Unrealized Swedish Nuclear Weapons Program

Against the backdrop of the US threat to NATO unity, the possible demise of the Cold War-born alliance, and the expiration of the New START Treaty, the European Union has begun discussing joint nuclear deterrence measures, possibly including the development of its own nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.

Undoubtedly, the discussion of a European autonomous nuclear umbrella will continue on the political surface for a long time, while in the background, away from public scrutiny, military and nuclear scientists will simultaneously be working on specific military-technical aspects: the yield and design of nuclear warheads, air, sea, and land-based nuclear delivery vehicles, priority targets, and attack sites on potential adversaries’ territories.

In addition to Russia and Belarus, the adversaries against whom nuclear deterrence will be applied may also include the United States, especially if the Republican Party retains power in that country after 2028 and continues its current political course.

The Northern Observer is beginning to publish materials on the topic of prospective joint nuclear deterrence by some EU countries. The article below assesses Sweden’s experience working on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems before it signed the NPT in 1968.

A Fairy Tale Instead of a Preface#

A grizzly bear awoke from a long winter’s hibernation very hungry. His last substantial meal had been almost 180 years earlier, when he ate more than half a cheap Mexican tortilla. His meal fifty years later was much more modest, and his stomach was less than half full, containing several hefty pieces of Spanish paella.

From his long period of starvation, the grizzly bear’s pelt was in poor condition—his fur was matted, and in some places bare skin was visible. Heavy folds of skin hung over his large, hungry belly. The rising sun shone through a hole left by a hunter’s bullet in the upper part of his right ear. His hungry eyes glowed like two red coals in their deep sockets.

Available food was very scarce at the beginning of summer; salmon were still fattening up in the sea, and the only food available was fresh leaves of willow, aspen, maple, and ash, as well as protein-rich ants.

The grizzly began searching for food and, as luck would have it, almost immediately stumbled upon a large anthill, next to which stood a sign with the faintest inscription European Union. Further away, another large anthill was visible, containing far fewer ants than the first. The sign read Canada. The grizzly immediately dug into both anthills to fortify himself. He knew from nutritionists that ants contain many valuable nutrients: protein, vitamins, minerals, and all the essential amino acids. At first, he planned to eat a huge bowl of poutine, leaving not a crumb for the bilingual ants, and then drink an entire very large glass of Greenlandic coffee.

The ants were dissatisfied with the grizzly’s actions and, spilling out into the street, began discussing what to do. Some, however, decided to remain silent and hide deep in the underground passages where the food supplies were stored, hoping the grizzly would change his mind and decide to eat someone else who spoke English with a Spanish or Portuguese accent.

The group of brave ants was led by an elderly female ant with deep wrinkles on her face, betraying her advanced age: she spoke with a strong German accent, and instead of interjections, she often uncontrollably uttered the word Heil. From her rapid, energetic, but not always clear speech, it was clear that the ants needed to act urgently and work together to create a large club that could be used to drive away the grizzly, and if they were lucky, even cause serious harm. In the former case, the grizzly could head straight south in search of food, where there were numerous other anthills.

If the grizzly did remain in this part of the mainland, the ants would clearly need a strong club to break the bear’s large bones and then attempt to dismember it into fifty pieces that the ants could easily gnaw on for years.

After the gender-correct leader, the first to speak was a small ant with a strong Arabic-Swedish accent. He was quite old and knew something most ants had long forgotten. He had participated in the creation of a very large club for an unequal fight with a Siberian bear, and his memory retained fragments of the club’s design.

A Nordic Nuclear Weapons Program#

Now that all Nordic countries are members of NATO, a joint Nordic nuclear weapons program would mean an important strengthening of NATO. At the same time, the Nordic countries would be preparing for a nightmare scenario in which NATO completely collapses. This is what Nicolai Svejgaard Poulsen, senior advisor in the Danish parliament, and Morten Møller Sørensen, head of office in the European Parliament, wrote in a debate article in the newspaper Berlingske.

“It’s a wild idea, but we live in wild times,” they wrote.

One of the debaters tells Dagens ETC that Sweden would have an important role to play.

Sweden, like Finland, already has nuclear power plants and experience in nuclear research, which is crucial for a potential Project Mjölner.

Sweden’s Plan to Produce Nuclear Weapons#

During the 1950s and 1960s, several states investigated the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. Even neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland had extensive plans to produce nuclear weapons before the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, was negotiated in 1968, which caused most states to abandon these ambitions.

Swedish nuclear weapons research began as early as 1945, shortly after the first atomic bombs were dropped on Japan. The Swedish Defense Research Institute FOA (today FOI) was commissioned by the Commander-in-Chief to develop knowledge about the new weapon of mass destruction.

The assignment also included investigating the conditions for the production of, as it was called at the time, atomic bombs. Swedish non-alignment, the proponents reasoned, required a strong military strike force that could convince both blocs that Sweden really had the ability to stand by its policy of neutrality in the event of war.

FOA and AB Atomenergi#

In the late 1940s, FOA began a collaboration with AB Atomenergi (AE), which was formed in 1947 and was tasked with the development of civilian nuclear energy. AE built reactors, a fuel factory, and conducted several technical studies on the conditions for the production of weapons-grade plutonium on behalf of FOA. FOA, in turn, was responsible for the actual research and development of Swedish nuclear weapons.

During the 1950s and 1960s, these plans were discussed vigorously within the defense sector, in the media and in the general political debate. Between 1948 and 1968, when Sweden signed the NPT, five major studies were conducted by FOA on the conditions for nuclear weapons production.

The plans to produce nuclear weapons that emerged from the collaboration between FOA and AE were based on the premise that Sweden would use heavy water reactors loaded with domestic uranium to produce plutonium, which would be included in the charges themselves. The military production would be integrated into the civilian nuclear power program to reduce costs and avoid diluting the country’s rather limited scientific and technological resources in two separate programs.

The Chief of Defense Pushed for Nuclear Weapons#

The public debate about Swedish nuclear weapons began in earnest in 1954 when Commander-in-Chief Nils Swedlund, in the ÖB-54 defense inquiry, argued for the acquisition of nuclear weapons so that the Swedish defense could defend neutrality in the event of war. Before the debate began, the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons had only been discussed within a narrow circle of politicians, military personnel and researchers.

The initiative to acquire nuclear weapons came from the military and it was the defense leadership that pushed the issue the hardest, but initially these plans had strong support among leading politicians from various political parties.

The Political Stance#

The position between the parliamentary parties in the mid-1950s was that the Right Party/Conservatives was ready for an acquisition while the People’s Party took a positive stance but did not want to commit to a yes at the present time, while the Farmers’ League did not express a position on the issue. The Social Democrats were divided, there were both representatives for and against. Prime Minister Tage Erlander, as well as Defense Minister Torsten Nilsson, in the Social Democratic-led government, were in favor of a procurement.

The Women’s League Resistance#

Within the Social Democrats, there was a disarmament faction that was negative about the expansion of defense in general. This faction included the Social Democratic Women’s League, which, under the leadership of its combative chairwoman Inga Thorsson, started an active and successful resistance to the nuclear weapons plans during this time. In addition, Foreign Minister Östen Undén was strongly against a nuclear weapons procurement.

Defense policy in Sweden during this time was characterized by consensus between the leading parties and for Erlander it was important that the consensus also extended to the nuclear weapons issue. The parliamentary defense committee appointed in 1955 therefore had three Social Democratic members and three representatives from the liberal-conservative opposition. This worried the disarmament phalanx, since two of the bourgeois parties were positive about Swedish nuclear weapons.

Large Grants for Research#

Generous grants were granted to FOA for the purpose of conducting nuclear weapons research from budget year to budget year. In 1954, Sweden’s first reactor was put into operation, and the following year, FOA concluded in a classified report that, provided access to plutonium, Sweden could acquire nuclear weapons.

It can be said that around 1955, FOA knew very well how Swedish nuclear weapons could be manufactured and used, although later research and development would nuance this picture.

A nuclear weapons program that would include 100 so-called tactical nuclear weapons emerged on FOA’s drawing board, and the weapons carriers would primarily consist of missiles that the Swedish-built Lansen and Draken fighter aircraft would be equipped with.

In addition, it was decided to develop a special nuclear bomber, adapted and optimized for the specific features of the Baltic theater of military operations. Project 1300 was intended to build that delivery system, and the result was a delta-wing, twin-engine supersonic bomber that could carry a free-falling nuclear bomb weighing up to 800 kg.

The intended design had projected speeds that exceeded Mach 2 and a service ceiling near 60,000 feet. It was intended to be a fast and high-flying nuclear-capable bomber that could surge across the Baltic Sea and quickly strike potential Soviet targets in the Baltic states and beyond.

A Swedish nuclear bomber would have to be capable of operating from dispersed airfields in accordance with Swedish doctrine. It would, therefore, look quite different from its American or Soviet counterparts.

Work on the A-36 was progressing well. However, by 1957, Sweden realized it could not afford to develop the A-36, nuclear weapons, and other vital defense programs. The A-36 program was canceled because it would not have a conventional capability.

The USSR found out about the development of a nuclear bomber, and Sweden was warned that there was no such thing as a “neutral” nuclear deterrent.

The Debate Gains Momentum#

As the debate got underway and gained momentum from the mid-1950s, pressure on the government to take a position increased from both opponents and supporters of Swedish nuclear weapons. However, the Swedish nuclear weapons plans met with strong opposition and a lengthy discussion took place in the Riksdag, within the governing Social Democratic party, in organizations and among the general public during the second half of the 1950s.

A large number of nuclear weapons opponents consisting of cultural figures, well-known academics and debaters came together and created the Action Group against the Swedish Atomic Bomb (AMSA), which began a successful public opinion campaign against Swedish nuclear weapons. The Social Democratic Women’s League under the leadership of Inga Thorsson in collaboration with Foreign Minister Undén formed the hub of the internal Social Democratic opposition to Swedish nuclear weapons.

The Social Democratic government was under heavy pressure from both supporters and opponents, and the solution to Erlander’s dilemma was to postpone the issue for the future.

The Social Democratic leadership’s line was that it could not take a position in the current situation because civil nuclear power development had not really gotten going and therefore there was no technical basis to take a position on. For this reason, the Social Democratic party board recommended postponing the issue until the level of knowledge allowed a decision.

This line also developed into the government’s strategy on the nuclear weapons issue: to refer to civil nuclear energy research in order to use it as a buffer against making a decision. In this way, it was possible to appease both opponents and advocates within its own party in order to counteract party division and to meet the bourgeois parties and the military who wanted to continue nuclear weapons research.

International Talks on Disarmament#

In February 1956, the Social Democratic party board met to discuss the nuclear weapons plans. Prime Minister Erlander had prepared a proposal to forestall deadlocks and conflict-creating discussions. The proposal was to postpone a decision on the nuclear weapons issue until 1958. There were two reasons for this, according to Erlander.

First, a decision did not need to be made until 1958 because then the picture of the technical conditions for nuclear weapons production would be clearer. Second, international talks on nuclear disarmament were underway and Sweden should not make these more difficult by deciding to acquire nuclear weapons, which would probably lead to further global proliferation. Before the meeting, Erlander had asked Foreign Minister Undén, an opponent of nuclear weapons, to report on the disarmament talks in the UN at the meeting.

The Idea of Nuclear Weapons Begins to Waver#

There is much evidence that Erlander and the Social Democratic leadership began to waver in their view of equipping the Swedish defense with nuclear weapons as early as 1957. Undén pushed the issue of international disarmament with great energy in the UN and in other international contexts from the end of the 1950s onwards, which influenced public opinion in Sweden but also Prime Minister Erlander. This is not to say that Erlander publicly spoke out against acquiring nuclear weapons, not even in the inner circle of Social Democrats.

Erlander prioritized party-political consensus, which meant that the nuclear weapons issue would be resolved with the greatest possible unity between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties. With his stance, Erlander encouraged public opinion against Swedish nuclear weapons, which gave Foreign Minister Undén and the Social Democratic Women’s League opportunities to campaign. At the same time, Erlander advocated a postponement, which enabled continued design-oriented research.

The Undén Plan#

Although Sweden had not reached a definitive decision on whether or not to acquire its own nuclear weapons, its voice was heard in international forums long before the NPT was signed. First through Foreign Minister Östen Undén and then through Alva Myrdal, who would lead the Swedish disarmament negotiations.

At the same time as the first initiative for the NPT was taken by Ireland in 1961, Sweden presented the so-called Undén Plan to the UN General Assembly, a proposal based on the non-nuclear-weapon states forming a nuclear-weapon-free club. Unlike the Irish initiative for a non-proliferation treaty, however, the Undén Plan was not adopted by consensus because the Western Allies voted against it.

A year after the Undén Plan, Sweden was one of eight non-aligned states that became members of the 18-nation Conference on Disarmament. In this capacity, Sweden actively participated in the drafting of the NPT, and was one of the forces behind the inclusion of Article VI on disarmament in the treaty. According to Sweden, it was necessary to obtain obligations for the nuclear-weapon states, both to create a balance between the concessions of the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states, and to get more states to join.

Sweden Signs the NPT#

On 19 August 1968, Sweden signed the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, thereby committing itself not to acquire nuclear weapons. This was the definitive end point for the Swedish nuclear weapons plans. Since then, Sweden has initiated and contributed to various proposals that in one way or another aim to strengthen the regime that has emerged on disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Paradox#

In other words, Sweden’s nuclear weapons history is characterized by having first been a potential nuclear weapons proliferator and then having abandoned these plans and become a driving force in the work on the non-proliferation regime. How can this paradox be explained? There are different interpretations of why the Swedish nuclear weapons plans fell through. One interpretation emphasizes the significance of the choice to include the Swedish nuclear weapons within the framework of civil nuclear energy.

Since this process is both technically complicated and time-consuming, it took so long to achieve results that an opposition had time to take shape and grow strong both in and outside the Riksdag. These critical voices gained further strength and arguments in the Swedish debate when the United States and the Soviet Union began disarmament negotiations with each other in the late 1950s. In this context, opinion work of organizations such as the Social Democratic Women’s League and AMSA played a crucial role.

Another factor highlighted is the military technological dependence on the United States, which meant that the USA was able to influence Sweden to abandon these plans. Further explanations for Sweden’s refusal to acquire nuclear weapons can be found in the emerging Swedish disarmament policy, with the importance of Östen Undén’s and Alva Myrdal’s persistent work for international disarmament.

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