A Historical Overview
Most people are unaware of Spain’s Arctic tradition. While it is well known that the country used to lead one of the largest empires ever existed, which controlled at its height most of the American continent, some parts of Italy and the Netherlands, that its piece of eight was the main global currency until the middle of the 19th century and that Spain de facto started the Modern Age, few people know about the country’s quest for the Northwest Passage and its territorial claims on parts of Canada and Alaska. Still, while Spain’s Arctic claims were short-lived and left few traces, the Spanish contribution to the ultimate discover of the Northwest Passage is hard to underestimate.
Spain’s Arctic explorations started after the Discovery of America, at a time when it just ended the Reconquista and was ready to become one of the two world superpowers. After the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which assigned most of the New World to Spain, the country started to look for the mythological Strait of Anian, which was supposed to link the Labrador Peninsula (now part of Canada) and the Baja California (in present Mexico), originally thought to be an island. As for the Discovery of America itself, the main aim was to find new trade routes towards the Orient bypassing the Ottoman Empire on the basis that the Earth was round; and, given its greater geographical proximity, all expeditions towards the mythological Strait of Anian started from the Viceroyalty of New Spain (henceforth the Virreinato), which at its height included Central America (including Mexico) and the Southwestern United States.
Since the core of the Virreinato was in Mexico City and on the surrounding plateaus, the quest for the Northwest Passage followed the Pacific Coast northwards. In 1539, the notion of the Strait of Anian was discredited by Francisco de Ulloa, the first to discover that Baja California was a peninsula. This, nevertheless, didn’t stop the quest for the Northwest Passage: in 1592, the Greek-born sailor Juan De Fuca sailed the Pacific Northwest up to the strait dividing the Vancouver Island in Canada and the nowadays U.S. State of Washington, which now bears his name.
A new wave of Spanish explorations occurred in the 2nd half of the 18th century, also because Britain and Russia started to build settlements and trading posts in the Pacific Northwest. In 1774 Juan José Pérez Hernández reached Haida Gwaii (formerly known as the Queen Charlotte Island), in nowadays British Columbia, but the most important expeditions occurred between 1775 and 1779, when Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra explored the Pacific Northwest up to Kodiak Island, in Alaska. Meanwhile, whalers from Northern Spain had been fishing around the Labrador Peninsula since the 16th and around the Svalbard Island since the 18th century.
Wherever they went, the explorers were accompanied by brethren of various religious orders, which subsequently founded missions in the newly explored lands with the aim both of converting the indigenous population and to strengthen the Spanish control of these lands. The actual colonisation, nevertheless, was slow: the first mission in the Californias was founded in 1697, the first one north of the current U.S.-Mexico border followed up in 1769, and Santa Cruz de Nutca, the northernmost Spanish settlement ever founded, lies on the Vancouver Island just south of the 50th Parallel.
The Spaniards claimed a large chunk of land up to the 61st Parallel, mapping it and giving Spanish names to many places (Puerto Córdoba, Puerto Santiago, Puerto Valdez…); but in fact their control over what they called Nutca Territory was very weak at most, and the only signs of a Spanish presence north of the Californias are in a few toponyms (Revillagigedo Island, Valdez and Cordova in Alaska and the aforementioned Strait of Juan de Fuca). Moreover, most of that region was claimed also by Britain and Russia, and both were actually better positioned to enforce their claims.
The 1794 Nootka Convention, which forbade both Britain and Spain to set up permanent establishments in the Nootka Sound (the location of Santa Cruz de Nutca), marked the beginning of the end for Spain’s Arctic ambitions. The times of Tordesillas were definitely over: while according to its terms Spain was legally entitled to the Nutca Territory, Britain refused to recognise these claims, and the same applied for Russia, whose southernmost American establishment, founded in 1812 about 145 km north of San Francisco, was already within the Spanish-controlled Alta California.
Last but not least, the fledgling United States had already set their eyes onto what they called Oregon Territory. To reduce the damage, Spain attempted to set the northern border of the Virreinato on the Strait of Juan De Fuca, but the 1819 Adams-Onis Treaty with the United States put it on the 42nd Parallel (the current border between Oregon and California), well below the Arctic region. Two years later, after Mexican independence, Spain lost any interest in the Arctic region, and from then onwards the country remained a mostly inward-looking regional power, far away from the glories of the past, occasionally under turmoil and whose actual sphere of influence didn’t expand much further than North and Western Africa. We should wait until the end of the 20th Century to see Spain in the Arctic again.
A map with Spanish claims, 18th century
Spain’s Arctic Strategy
The publication of the Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy in 2016 officialises the country’s return to the Arctic region after a long absence. The main trigger of this renewed interest has been climate change, with the gradual melting of the ice caps and the connected global challenges; but, as we are going to see, the strategy also mentions fishing resources, new transportation routes and political aspects.
Choosing the word “Polar” rather than “Arctic” is not a detail: Spain has also two research bases in the Antarctica and, while the two poles are very different in terms of geology, political status and demography, many of the challenges both regions have to face are similar if not superimposable. Moreover, activities in both the Arctica and Antarctica are managed by the Spanish Polar Committee.
Unsurprisingly, for a white paper officially triggered by climate change, scientific research is mentioned first. Spain has signed both the Svalbard and the Antarctica Treaties, granting freedom of research in those lands; but, unlike in Antarctica, Spain has currently no Arctic research station of its own. Therefore, as put by the strategy, Madrid needs to formalize relations with other countries in order to get access to their installations and to do research in Arctic waters using Spanish resources, or to join forces with other countries. But, in spite of this, Spain has been rather active in this sector: it conducted its first oceanographic mission in 2007, it took part to the large Arctic Tipping Point (ATP) project, dedicated to the Arctic marine ecology, and the Institute of Marine Sciences of Barcelona has been one of the partners of the MOSAiC Expedition, the largest one ever undertaken in the Arctic Ocean. Spain has also two research vessels with icebreaking capacities, BIO Hesperides and Sarmiento de Gamboa, although their icebreaking skills are not comparable to those, for instance, of Polarstern: both of them are able to cross thin first-year ice with occasional older ice, but not ice banks more than 70 cm thick.
Fishing is another main topic mentioned by the White Paper. As put by the latter, Spain has a “major deficit of fish products, which demands maintaining a very dynamic external policy in order to reach agreements making it possible to obtain these products”. As a EU member, Spain is bound to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which grants unlimited access for EU fisheries to the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other EU members; but the limited fish resources somehow affect all EU members, which have to buy fish or accede the sea resources of non-EU countries, among which the Arctic ones are a priority for both Spain and the EU as a whole.
The White Paper also mentions the development of new sea routes through the Arctic: the Northeast Passage, which would give Spain a quicker access to the Eastern Asian markets, and the Northwest one, that would reduce voyage timing for the West Coast of the United States compared to the traditional route through the Panama Canal; hailing their opening as greatly beneficial to Spain, due to its overcapacity of turnkey transport and logistical infrastructure and because, as a country straddling from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, it is strategically positioned among two main navigation routes: the North-South one and that crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, But, at the same time, “as long as it is not possible to have the passages completely open year-round, or at least during a full half-year, it will not be possible to duly meet the requirement of regularity demanded by shipping agents regarding intercontinental transport services”.
Last but not least, the political and diplomatic aspects of Spain’s presence in the Arctic must be mentioned. Spain is an observer in the Arctic Council since 2006 and a member of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) since 2009.
The White Paper advises Spain, among the others, to join the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and all the other major polar organisations to ensure its participation in a wide range of fields and activities ranging from scientific research to environmental protection, energy and support for the traditional lifestyles and cultures of the indigenous Arctic populations, peacekeeping missions, the promotion of security in the polar regions and to foster the creation of a specialised commission devoted to polar issues within the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU is often mentioned as a main platform to promote Spain’s Arctic interests, which is not surprising given Spain’s distance from the region and an overall interest to get as much access as possible to the Arctic region’s economic and logistical resources.
Beyond The Strategy: Spain In The Arctic
The White Paper is not exhaustive and does not include all Spain’s interests in the region. One of them, shared with other Arctic countries, is illegal immigration. Most of it is made up of “economic migrants”, whose presence is totally illegal, aside with potential asylum seekers; and, while the former should be just repatriated, at least in theory, the latter’s status gives them a right to stay.
Asylum policy in the EU is regulated by the Dublin III Regulation, which states that refugees have to apply for political asylum in the country where they arrived and to live and work in the country which gave them asylum, although they can move to other EU countries for tourism. Since most refugees actually want to reach countries such as Germany or Sweden, this causes a strong resentment among countries on the receiving end of the migration flows, which already bear the burden of the arrival of illegal immigrants; especially where the populist right came into power (Italy under the 1st Conte Government is a good case in point), they often complain a lack of support from other EU countries, demanding an equitable repartition of asylum seekers among European countries.
Unlike in Italy, nevertheless, in Spain illegal migration didn’t cause tensions with Central and Northern European countries but with Morocco. While Rabat receives hundreds of millions of euros every year to keep illegal immigrants at bay, it lessened its controls in 2021 as a reaction to the hospitalisation in Spain of the leader of the Polisario Front (a movement fighting for the independence of Western Sahara, mostly controlled by Morocco), causing around 8,000 illegal immigrants to cross the border in the Spain’s African exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. This caused tensions not only with Spain, but also with the EU leaders and institutions, some of which accused Morocco of blackmail. At the same time, perhaps also because of the political differences between the two countries, the redistribution debate in Spain has not been as strong as in Italy. It should be added that Spain hosts a sui generis migration: the one of thousands of British and Northern European expats, mostly seniors and smart workers, who settled in Spain to enjoy a warmer climate. Since Spain was one of the few countries with a positive migration balance with the UK, these expats have played a main role in the Brexit negotiations.
Another main topic is economic cooperation, which implies first of all oil and gas. Unlike most EU countries, who buy their gas from Russia or Norway, Spain traditionally imports most of its gas needs from Algeria—48.25 per cent of it in 2017, followed by Nigeria and Peru, both with percentages slightly above 10 per cent; but given the recent worsening in the Spanish-Algerian relations, due to Madrid now endorsing Morocco on the Western Sahara Dispute, diversifying supplies has become a must. This is why Repsol, Spain’s largest energy company, looked at the oil and gas resources of Alaska: the company, for instance, owns 49 per cent of the Nanushuk oil field, probably the biggest onshore oil field discovered in the last few decades. The company is also active in Norway since 2003, where it owns a number of gas fields. But the main breakthroughs probably occurred in Russia.
Due to geographical distance, Spain and Russia never had very strong trade relations, and even the political relations have often been tenuous; but, during the last few decades, Spain’s interest in Russian oil and gas has definitely grown. On 3rd March 2009, for instance, Russia and Spain signed an agreement giving Spanish companies a greater access to Russian oil and gas fields and simplified the path for Russian energy companies to acquire stakes in Spanish ones. The participation of Spanish companies in Russian oil projects, including the Yamal one, was also considered. The Spanish Repsol also got 50 per cent of the Evrotek-Yugra project in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District, which it sold at the end of 2021, and a main importer has signed a long-term agreement with Novatek to import Russian gas from the Yamal fields in the form of LNG.
While the ongoing tensions in Ukraine have curtailed the possibility for Spain to invest in the Russian Arctic gas fields, the role of Russian LNG in Spain’s market has kept on increasing, and in June 2022 Russia became the country’s second main gas supplier, before Algeria and just after the United States.
Conclusion
Does Spain have a “real” Arctic policy? The White Paper is correct at stating that Spain’s role in the Arctic has often been underestimated, as shown by its explorations of the Pacific Northwest and its role in scientific research; still, its current outreach has some limits. A main difference between Imperial and modern Spain is that the former had American possessions which could be extended up to the Arctic, at least in theory, and therefore it was able to project hard power in the region; the latter, which lacks this possibility, has to rely mostly on diplomacy, as well as soft and economic power. Being a non-Arctic state with Arctic interests which it pursues mostly peacefully explains both the strengths and the weaknesses of Spain’s Arctic policy.
Getting access to the Arctic fisheries is rather difficult for non-Arctic nations. The adoption of the CFP is the main reason not to join the EU for countries such as Norway and for the Danish dependencies of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, with their rich fisheries and limited populations. Likewise, in the UK, regaining control of the local fish resources has been a main argument of the Brexiteers, while one of the main countersanctions adopted by Russia has been not to renew an agreement with the UK allowing British vessels to fish in some parts of the Barents Sea.
Arctic fisheries are highly valuable: Arctic nations know this pretty well, and getting access to the Arctic fish resources located in the EEZ of non-EU countries is all but easy. The only notable exception are the Svalbard Islands: as a party of the aforementioned treaty, Spain has the right to fish in their EEZ, and the Spanish cod fleet is very active here.
At the same time, the opening of new Arctic Sea routes is not necessarily good news for Spain. While there are definitely some advantages at using it, the Northern Sea Route would directly challenge the traditional one through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal; and, while Spanish ports may work as transhipment points between the Northern Sea Route and the Mediterranean countries, the ensuing damages for the Spanish economy could be greater than the advantages of using the quicker route towards the Russian Arctic. Spain’s main ports, after all, are mostly located on the Mediterranean Sea or at a close distance to the Strait of Gibraltar, while purely Atlantic ports such as Bilbao deal mostly with trade towards Britain and Northern Europe.
During the latest years, Spain has definitely shown a certain interest in alternative land routes towards China and the East (the Yiwu-Madrid freight rail connection, for instance, has celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2024); but land transportation is not an alternative to sea transportation for goods such as raw materials, and it’s not surprising that the aforementioned rail link is used mostly to transport consumer items like clothes, cars, wine and mechanical items. The Northwest Passage, on the other hand, is not as developed as a navigation route as the Northern Sea Route, and we may still need some time before seeing a direct freight connection between Vancouver or San Francisco and some Spanish port through the Northwest Passage.
The main strength of Spain’s Arctic strategy, on the other hand, is its peaceful nature, since its main focuses are scientific research and the exploitation of the local natural resources. To be fair, Spain’s presence in the Arctic is not totally void of a military component, as shown by the participation of the country to the 2024 Northern Response NATO training; but, unlike those of Germany, Canada and the UK, Spain’s Arctic policy doesn’t seem to be heavily affected by the ongoing geopolitical tensions over Ukraine, if we exclude the EU-imposed anti-Russian sanctions which inevitably limit its investment opportunities in the Russian Arctic and the possibility to team up with Russia on issues where the interests of the two countries converge, as it did in the late 10s on the status of the Svalbard Islands.
Interesting enough, while before the 24th February Spain had a secondary role in the Russian Arctic gas industry compared to Germany, which co-owned some fields and de facto became the main European hub of Russian gas, the situation is now the opposite. The Nord Stream gas pipelines have been destroyed and Wintershall has lost its Russian assets; Spain, on the other hand, has emerged as a main hub of Russian LNG, thanks to its six regasification plants. Spain has also vehemently opposed a total ban of the imports of Russian gas, successfully lobbying to insert of a clause allowing the European Commission to suspend the ban in case the supplies of one country are at risk, also in order to preserve the aforementioned long-term contract signed with Novatek. This has caused the country to undergo severe disapproval by the EU authorities and the most hawkish EU member states, but it will clearly be helpful in restoring the relations with Russia in case of a diplomatic solution on the conflict in Ukraine.
As a whole, Spain’s Arctic policy has several weaknesses. The absence of topics such as tourism, in spite of its potential, is clearly a main weakness; and, at the same time, its overreliance on the EU in promoting its Arctic interests may be a limitation when the situation would require to team up with non-EU Arctic countries such as Russia, Canada and the United States. Therefore, Spain ended up playing a secondary role to the Arctic, compared not only to Arctic countries such as Russia, Denmark and the U.S. but also to Germany. Nevertheless, we should never forget that no point on the Spanish soil is closer to the North Pole rather than to the Equator and that Spain has been absent from the Arctic for almost 200 years. These unfavourable premises should be considered when evaluating Spain’s role in the Arctic and allow us to talk about remarkable progresses on this topic.
AUTHORGiuseppe Cappelluti
Independent Expert