Denmark and Nuclear Weapons#

Since 1957, Denmark has maintained a non-nuclear status, benefiting from the nuclear ‘umbrella’ common to NATO countries, which the United States provides. Specifically, Denmark pledged not to deploy nuclear weapons or their delivery vehicles on its territory. The impetus for revising this doctrine came on March 6, 2025, when the Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen responded to Macron’s proposal to extend French nuclear guarantees to European NATO countries if the United States withdraws them.

It’s important to note that the revision of the Danish position was not prompted by events in Ukraine, where hostilities had been ongoing for over three years by that time, but by the Trump administration’s initial claims to Greenland, announced shortly after his inauguration on January 20, 2025.

The powerful US push against Greenland in early 2026, which led to the destruction of trust within NATO, raised the previously unthinkable possibility of Denmark developing its own national nuclear weapons in cooperation with other Nordic countries: Finland, Norway, Finland, and possibly Iceland. The idea of ​​two opposition politicians was published a few days ago in the popular Danish newspaper Berlingske and addressed several issues at once.

The initiative directly challenges the US’s never-encouraged development of nuclear weapons outside the club of nuclear powers under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if these were NATO allies with the exception of the United Kingdom, whose nuclear potential is entirely subordinated to the United States.

It’s understandable that Danish politicians, known throughout Europe as troublemakers, instigators, and empty talkers, have caused a storm in a teacup. On the one hand, they’ve prepared Danish and European public opinion for steps toward the strategic autonomy of Euro-NATO. On the other hand, Trump’s shock actions have left European politicians in a state of mental and psychological imbalance which can only give rise to unhealthy mentalities and immature, poorly thought-out initiatives.

From a political, diplomatic, legal, scientific, technological, budgetary, financial, and moral perspective, the proposal of the Danish opposition politicians is absolutely unfeasible, and from a military-strategic and geopolitical perspective, it is downright suicidal. The fates of Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, their countries, and their nuclear programs attest to this.

The question remains: against which country will Europe’s nuclear weapons, which will likely never be developed, be targeted? Current global events leave no doubt—primarily against the United States, with its acute and pressing threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Denmark, and possibly also to the possessions of other EU countries, primarily France and the United Kingdom, in the Western Hemisphere.

Russia, for its part, makes no territorial claims against any EU or other European countries and poses no military threat to them, addressing its security concerns through a special operation in Ukraine.

The analysis of the Danish politicians’ nuclear initiative presented below, by Polish analysts and military officials, is worthy of close attention and correct in its fundamental conclusion: it must under no circumstances be implemented.

The North Observer will follow developments on this topic.

No Nuclear Weapons on Danish Soil#

Since 1957, it has been a fundamental part of Danish defense policy that there should be no nuclear weapons on Danish soil.

On March 6, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen opened the door ajar for the first time.

Can You Deny That Denmark Wants to Host Nuclear Weapons?#

“I can say that it is not something we are working on at all, but you are not making me stand by and say no to other people’s ideas in this process. I hope that everyone’s seriousness has subsided now. It’s about defending Europe and deterring Russia, and I’m not going to reject ideas,” she said.

After World War II, the United States wanted to expand NATO’s nuclear defense in Europe, and in February 1957 the Danish government was offered weapons systems that could be used with nuclear warheads.

The Soviet Union Threatened Consequences#

However, the Kremlin did not look kindly on possible nuclear weapons in Denmark.

The Prime Minister of the Soviet Union Nikolaj Bulganin sent a terse letter to the Danish Minister of State and Foreign Affairs H.C. Hansen.

In the letter, the Soviet Prime Minister made it unequivocally clear that in the event that nuclear weapons were to arrive on Danish soil, the Soviet Union would consider these as a bombing target.

Nikolaj Bulganin wrote that for a country the size of Denmark it would be ‘suicide’ to lay the groundwork for nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons played a dominant role in the 1957 Danish parliamentary election. The election resulted in a no-nuclear-weapons policy that would remain in effect for the next 68 years.

When H.C. Hansen subsequently formed a government, the government declared that Denmark had not been offered nuclear weapons and that the government would reject the offer if it came.

Nikolaj Bulganin, Soviet Prime Minister (1955–1958). Source: Wikimedia Commons, Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-29921-0001, CC-BY-SA 3.0

Bombs in Greenland#

But in the Arctic part of the kingdom, a more nuanced game was played.

In November 1957, the American ambassador Val Peterson asked H.C. Hansen whether Denmark would be informed if the United States wanted to store nuclear weapons in Greenland.

H.C. Hansen gave the Americans tacit acceptance and chose not to inform either his government or the Danish parliament of the decision.

“We can certainly state that the USA had nuclear weapons in Thule, and that only a very few people in Denmark knew about it,” says Jens Perch Nielsen.

Val Peterson, US ambassador to Denmark (1957–1961)

The official Danish opposition to nuclear weapons on Danish soil led NATO in 1963 to definitively abandon the idea of ​​storing nuclear weapons in Denmark.

At the same time, during the 1960s, the great powers shifted their focus from small tactical nuclear weapons, which were to be used directly in combat, to larger strategic weapons. This also reduced the need to have them stored in the various countries.

Nuclear Submarines and Bombers#

The strategic nuclear weapons that became prevalent with John F. Kennedy are typically stored on submarines or aircraft and thus do not necessarily have a permanent address.

And compared to the 1960s, the fact that strategic nuclear weapons are most often on submarines and aircraft has not changed either. That is why Jens Perch Nielsen also finds it difficult to see the need to store nuclear weapons on Danish soil.

“In my world, it is completely unrealistic that we should have nuclear weapons stationed on Danish soil. Why would we? But it is possible that we will be visited by French nuclear submarines with nuclear weapons on board,” he says.

The Umbrella Has Covered Denmark#

Carina Ann Meyn, assistant professor at the Department of Strategy and War Studies at the Danish Defense Academy, explains that Denmark has benefited from the US nuclear weapons umbrella for decades, even though we ourselves have not wanted nuclear weapons within our borders.

“Even though we have not noticed it, we have not been outside the nuclear political equation at any time since the Cold War,” she says.

A Quick Reaction to Trump’s Threats: They Want to Develop a Nordic ‘Thor’s Hammer’#

The idea of ​​acquiring a ‘Thor’s Hammer’—its own nuclear weapon—has emerged in Denmark. Faced with Donald Trump’s threats and demands, politicians are proposing a joint nuclear program for the Nordic countries. Experts in an interview with Interia analyze its real chances, the consequences for NATO, and Poland’s possible participation. General Mieczysław Bieniek, on the other hand, bluntly advises against such a move.

Thor’s Hammer and the ‘Breaking of the Credibility of American Guarantees’#

One might initially ask why such weapons have not been developed yet. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been in force since 1968, and most countries in the world have acceded to it. The principle is simple: only those countries that possessed them at the time of signing the treaty can possess nuclear weapons.

However, Rafał Kopeć argues that we may be seeing the beginning of a process of rejection of the treaty. “Over the past year, there has been increasing talk of acquiring nuclear weapons, for example, in Japan, South Korea, and the Nordic countries. This is no longer an abstract topic,” emphasizes the head of the Department of Strategic Thought at the University of the Commission of National Education in Kraków.

The professor emphasizes that there are two reasons: “First, nuclear weapons were used by Russia to blackmail Ukraine and the West. Second, the credibility of American security guarantees in connection with the Greenland issue has been undermined.” Even if the Americans don’t go too far with their threats, the milk has already been spilled. Credibility will be very difficult to rebuild, Kopeć believes.

Will Scandinavia therefore be able to decide on its own nuclear weapons? “The scenario is conceivable, but I don’t think we’re close to it at this point,” Artur Kacprzyk, a nuclear deterrence analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, tells Interia.

“It could materialize if there’s a permanent transatlantic divide, a further and serious deepening of the current crisis within NATO, especially if the US uses force against Greenland,” the expert adds. He also explains the difficulties a potential Scandinavian nuclear program would face.

Openly or Secretly?#

Kacprzyk points out that in the 1960s, Sweden was on the verge of acquiring its own nuclear weapons. It backed down when the aforementioned treaty was adopted. The analyst also emphasizes that even if attempts were made to secretly acquire such weapons, it is not easy these days.

“Secretly violating this treaty is made more difficult by the fact that it established a system for monitoring civilian nuclear programs by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since the treaty was signed, export regimes for sensitive nuclear technologies, those most useful in developing nuclear weapons, have also been strengthened,” says Interia.

Detection of the program would pose a risk that Russia would strike nuclear installations to halt work on a nuclear arsenal.

The expert adds that such actions are risky, as Moscow will be the first to protest against new nuclear programs.

“Over the decades, national intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities have strengthened. Today, if the Nordic countries attempted to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk of detecting this program would be much greater than when Sweden attempted to acquire them. Detection of the program would, in turn, pose a risk that Russia would strike nuclear installations to halt work on a nuclear arsenal, as the United States and Israel did last year against Iran,” the expert points out.

What Will It Take to Implement the Program?#

The path to a Nordic nuclear program will also require overcoming technical obstacles.

“Of the Scandinavian countries, Denmark is in the weakest position. It currently has no nuclear reactors, nor does it have uranium deposits on the main part of its territory.” To acquire a nuclear weapon, you need either uranium, which still needs to be processed and enriched, or plutonium, which can be recovered from fuel used in nuclear reactors. Uranium deposits are located in Greenland, but they are not currently being exploited, explains Kacprzyk.

Furthermore, for nuclear weapons to make sense, they must have a means of delivery, i.e., missiles with a sufficiently long range. Technology to miniaturize a nuclear warhead so it can fit in a missile is also important. According to our source, a potential Nordic nuclear program would require at least several years.

However, Kacprzyk admits that the Scandinavian arms industry could handle the task. And not only the Scandinavian one.

“Poland would be capable of producing nuclear weapons, but it would be a lengthy and risky process. The wisdom of such a step will depend primarily on the future credibility of the US as an ally, but the attitude of major European allies will also be important,” the expert emphasizes.

General Bieniek Is Blunt: “I Would Advise the Minister Against It”#

Perhaps Scandinavian ambitions also offer an opportunity for Poland to join its own nuclear weapons program. General Mieczysław Bieniek is a social advisor to the Minister of National Defense. We asked whether, if participation in the Nordic nuclear program were possible, he would advise the Minister of National Defense to do so.

“I wouldn’t advise it,” the general says succinctly. “We have a nuclear umbrella and powers that possess nuclear weapons. Such an idea would only heighten tensions. It’s a loose idea concocted by opposition politicians in Denmark. It’s as if some opposition politician in our country said: let’s build nuclear weapons with the Baltic states. It’s a long-term process, even though the technologies are advanced today. It serves no purpose.”

“I think the nuclear umbrella is quite effective, and we don’t have to worry about it,” Bieniek argues.

We ask whether the general believes American security guarantees have weakened under Donald Trump’s presidency.

“They are slightly different, but they are still there. Trump’s year as president has been marked by various transactions. Expanding influence and recognition. He considers himself the smartest, the most powerful. This is the fulfillment of his MAGA agenda. Remember that everything still requires congressional approval. He’s doing some things without consent now, but sooner or later, things will change,” the general emphasizes.

Bieniek also emphasizes that ‘thanks to President Trump’s decisive stance, NATO countries have increased their budgets, and NATO is stronger because of it.’

“The Americans have too many economic, political, and social interests to leave Europe. We, on the other hand, have bilateral contacts with the US and multilateral contacts with NATO. And let’s not forget that if a conflict with China ever breaks out—I hope not—who will the Americans have to be allied with? Only with Europe and possibly with countries in the Far East: Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. America cannot pursue a broad policy on its own, and Trump knows this perfectly well,” assesses Mieczysław Bieniek.

The US and Russia Reaction: a Necessary Balance of Profit and Loss#

Both Rafał Kopeć and Artur Kacprzyk emphasize that the decision to pursue a nuclear program must be preceded by a serious balance of profit and loss. This is especially true in the context of Washington’s reaction.

“Since the 1960s, the Americans have repeatedly attempted to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons not only by their rivals but also by their allies—to this end, the US has both exerted pressure and maintained and strengthened alliances. If Polish nuclear weapons development were discovered, they could pressure them to halt it by threatening to reduce their military presence in Poland or even withdraw from alliance commitments altogether,” warns a PISM analyst.

Additionally, there is the issue of the Kremlin’s reaction. “Russia would certainly take action to stop our nuclear program,” Professor Kopeć points out.

The expert also points out that a joint nuclear program is problematic because possessing nuclear weapons makes the most sense when these weapons are solely under the national control of the owner. He adds that, on the other hand, it might be easier to push the idea of ​​acquiring weapons internationally within a group of countries.

Is There an Alternative?#

In the context of the nuclear program, Artur Kacprzyk also points to the need to analyze the reactions of countries on the Old Continent.

“I believe that at this point, most European countries are not supportive of further NATO and EU countries acquiring nuclear weapons. They will fear being drawn into a war with Russia if it discovers and attacks their allies’ nuclear programs. However, this attitude could change if the US were to withdraw from Europe—in which case the risk of conflict would drastically increase anyway,” the expert says.

“In the event of a lasting crisis in relations with the US, many countries will likely prioritize greater protection from the nuclear forces of France and the UK.” Both countries are already taking steps in this direction, although it is unclear how much further they will be willing to take, notes the PISM analyst, adding that there is another alternative to nuclear ambitions.

“Some European countries may also attempt to approach the status of a ‘nuclear threshold state.’ That is, one that is not developing nuclear weapons but possesses the technology and resources that would allow it to acquire them relatively quickly if the appropriate decision is made. Among the US allies, such states include Japan and Germany, and to a lesser extent South Korea,” explains Artur Kacprzyk in an interview with Interia.

Source:

• Interia (in Polish)
• Nyheder (in Danish)