Republic of Korea to Use Northern Sea Route for Commercial Shipping
The Republic of Korea quietly entered the Arctic race in 2023, passing the Polar Activities Promotion Act and the First Basic Plan for Polar Activities Promotion (2023–2027). The Republic’s authorities see the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs partly through internal waters and also through Russia’s territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, as the only feasible shipping route, rather than Canada’s Northwest Passage.
For observers, the Republic of Korea’s desire to jump on the Arctic train crystallized at the most inopportune time: an era of global restructuring, the formation of a new world order characterized by a prolonged period of instability and even chaos, characteristic of an era of global geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic transition, fraught with global military conflict or a series of regional wars replacing global war as a tool for reconfiguring the world system.
As history shows, the active phase of transit can last 20–30 years, dominated by various types of conflicts, inevitably resulting in temporary disruptions or the final collapse of globalization as a form of global economic organization and a transition to economic regionalization and the formation of trade and economic blocs led by the world’s leading powers.
In this new deglobalized world, countries with export-oriented economies, transporting their cargo through increasingly dangerous or even inaccessible sea routes, will be particularly hard hit. An unprovoked and illegal attack by Israel and the United States on Iran and the resulting shortages of energy resources, metals, and fertilizers will, as is already clear, escalate into a global financial and economic crisis—an inevitable attribute of ongoing global transit.
Resource-deficient and export-oriented, the Republic of Korea is particularly vulnerable in the era of global transit: importing all types of raw materials and exporting high-value-added goods by sea requires freedom of navigation and unimpeded passage through the Strait of Malacca, the Persian Gulf, and the Suez Canal. Only the Pacific Ocean is relatively safe for the Republic of Korea’s maritime trade, with the exception of its western part, where the Taiwan issue remains unresolved.
A maritime route from the Republic of Korea to Europe bypassing Africa via the Cape of Good Hope is economically unviable and makes its goods uncompetitive in the EU market. The Republic of Korea’s planned use of cold Arctic waters instead of its usual tropical and subtropical waters is a hard decision, as navigation in high latitudes is impossible year-round, and the shallow depths limit the tonnage of merchant vessels, thereby reducing the economic impact of trade volume.
Environmental regulations for Arctic shipping are soon planned to be tightened for certain types of marine fuel, and assistance in the event of a potential breakdown or accident is unavailable quickly. Insurance rates for navigation in Arctic waters are higher, and the cost of icebreaker assistance will also reduce the profitability of the route.
Shipping in Arctic waters implies political cooperation with Russia, which has been effectively disrupted by the unilateral sanctions imposed by the Republic of Korea, with sweeping export restrictions aimed at limiting Russia’s technological development and military potential. These restrictions cover more than 1,100 items, including strategic materials, heavy construction equipment, automobiles, spare parts, and electronics. Clearly, if the current sanctions regime continues, the prospects for regular shipping by the Republic of Korea along the NSR are illusory.
Despite a long list of unresolved issues, some of which are outlined above, the administration of President Lee Jae-myung has made the Arctic route a national policy priority, viewing it as a shorter alternative (roughly 13,000 km to Rotterdam vs. 20,000 km via Suez) to improve competitiveness.
The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, led by Kim Sung-bum, announced plans for a 3,000-TEU container ship to travel from Busan to Rotterdam via the NSR, aiming for a September 2026 test run.
The Republic of Korea is clearly wary of jumping on the Arctic train too late, leaving it to watch with envy as savvy Chinese traders profitably exploit the short Arctic route to trade with the European Union, albeit not year-round.
The Republic of Korea’s Arctic plans also have a significant domestic dimension. The country will implement a large-scale strategic plan to create a powerful industrial and logistics cluster in its lagging southern provinces, which will create a second pole of economic and political power equal in potential to the capital region. In terms of scale, this plan is comparable to the Siberianization project of Russia and will determine the future of the Republic of Korea for decades to come.
There appear to be no other growth drivers for the southern provinces of this small country other than the development of an economy focused on the Arctic and Arctic shipbuilding and shipping. Recognizing this, the government announced plans to relocate the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries to Busan to support Arctic trade initiatives, aiming to turn the city into a hub for polar shipping.
There is no doubt that the participation of an economically strong middle power, the Republic of Korea, in Arctic projects will serve the common good of responsible, sustainable, and long-term development of the Arctic’s potential, will contribute to the “stitching” of this part of Eurasia into a single economic space, and will create the necessary competitive environment for its development.
In the informative text below, three lawyers from the Republic of Korea provide a concise analysis of the need for the Republic of Korea to participate in Arctic affairs, citing the geopolitical transformation of the world and the increasing risks to maritime shipping on established shipping routes. The text presents the Republic of Korea’s perspective on the positions of Arctic countries in the context of Arctic issues, identifying the undeniable benefits, as well as the challenges and risks for the Republic of Korea.
Race to Secure the Arctic Route: International Trends and Implications
The Need for Alternative Routes Due to Geopolitical Reshaping
As climate change and geopolitical reshaping intertwine, the Arctic is gaining strategic importance as an alternative route capable of mitigating the instability of existing maritime trade structures. As new maritime routes, such as the Northern Sea Route, are gradually opening up due to the melting of glaciers, major countries including Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union are redefining their Arctic strategies and priorities, and forming a new competitive landscape.
The deepening instability of the South China Sea and the Suez Canal is also increasing the need for alternative routes. The Suez Canal is a key maritime route that handles about 12% of Asia-Europe trade volume, but it has experienced bottlenecks several times due to the Middle East wars, the grounding of the container ship Ever Given, and attacks by Houthi rebels. In particular, there have been instances where logistics costs have skyrocketed, with war risk insurance premiums per vessel rising by up to $1 million following attacks by Houthi rebels. This reveals one aspect of the structural vulnerability of the global maritime transport system.
As a result, some shipping companies are utilizing the Cape Route, which connects Europe and Asia, as an alternative route; however, this route is approximately 9,000 km longer than the existing Suez Canal and causes delays of 7 to 10 days in transport. Consequently, fuel costs per vessel have increased by about $1 million, and container freight rates, surcharges, and insurance premiums have risen accordingly. In fact, the number of vessels transiting the Suez Canal decreased from 2,395 in May 2023 to 930 in February 2025, while the number of vessels using the Cape Route increased from 1,170 to 2,887.
These geopolitical risks have a direct impact on major trading partners, including the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea has transported a portion of its trade with Europe and energy imports through the Suez Canal, and instability in this route poses a significant threat to national maritime logistics and energy security. Furthermore, military tensions in the South China Sea and the potential for restrictions on freedom of navigation are particularly serious risk factors. If this area is blockaded, ships must bypass the Indonesian Lombok Strait (Selat Lombok), which results in a route extension of approximately 2,000 km and a shipping delay of 3 to 4 days.
In this context of growing vulnerability in global maritime logistics networks and increasing geopolitical uncertainty, the Arctic route is emerging as a major alternative route and is being highlighted as a space with strategic implications linked to climate change, energy security, and international maritime governance.
Trends and Policies of Major Countries
The approaches of major countries regarding the Arctic Sea Route are unfolding differently depending on their economic structures, geopolitical interests, perceptions of maritime control, and environmental and climate policy directions. The linear confrontational structure previously divided into “Russia versus the U.S. and Nordic nations” is gradually disintegrating, and a multi-layered strategic landscape is forming where cooperation and competition intersect based on issue-specific interests. Amidst these changes, the Arctic Sea Route is establishing itself as a complex strategic space where various policy domains—including energy, security, industry, and the environment—intersect.
Russia
Russia is utilizing the Arctic Sea Route as an economic breakthrough to counter Western sanctions and as a strategic axis for resource exports. Through the 2030 National Arctic Sea Route Development Plan, it is establishing an integrated development system for the energy, logistics, and shipbuilding industries. Furthermore, it effectively regards parts of the Arctic Ocean as its own territorial waters and is actively pursuing a policy of prioritizing its own vessels. This can be understood as an attempt to build a self-sufficient system to operate the Arctic Sea Route using its own capabilities in the long term, despite Western sanctions. In addition, under the Shipbuilding Industry Development Strategy 2050, a plan has been presented to invest approximately 500 billion rubles (about $6.3 billion) over the next six years to build more than 1,600 vessels at domestic shipyards by 2036. Through this, the goal is to strengthen the industrial system centered on crude oil and gas carriers, increase the localization rate of shipbuilding components to 80%, and prioritize the digital transformation and the expansion of large-block construction methods.
At the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2025, President Putin officially announced the Transarctic Transport Corridor plan, which connects major ports from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok. He also stated his intention to expand this into a complex logistics network linked with inland transport networks in Siberia and the Far East. This can be understood as a vision to develop the Arctic route not merely as a maritime transport route, but as a major national logistics artery connected to the entire territory of Russia. In terms of military security, Russia continues to build up its military power in the Arctic region. Along with the modernization of Arctic bases, it is concentrating approximately two-thirds of its strategic nuclear submarines (equipped with ICBMs) on the Kola Peninsula and is also pursuing plans to construct additional floating nuclear power platforms. These moves are linked to concerns that the Arctic could emerge as the region with the highest concentration of nuclear and military assets in the world in the medium to long term.
United States
The United States defines the Arctic shipping route as international waters and actively asserts its Freedom of Navigation, attempting to counter China’s expansion into the Arctic while simultaneously seeking to secure the initiative in the norms and order within the region. As the Arctic activities of Russia and China expand, the U.S. policy stance also appears to be shifting toward a more proactive approach.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is pursuing the acquisition of six Polar Security Cutters by 2029 and is seeking to secure influence and operational capabilities in the Arctic through the expansion of its icebreaking capabilities. The United States, Canada, and Finland are establishing a cooperative framework covering the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of icebreakers based on the ICE Pact signed in July 2024.
In terms of infrastructure, the United States is constructing its first deep-sea Arctic port in Nome, Alaska, with a total project cost of approximately $399.4 million. This port is a complex infrastructure combining military and civilian purposes, with the primary goals being the stationing of U.S. forces and the strengthening of strategic base functions.
Diplomatically, the U.S. is attempting to expand its influence in the Arctic by reopening a consulate in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, and expanding diplomatic and economic presence in Tromsø, Norway, one of the northernmost cities on Earth.
The second Trump administration also regards the growing influence of Russia and China in the Arctic as a substantial threat to national security and is reinforcing a stance that explicitly recognizes the Arctic as a major strategic competitive space.
China
China has a strategy to actively utilize the Arctic Sea Route as an alternative route for global supply chains and a new axis of growth. Given China’s high dependence on maritime trade—accounting for approximately 46.5% of its GDP—and the significant potential of Arctic resources such as rare earth elements and hydrocarbons, securing access to the Arctic is recognized as a strategic task from a mid-to-long-term perspective. China has adopted the Arctic Sea Route as a strategy to mitigate geopolitical risks and diversify its supply chains.
China participated as an observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 and defined itself as a “near-Arctic state” upon publishing the Arctic White Paper in 2018. Through this, it clearly demonstrated its commitment to utilizing the Arctic Sea Route based on international cooperation and infrastructure development. In particular, it is fostering the development of the Arctic Sea Route as a strategic route connecting Europe and East Asia by linking it with the Polar Silk Road initiative. This shipping route holds significant strategic importance, particularly in that it can function as an alternative trade route in the event of a blockade of the Strait of Malacca, which is considered one of the world’s most important shipping lanes alongside the Panama Canal.
In terms of economic cooperation, China is pursuing large-scale energy projects such as Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2, centered on cooperation with Russia, while also expanding cooperation in infrastructure and resource development with Nordic countries including Greenland, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Although its military influence remains limited, it is securing a foothold for expansion into the North Pacific through the development of ports in the northeastern region; its future strategic direction is highly likely to be heavily influenced by the level of cooperation with Russia and the competitive landscape with the United States.
Chinese shipping companies are also reportedly accelerating investments, ordering icebreakers, acquiring used ones, and training crews.
The opening of commercial shipping routes is also yielding tangible results. In September 2025, the commercial container ship Istanbul Bridge departed from Ningbo Port, one of the world’s top three ports, and arrived at Felixstowe in the UK via the Arctic route, marking the realization of the first commercial voyage connecting China and Europe. The sailing time, which previously took about 40 days via the Suez Canal, was shortened to about 20 days, and it is expected to contribute to strengthening the price competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing through reduced carbon emissions and logistics costs. In particular, the Arctic route is emerging as a key route for diversifying global industrial supply chains in the future, as it is evaluated as being suitable for transporting high-value cargo such as electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and solar components.
Nordic Countries
Nordic countries, including Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, are utilizing the Arctic shipping route as a leading testbed for industrial technology innovation and sustainable shipping.
Finland is known to account for approximately 80% of global icebreaker design and 60% of construction, solidifying its position as a leader in the Arctic shipbuilding industry. Norway, as the Chair of the Arctic Council (2023–2025), is leading the Green Shipping Corridors and is concretizing eco-friendly shipping solutions through plans to deploy electric and ammonia hybrid vessels by 2027.
Sweden is developing low-carbon shipping technologies and establishing eco-friendly route operation models, while also expanding icebreaking infrastructure to address freezing issues in northern ports and striving to stabilize iron ore export routes. Iceland is emphasizing environmental responsibility by promoting sustainable fisheries and eco-tourism through policies on the transition of ships to renewable energy and the establishment of a climate fund. Similarly, Denmark, having assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council starting in May 2025, is strengthening its Arctic strategy centered on environmental and technological innovation, including the goal of reducing ship pollutants and underwater noise through digital and eco-friendly transition programs.
Implications
While the objectives for utilizing the Arctic shipping route vary by country, they share common core goals:
- Mitigating supply chain risks
- Securing energy security
- Securing new growth engines for the shipbuilding and shipping industries
- Expanding geopolitical influence
It is also notable that while Russia, the United States, and China approach the Arctic route as a strategic asset and institutionalize it, Nordic countries are strengthening cooperative approaches centered on security, the environment, and technological innovation.
Consequently, the Arctic shipping route has begun to function as a central axis for the reshaping of global geopolitical networks, transcending a mere maritime transport route; now, it is time for the Republic of Korea to prepare mid-to-long-term response strategies.
The government of the Republic of Korea presents policy directions for securing competitiveness in Arctic shipping routes through the Polar Activities Promotion Act and the First Basic Plan for Polar Activities Promotion (2023–2027).
This plan includes key tasks such as the development of eco-friendly icebreaking container ships, securing digital and autonomous navigation technologies, and establishing an Arctic Shipping Information Center. These initiatives serve as an institutional foundation for technological innovation and strengthening industrial competitiveness in the shipbuilding and shipping sectors.
Meanwhile, special bills related to the Arctic shipping route, including the Special Act on Support for the Establishment of the Arctic Shipping Route proposed in March 2025, are leading to discussions on the creation of an Arctic Strategy Fund to strengthen the legal and institutional foundations for the development and utilization of the Arctic route, and to promote the construction of Arctic-related infrastructure and the participation of private companies. This policy momentum is expected to provide the Republic of Korea’s shipbuilding and marine industries with an opportunity to secure leadership in the global eco-friendly ship market through the Arctic shipping route.
In particular, as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) implements measures to gradually restrict and ban the use of heavy fuel oil to protect the Arctic ecosystem, the Republic of Korea’s shipbuilding industry, which possesses strengths in eco-friendly ship technology, may be in a relatively advantageous position. Based on technological superiority in high-value-added vessel types such as LNG and low-carbon fuel-based ships and icebreaking LNG carriers, it is expected that competitiveness in the market for ships capable of handling the Arctic route can be enhanced.
While there are rosy prospects for the development of the Arctic route, various limiting factors are also being pointed out. For example, it is difficult to accurately predict sea ice conditions, and due to extreme weather conditions, the operation of expensive specialized vessels is essential, and high insurance premiums must be paid. Furthermore, if an accident occurs in the Arctic route, recovery efforts may be more difficult compared to other sea areas with favorable weather conditions. In addition to the IMO’s heavy fuel oil usage regulations adopted due to environmental issues in the Arctic region, there is also a possibility that additional regulations regarding black carbon or polar navigation fuels will be introduced in the future.
Furthermore, it is highly likely that Russia will maintain strict control over certain Arctic routes, claiming them as its territorial waters. In the current climate of geopolitical tension, Western sanctions on operations linked to Russia’s energy sector could also pose a risk to companies seeking to utilize the Arctic routes. The government of the Republic of Korea also faces the difficult task of maintaining a diplomatic balance between the U.S. and Russia during the process of pioneering the Arctic routes.
In addition, manpower supply could act as a potential bottleneck, as there is a limited number of professional seafarers with experience operating on Arctic routes domestically, and captains and navigators who have completed polar navigation training courses in accordance with IMO regulations are required.
Moreover, container shipping is currently assessed as less economical than the general Asia-Europe route, so the authors emphasize that emphasis must be placed on high-value bulk cargo.
Therefore, while clearly recognizing these realistic constraints, the authors argue it is necessary to develop an integrated Arctic response strategy that includes investing in eco-friendly ship technologies, such as icebreakers, establishing a training system for personnel specialized in Arctic route operations, and strengthening the linkages between shipbuilding, shipping, and polar policies. In addition, the Republic of Korea must simultaneously pursue efforts to reflect its position by designing a financial, tax, and regulatory support package to facilitate private sector participation, engaging in substantive cooperation with Arctic-related countries including Russia, and actively participating in the IMO rule-making process.
The Republic of Korea needs to utilize the Arctic Sea Route as an alternative route to diversify risks and as an opportunity for the leap forward of its eco-friendly, high-value-added shipbuilding industry. The Republic of Korea must establish a balanced long-term strategy capable of maximizing tangible benefits within the framework of international competition and cooperation surrounding the Arctic Sea Route, while comprehensively considering geopolitical risks, environmental regulations, and technological and human resource requirements.
Source: Law Times (in Korean)
