Finnish and Swedish marines practise amphibious operations with other NATO Allies in northern Norway, part of the Nordic Response exercises. Source: Flickr, NATO, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
In recent years, the Arctic has come to be seen by NATO as a structured operational space, and no longer just as a remote and marginal area—what it was for much of the Cold War. More than political statements or doctrinal documents, it is military exercises that demonstrate the extent of this shift. They test readiness, integrate logistics and adapt personnel, equipment and strategies to specific—and extreme—conditions.
Every military deployment in the High North—whether in Norway, the Barents Sea, or along the GIUK gap—is based on a precise strategic assessment and exercises serve not only to refine procedures and interoperability, but they act as military communication tools, signalling primarily to potential adversaries rather than allies. The way they are designed and conducted also offers a concrete reflection of NATO’s priorities within a very specific context.
But, as we well know, the Arctic is not just a “strategic” region: it is also one of the largest basins of energy and mineral resources on the planet. According to estimates, roughly 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 per cent of its undiscovered natural gas may lie beneath its surface. Added to this is the growing interest in rare earth elements and offshore deposits along the Eurasian ridge and in Greenland.
NATO’s Arctic exercises, therefore, cannot be fully understood if isolated from the economic and logistical context in which they take place. The main operational theatres coincide with areas crossed by emerging commercial routes and regions of potential energy exploitation. The Arctic is not “just” an extreme environment for training purposes, but a corridor for transit and supply that demands tailored operational expertise. Developing military capabilities in such settings inevitably implies a broader projection of presence, both for defensive purposes and to ensure (future) access and mobility.
In this light, the growing focus on logistical components—such as bases and deepwater ports—is not solely aimed at deterrence but fits into a wider framework of territorial anchoring. This is evidenced, for instance, by strong cooperation between NATO and Norway in upgrading Arctic logistics facilities, as well as renewed interest in the Faroe Islands and Iceland, key points along the North Atlantic routes.
This article aims to reconstruct the evolution of NATO’s Arctic military activity since the Cold War, focusing on the growing role of exercises. It will analyse key moments and operational plans, with the aim of providing as comprehensive a picture as possible.
Arctic Manoeuvres During the Cold War and the Early 2000s
During the Cold War, as mentioned, the Arctic remained on the margins of NATO’s operational priorities, although never entirely excluded. The region was considered a possible corridor for Soviet penetration into the North Atlantic (conversely, Soviet military planners saw the vast Russian Arctic—so easily overflown by bombers or intercontinental missiles—as a serious vulnerability) and was therefore included in several large-scale exercises. Manoeuvres such as Northern Wedding (held from 1970 to 1986) or Strong Express (1972), which involved tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of ships, aimed to test the Alliance’s ability to reinforce Europe’s northern flank, especially Norway, in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack.
However, NATO’s interest in the Arctic environment in a strict sense remained limited. Exercises were mostly held in southern Norway or subarctic areas and training under extreme conditions remained partial. At that time, NATO’s interest in the region was mainly functional to the logic of general deterrence rather than the direct control of polar space.
For much of the early 2000s, NATO’s operational interest in the Arctic remained marginal, overshadowed by out-of-area missions and crises in the Middle East. Russia’s reunification with Crimea in 2014 and its gradual military build-up in the Arctic region prompted the Alliance to reconsider its posture in the High North. Within this context, Norway’s role also grew, as it strongly pushed for the Arctic to be properly integrated into NATO’s planning.
It is from this renewed focus that the full significance of subsequent exercises—beginning with Trident Juncture 2018—can be properly understood.
A Dutch Marine and a Norwegian Army soldier watch amphibious landing operations at Sandastrand, Norway as part of Exercise Nordic Response 24. Source: Flickr, NATO, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
Trident Juncture and Cold Response
From 2015 onwards, the Arctic entered NATO’s strategic considerations more assertively. The turning point was Trident Juncture 2018, the largest NATO manoeuvre since the Cold War. Hosted by Norway, it involved over 50,000 troops from 31 countries, including Finland and Sweden, which at the time were not yet members of the Alliance. Most operations took place in central and northern Norway, involving amphibious, air and land exercises in severe weather conditions. The objective was to test NATO’s ability to activate the collective defence clause (the well-known “Article 5”) in a Nordic context, just over a year after Russia’s reunification with Crimea.
Trident Juncture marked the start of a new phase of recurring exercises, with Norway increasingly central as a testing ground. In particular, the biennial Cold Response exercise assumed growing importance—Cold Response 2022 involved around 30,000 personnel, with operations extending well beyond the Arctic Circle. The exercise included snow-environment combat scenarios, naval warfare and special operations in coastal areas with limited infrastructure. This time, full attention was given to the Arctic operational environment—manoeuvres on land, at sea and in the skies above the Arctic Circle, with sub-zero temperatures and terrain made unstable by snow, ice and thaw. “Embrace the cold!” read one of the exercise’s slogans. The aim was to train troops to fight and endure in extreme conditions, carrying heavy loads, with limited visibility and a credible, but fictional, enemy. Cold is not merely an environmental factor—it is a real multiplier of complexity that can burden every link in the logistics chain.
Nordic Response 2024
In March 2024 NATO launched Nordic Response, a large-scale exercise held in the north of Norway, Sweden and Finland. The operation was part of the broader Steadfast Defender 24, the largest NATO training cycle since the end of the Cold War, with over 90,000 participants and, once again, an explicit focus on defending Europe’s eastern and far-northern flanks. With 20,000 troops involved, Nordic Response represented more than just a regional component. It marked the full and definitive consolidation of a truly integrated Nordic operational space, including for the first time all three Scandinavian countries as full members of the Alliance.
Nordic Response demonstrated that territorial defence—particularly in Arctic and sub-Arctic regions—has once and for all returned to the core of NATO’s military planning. Operations focused on securing maritime and land access points, on wide-scale defensive manoeuvres in snow-covered environments and on coordination between Scandinavian and non-Scandinavian armed forces. The Norwegian command stressed that the exercise was not only aimed at refining operational capabilities but also at demonstrating the strategic cohesion of NATO’s northern arc, now reinforced by the accession of Finland and Sweden.
Beyond the large-scale manoeuvres already mentioned, several smaller exercises held in recent years also deserve attention. Arctic Forge, for instance, takes place every two years and involves US and Canadian troops deployed in Finland and Norway. Its goal is to test interoperability with local forces under extreme cold. Joint Viking, once again coordinated by Norway, focuses instead on ground mobility and operational resilience along the northern border of NATO. Naval exercises such as Dynamic Mongoose and Arctic Dolphin, dedicated to anti-submarine warfare in subpolar environments, reflect growing attention to the Norwegian Sea seabed and Atlantic access routes. Although these exercises involve fewer troops and equipment than the major joint manoeuvres, they help maintain operational readiness and allow experimentation with tailored solutions for one of the world’s most demanding theatres.
Italian Marines with the Italian Navy’s San Marco Brigade during a training as part of Exercise Nordic Response 24. Source: Flickr, NATO, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
Lastly, Arctic Challenge 25, scheduled from the 26th of May to the 14th of June 2025, will be another important test for NATO in the field of Arctic air defence. This multinational drill will involve the air forces of Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, with the aim of improving interoperability and operational readiness.
Although NATO Arctic exercises often focus on the European High North, the North American front undoubtedly also plays an essential role in the broader architecture of transatlantic security. The United States and Canada regularly take part in joint drills in northern Norway and are also involved in autonomous bilateral initiatives.
Greenland, while not hosting large-scale manoeuvres, is assuming increasing strategic importance for Washington, both as a logistical hub and as an advanced surveillance platform. The presence of Thule Air Base in the island’s northwest underlines the value the United States places on this area as a potential staging ground for air operations across the Arctic quadrant. The growing American interest in Greenland, including at the political level, also fits into a broader strategy of countering extra-NATO influence—particularly Chinese—in the island’s infrastructure and civilian development projects.
Conclusion
NATO’s growing focus on the Arctic—and more specifically, for obvious reasons, on the Scandinavian sector—signals a strategic shift in the perception of a region that is no longer seen as a remote edge but rather as a critical node of Euro-Atlantic security. The Arctic now functions as a laboratory of strategic and organisational innovation, where interoperability, logistics and environmental adaptation—core aspects of any military exercise—take on a new and distinct significance.
AUTHORTommaso Bontempi
Journalist
Osservatorio Artico