Modern Chinese view of international relations relies on the so-called ‘Community of Common Destiny’—an idea that has been voiced by top Chinese officials, Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Despite the global character of the idea, it often reappears in the context of bilateral relations, e.g. with Pakistan. In general, the Common Destiny implies that the world shares a common future which can be achieved by joint efforts of international relations actors. Here, one of the highlights is the accent on relations, not the states themselves. Thus, the concept invites to rethink the sovereignty-based world order.
Despite the UN-esque sound of common destiny and common global problems, the idea hasn’t been perceived that well in other countries. This idea encounters resistance primarily because China accents the rebuilding of the Western system in international relations. In that light, even a small success marked by a phrase in UN resolution was considered a win in the East.
On the other hand, there is a concept of Arctic ‘commonality’. It appears, for example, in the legal analysis of political discourse done by Kristin Bartenstein. This term implies that the Arctic region shares a lot of ‘commons’ which are very often referenced by the politicians. This can relate, for example, to the ‘common problems’ (primarily, climate change), ‘common interests’, ‘common agenda’, ‘common goals’, ‘common heritage’ etc. Although not many reference the ‘common natural resources’, we have to assume that this is also a part of the existing discourse.
Arctic ‘commonality’ has been used by non-Arctic states quite often, but right now this theme went off-topic because of the global geopolitical turbulence.
It can be easily observed that these statements align quite well with the whole idea of common destiny or shared future, despite the fact that we do not see many direct linkages.
During his speech in the General Assembly of the UN in 2015, Xi Jinping formulated five principles of the Common Destiny:
- Building partnership relations based on equality;
- Creating a security model based on the principles of justice, mutual trust, cooperation;
- Developing with openness and mutual provision of benefits;
- Performing inter-civilisation exchanges based on the search for common ground;
- Creating an ecosystem based on the principles of respect for nature, harmonious coexistence of man and nature.
As can be seen, the fourth and fifth principles are rather relatable to the Arctic topics in general, but how do they appear in actual discussions of the Arctic, Belt and Road Initiative, and Common Destiny?
According to Chih Yuan Woon’s research, among scholars, these concepts are framed in more available forms such as metaphors or catchphrases: ‘symphony’, ‘win-win’ (that is, for cooperation in the Arctic), ‘shared interests’.
We also see some direct mentions of this particular connection in the academic discourse: for example, a Chinese scholar Qin Dahe in his book Polar Silk Road touches on the topic by accenting the joint character of Arctic cooperation. He proposes ‘jointly building the PSR’ and often refers to such categories as ‘shared future for mankind’, ‘community with a shared future’. Global governance of the Arctic is linked to the development of the Belt and Road Initiative.
This could mean that the theory of international relations, when it comes to Arctic matters, slightly shifts. Currently, compared to previous expectations, China’s activity on the issues of PSR is lower than it was previously expected because of the international crises and major risks of sanctions for China if the country decides to directly participate in Russia’s projects on the Northern Sea Route.
The idea of Common Destiny, despite its attractiveness in the global agenda, hasn’t gained much appraisal. However, we are ought to expect a significant change in discussions if the dust settles and if the same principles will have been aligned with the topic of the Polar Silk Road, as the Arctic is a fruitful ground for cooperation as is.
AUTHOR