a focus on scientific research and economic cooperation. The former is well-established: Italy has a long tradition of Arctic explorations and studies, as shown by the voyages of the Caboto brothers in the early 1500s and Umberto Nobile’s flights over the North Pole. Moreover, the country can rely on a research station on the Svalbard Islands, a research icebreaker and on third party’s structures such as the Thule-Pituffik High Arctic Atmospheric Observatory (THAAO). The issue of economic cooperation, on the other hand, is more complex.

The opening of new transportation routes through the Arctic Ocean is barely mentioned. This can be explained not only by the ongoing tensions with Russia, which holds the keys to the Northern Sea Route, or the low development of the Northwest Passage, but also—and, perhaps, mostly—with Italy’s geographic position. Northern Italy’s industry may benefit from the opening of Arctic routes through ports such as Rotterdam or Hamburg, but the country’s handiest navigation routes are those across the Mediterranean, and the advantages of the Arctic Sea routes are not as great as they are for countries such as Germany. It’s even possible to claim that the opening of these routes may damage Italy, since they would compete directly with the traditional ones. Understanding this, nevertheless, would require an analysis ad hoc.

The perspectives for the shipbuilding, the defense, the space and the oil and gas industry, on the other hand, are more promising. About the former, we cannot overlook the role of Fincantieri, Europe’s main shipbuilding conglomerate: following its 2013 acquisition of the Norwegian Vard, the company is now also a main icebreaker producer. The opening of the Arctic navigation routes will inevitably create new business opportunities for Fincantieri. Leonardo, one of the largest defense companies in the world, is involved in the Arctic Security and Emergency Preparedness Network since 2019. E-Geos, a joint venture between the Italian Space Agency and Telespazio, is active in the monitoring of the Arctic ice cap and of its environment as a whole. And, last but not least, we cannot overlook the Arctic activities of Eni, Italy’s main oil and gas producer. As put by the White Paper, Eni not only managed to operate successfully in such a difficult context, but “it showed a great sensitivity towards the impact of climate change and the preservation of the ecosystems”.

Giuseppe Cappelluti
Independent Expert