Background#

Svalbard in not only sensitive because of its proximity to Kola Peninsula. What makes its status of vital concern to Moscow is its command of the northern shore of the mouth of that natural, ice-bounded fjord through which Kola based vessels must traverse when accessing Western seas. The ice boundary stretches southward from Svalbard to about Bear Island before curving eastward and terminating at Cape Saint Nose (Mys Svyatoi Nos). Northern Norway and North Western Kola form the southern shore of the ‘artificial’ fiord, then leading into Murmansk and the numerous bays. Any incorporation of Svalbard or Northern Norway into anti-Russian military activities would be wholly intolerable to Moscow, as these regions control the sole access route to the Kola Peninsula.

To comprehend the motivations behind contemporary Russia’s security concerns regarding radar placements and military activities around Svalbard (leaving behind the potential for bases and dual-use infrastructure), one needs to take into consideration the foreign policy context at post-Cold war era, alongside the historical context of Soviet-Norwegian disagreements concerning the interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty.

Soviet reactions towards potential Norway’s inclusion of its northern territories (Svalbard, the Bear Island, and the island of Jan Mayen) within NATO’s command structure in the early 1950s stemmed from their perception that this action violated the Svalbard Treaty’s demilitarization clause. Norway responded that no military fortifications or bases had been established on the archipelago, and that the country would not allow any state to do so. From the Norwegian viewpoint, the Svalbard Treaty obligations had been upheld. However, the Soviet Union remained unconvinced, expressing concerns about the potential for military utilization of Svalbard by Norway or its NATO allies.

Still, Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty prohibits Norway from establishing naval bases or military fortifications on the archipelago and states that it “may never be used for warlike purposes”.

So, the presence of a permanent military force is prohibited on Svalbard. This presented a strategic challenge for NATO planners, archipelago being incorporated into the Supreme Allied Command (Atlantic) but lacking any military defence infrastructure. Although Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty guaranteed allied support in theory, neither Norway nor its allies could realistically undertake military preparations to defend Svalbard during the Cold War without violating the stipulations of the Svalbard Treaty.

ESRO And The Svalbard Telemetry Station#

A notable historical precedent for contemporary geopolitical tensions is a mid-1960s dispute between the Soviet Union and Norway regarding the establishment of a telemetric station by the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) on Svalbard.

ESRO, founded in 1964, aimed to prepare and coordinate a civilian scientific and technological joint effort in the area of space research by European states. While Norway held observer status within ESRO and participated in its projects, the planned construction of a telemetry station on Svalbard under ESRO’s auspices raised concerns for the Soviet Union.

Given Svalbard’s treaty status as a territory under Norwegian sovereignty, but with special restrictions on the use of the archipelago ‘for warlike purposes’, and a ban on the construction of fortifications, this was not entirely unexpected.

Although the construction of the station itself was deemed unlikely to provoke a direct military response from the Soviet Union, it fueled anxieties when considered alongside other developments, such as proposed airfield construction on Svalbard. The Soviets thought that Norway might be acting on behalf of NATO and that these projects could ultimately serve military purposes. Despite Soviet concerns, the ESRO station was established on Svalbard and remained operational until 1974. The personnel were Norwegian, but the station was open to scientists from many countries, and Russian scientists visited the station in 1968.

Around the same time, the UK news outlets began to refer to Svalbard as NATO’s ‘Achilles heel’. This designation raises questions about the rationale behind the UK media’s emphasis on this perceived vulnerability rather than Norwegian sources. One possible explanation is a strategic shift in focus from maritime security concerns (specifically, the Greenland–Iceland–UK Gap and its role in deterring Soviet submarine access to the Atlantic) towards territorial spaces like Svalbard, which could potentially serve as forward operating bases for alleged Soviet power projection.

Throughout the 1970s, Norwegian authorities faced a delicate balancing in asserting their sovereignty. While no improper use of helicopters was detected at the Russian settlement of Barentsburg, concerns persisted regarding their potential conversion into a military base. This environment of uncertainty meant that all parties became deeply invested in watching one another for signs of power projection, ‘presence’ through science and potential violations of the treaty.

U.S.-Induced Geopolitical Peculiarities In 1990-2000s#

In the 1990s, Svalbard became the arena for an increasing number of space-related activities. Despite the failed experiment by ESRO, since 1997 the Svalbard Satellite Station (SvalSat), situated on Platåberget near Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Norway, has been operational. Managed by Kongsberg Satellite Services (KSAT), a joint venture between Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and the Norwegian Space Centre (NSC), SvalSat serves as a critical hub for satellite communications.

The station’s use for military intelligence purposes has been subject to debate, with journalist Bård Wormdal arguing that downloading earth imagery for intelligence and military activities violates the Svalbard Treaty. He cites examples such as the sale of Landsat images from the Libyan Civil War to the Italian Armed Forces, Technology Experiment Satellite images to the United States Armed Forces during the War in Afghanistan, and Arirang-2 images of North Korean installations to the United States.

Despite these concerns, former governor of Svalbard Odd Olsen Ingerø maintains that indirect military use of SvalSat data does not constitute a treaty violation. Professor Geir Ulfstein’s dissertation further concludes that even direct downloading of military intelligence from military satellites via SvalSat would be permissible under the treaty.

Further exacerbating Russian anxieties were signals from Washington in the late 1990s regarding a possible termination of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The subsequent U.S. withdrawal from this treaty in 2002 and the deployment of ABM radars and missile interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic heightened the Russian worries over the potential military use of radars or any form of military activities in northern Norway and Svalbard.

In addition, Norway’s decision in 1997 to lift some of restrictions on foreign military activities east of the 24th meridian, that is, in the country’s northernmost and easternmost land, sea, and air space, was interpreted in Russia as yet another potentially threatening departure from the status quo. This move, perceived by Norway as normalization of the situation in the northern border region, was met with resistance from the Russian military, which could mean an escalation of NATO exercises near Russia’s northwestern border.

First National Security Strategy In Progress#

In May 2025, Norway unveiled its inaugural National Security Strategy, a direct response to the increasingly complex and evolving security landscape in the northern region. The strategy represents a comprehensive plan that includes strengthening national defence capabilities, enhancing societal resilience, and ensuring the security of critical infrastructure. The strategy emphasises the importance of continued support and reinforcement from the United States as integral to Norway’s defence posture. Additionally, Norway expresses its endorsement of U.S. intentions to monitor Russian strategic nuclear forces and submarines for security purposes.

To strengthen its military presence in the Arctic region, Norway intends to accelerate the construction of relevant infrastructure on Svalbard, aligning with the objectives set in the National Security Strategy. Units from the Norwegian armed forces, specialising in modernising seaports and airfields, will be responsible for the construction.

While full militarization of the archipelago seems improbable, partial militarization is most likely to occur through the establishment of NATO contingents on a rotational basis in Svalbard.

Previously, the decision to establish a rotating United States Marine Corps presence in Norway, made in 2016, sparked debate regarding Norway’s foreign policy stance. Former Foreign Minister Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide faced criticism for deviating from Norway’s policy of balance by seeking increased allied commitment in the Arctic region. In response to this criticism, Søreide highlighted the necessity of collabourative efforts with allies in the North.

Earlier this year, the Norwegian government partnered with Space Norway to develop a new submarine cable system connecting Bodø, mainland Norway to Svalbard, named Arctic Way. This project, budgeted at NOK 2.8 billion, will also extend connectivity to Jan Mayen, currently reliant on satellite communication for all data transfer. Norwegian Minister of Defence, Tore O. Sandvik, emphasized that establishing a submarine cable connection to Jan Mayen is crucial for enhancing Norway and its allies’ situational awareness and strategic oversight in the region.

In pursuit of a lasting collabouration with the U.S., Space Norway has forged a partnership with SubCom LLC, a U.S.-based company specialising in turnkey cable system solutions. It is expected that SubCom LLC will be responsible for overseeing all phases of the subsea cable project, from initial survey and design to manufacturing and final installation.

Norway has consistently demonstrated alignment with United States foreign policy objectives. Notably, during the 1980s, Norway distinguished itself as the first NATO member state to surpass the 3 percent benchmark for annual military expenditure growth. This commitment persists today, with projected defence spending reaching 3.3 percent of GDP on defense this year, compared to 2.1 percent allocated in 2024.

Instead Of Conclusion#

It is increasingly evident that, due to the rising strategic significance of the Arctic in NATO’s long-term strategies, Norwegian officials may consider utilising Svalbard as a support base for the Alliance’s military forces in the High North. The decision to establish any fortifications, along with other initiatives to militarise the archipelago—such as conducting year-round Coast Guard patrols in its waters—contravenes the international legal status of Svalbard.

The decisions regarding Svalbard have garnered political backing, as evidenced by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Delegation’s visit to both Svalbard and Oslo earlier in May. During this visit, Norwegian officials repeatedly highlighted that although the immediate concern for Svalbard is the gradual undermining of the international rules-based order established in 1920, it is important to recognise that Svalbard is part of Norwegian territory and is covered by the collective defence obligation outlined in Article 5, as stated by Trond Helleland, Head of the Norwegian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.