Germany in the Arctic After Ukraine and Hormuz

Between Ukraine and Hormuz#

During the last four years, Germany’s strategic stance and energy supplies were severely affected by two main events. The first one was the launch of the Special Military Operation and the consequent escalation of the Ukrainian Crisis into a wider confrontation between Russia and the so-called “Collective West.” Albeit with some initial reservations, Germany fully adapted to the policy dictated by Washington and Brussels, and this led to the disruption of the previously profitable oil and gas partnership with Moscow, which supplied over half of Germany’s gas needs in 2021.

The second one is the beginning of the Iran War, with the consequent Hormuz Strait Crisis. The slump in the traffic through one of the world’s most important choke points caused an energy crisis which affected mostly Eastern Asia, but whose effects could be felt across Europe too. The first effect is the overall growth in oil prices, with the main indicators climbing from around $70/barrel to over $100/barrel in a few days. Oil prices have subsequently adjusted, but they remain above prewar levels, and transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains well below prewar volumes. The combined effects of the Ukrainian and Hormuz Strait Crises have already caused an economic slowdown and workforce cuts, such as those recently announced by Volkswagen, which could cause up to 100,000 layoffs.

The second effect was the jet fuel shortage. At the beginning of the Hormuz Strait Crisis, an Italian analyst foresaw that the main Western European hubs were in a much better position than Mediterranean ones, since they could rely on supplies through the Atlantic. Still, the crisis affected German aviation as well. Lufthansa had to cancel around 20,000 flights during the summer season, while Lufthansa CityLine, the German colossus’s subsidiary for regional flights, was closed in April 2026. The local aviation sector also had to deal with the closure of the Middle Eastern airspaces, adding to those over Russia and Ukraine, and flights between Western Europe and Eastern Asia were forced to reroute through a narrow corridor over the South Caucasus. In spite of some improvements during the last few months, the situation around Middle Eastern airspaces is not yet back to normal.

These crises have also greatly influenced Germany’s stance in the Arctic. Before 2022, the country’s Arctic policy was focused mainly on environmental protection and access to the local raw material resources—particularly the gas deposits supplying the Yamal-Europe and the Nord Stream pipelines—while military cooperation took a backseat. Nowadays, military cooperation has become paramount, while Germany’s former main oil and gas supply was defined as “a threat” by the 2024 Arctic Strategy. The situation remains fluid, given the ongoing reshaping of the world order and Washington’s partial retrenchment in the Americas. Likewise, the German political system contains a “wild card” capable of unraveling most of the policies carried out since 2022. Still, the structural changes that followed Scholz’s Zeitenwende Speech are likely to endure the next few years.

Oil and Gas#

Since the country imported around 98% of its oil needs in 2024, Germany has not abandoned its interest in Arctic oil and gas: what has changed is its main supplier. In 2021, 55% of Germany’s gas supply came from Russia, and the country aimed to become a hub for Russian gas in West-Central Europe (France, the Benelux, the Czech Republic, and potentially even the UK). In 2025, 45% of it came from Norway. Something similar applies for oil supplies. In 2021, Russia was Germany’s main oil supplier, with a 34% share; three years later, the leader was Norway, which supplied 20% of its imports, followed by the US (18%) and Kazakhstan (13%). The Druzhba pipeline, which used to transport Russian oil, is now used by Kazakhstan.

These shifts have gone hand in hand with disinvestments from Russian assets. Unlike other companies, such as France’s TotalEnergies, Wintershall (a subsidiary of BASF and one of the main shareholders of the Nord Stream pipelines) long resisted calls to disinvest from Russian oil and gas deposits. However, it ultimately quit its joint venture with Gazprom in the Russian Arctic in January 2023, partly as a result of strong political pressures. At the same time, Wintershall increased its presence in the Norwegian oil and gas industry—for example, with a minority share in the Snøhvit gas field—and in 2023 it was among the top three non-state oil and gas producers in Norway. Further developments, nevertheless, are hindered by the EU’s ongoing ban on new Arctic oil and gas fields, although this policy may be reviewed in the future given ongoing geopolitical issues.

This does not imply that Russian oil and, in particular, Russian gas have disappeared from Germany. Many of Germany’s gas imports come as LNG through countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark. Its origin is often difficult to trace, but we can state for certain that at least part of this LNG comes from Russia. Moreover, due to the Hormuz Strait Crisis, these imports are even increasing; in the first quarter of 2026, the EU as a whole imported 6.9 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, the highest level since 2022. Since pipeline imports have largely stopped, with the exception of those through TurkStream, most of these imports occur as LNG.

Last August, the EU eased planned restrictions on Russian LNG, allowing its members to buy and transport it even after January 1, 2027. The traditional German-Russian oil and gas partnership is unlikely to be reinstated soon. In January 2025, rumors circulated that American investor Stephen P. Lynch was planning to buy the Nord Stream pipelines. The restoration of these pipelines has also been proposed by the Alternative für Deutschland (henceforth AfD) party, the rising star of Germany’s hard right. At the moment, nevertheless, this is highly unlikely, since the AfD remains firmly in opposition and the current government is set on an anti-Russian path.

Military Engagement#

Germany’s Arctic engagements have been influenced not only by the ongoing Ukrainian Crisis but also by Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Trump’s claims on Greenland have caused rather vocal reactions in Germany. Both Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz condemned them as a violation of international law, and in January 2026, Germany took part in the Arctic Endurance operation to protect the island. But this commitment was halfhearted, and the fifteen soldiers of its reconnaissance team were withdrawn on January 18, officially because their mission was complete.

Did Germany blink? Trump’s threats against those countries which took part in the operation may have played a role in making Berlin back off, but the main reason may actually be different. As known, after WWII, West Germany had to accept a strong American military presence on its soil and to rebuild itself as a peaceful nation. The aim, of course, was to “keep the Germans down”; at the same time, however, this allowed the country to divert funds from defense spending to the welfare state and economic development. Die Wende didn’t imply a return to militarism; on the contrary, it made this policy Germany-wide, and defense spending was further reduced.

At this point, it’s reasonable to assume that the main concern of the German government was to “keep the Americans in.” Trump’s “America First” doctrine and his frequent criticism of Germany’s low defense expenditures are a major concern for Berlin, and we should not be surprised that Merz is one of the least critical Western European leaders of Trump’s actions, even if this implies self-evident double standards compared to his virulent criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine¹.

This brings us back to Russia. While its main source of tensions with Germany is not located in the Arctic but in Eastern Europe, most of Germany’s military activities in the Arctic and Northern Europe are directed against Russia. This was the main aim of the 2026 Arctic Sentry mission—part of a wider effort to strengthen NATO’s military capabilities in Northern Europe—to which the country sent four Eurofighter Typhoons. In 2023, the Bundeswehr also set up a permanent deployment in Lithuania; the 700 soldiers originally stationed there are expected to grow to 4,800 in 2027.

Last but not least, tensions are rising around the so-called “shadow fleet,” which carries Russian oil and gas, bypassing Western sanctions and price caps. On January 10, 2026, for instance, Berlin denied one of these vessels the right to transit through its territorial waters. Later, on June 30, a German Coast Guard vessel nearly clashed with a Russian corvette when it approached a vessel of the “shadow fleet” near the Danish Straits, likely with the intention of seizing it. Unlike France and the UK, Germany hasn’t seized any “shadow fleet” vessel so far. However, the deployment of military vessels to protect Russia’s oil and gas trade is a clear sign that tensions are high and new incidents cannot be ruled out.

The AfD’s Wild Card#

Are Germany and Russia headed for escalated tensions or even war? The answer is complex. Throughout the centuries, Russia and Germany (along with Germany’s main predecessors) have followed an almost regular pattern, making them friends in peacetime and enemies during major conflicts. For hundreds of years, they exchanged goods, raw materials, knowledge, settlers and even royalties; however, the last time Germany² and Russia were allies in war was during the Boxer Rebellion. Furthermore, most German-Russian tensions have been triggered by a quest for control over strategic regions in Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Arctic and the Balkans. Since frictions exist in all these areas, the answer is seemingly yes.

This prospect is counterbalanced by other factors that mitigate the possibility of an open war. Rather than Germany, the Western countries that took the greatest advantage from the Ukrainian Crisis are Britain, the US, and some countries of the “New Europe,” which managed to achieve a main strategic objective: driving a wedge between Germany (and continental Western Europe as a whole) and Russia. These nations never looked favorably upon the Nord Stream pipelines or the broader German-Russian oil and gas partnership. Additionally, the attack against the Nord Stream pipelines was also aimed at making the restoration of this partnership far more difficult once the Ukrainian Crisis is over.

Is it in Germany’s interests to support Ukraine “until it prevails,” or “to reach a just and lasting peace” if we use the more indirect language preferred by those politicians who don’t want to change course but who are aware that their voters may not want a new Afghanistan or Iraq? In the “Locomotive of Europe,” rearmament is seen as a possible way out of the ongoing German crisis, but militarization can be justified either by a rebirth of Germany’s traditional power politics or by an external enemy. The latter is precisely the path chosen by the current German government and some mainstream opposition parties, especially the Greens.

The alternative way out is a restoration of ties with Russia. This solution is favored by Germany’s two main populist parties: the left-wing Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) and the aforementioned AfD. Both have their strongholds in the former East Germany. While the BSW, after an initial rise, is slowly declining—though it may still be decisive in shifting the balance of power between the AfD and mainstream parties in some Eastern Länder—the AfD is constantly growing. Recent polls place the party just below 30%. The low popularity of Friedrich Merz, even compared to the Western European average, helps fuel this growth, and some recent scandals certainly do not help.

It’s difficult to foresee whether Germany will head towards rearmament or mend its ties with Russia. In the recent Saxony-Anhalt local elections, the AfD exceeded even the highest expectations, and a new breakthrough is expected in the upcoming local elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. However, the Brandmauer implemented by the mainstream parties still curtails the AfD’s influence. Even if it succeeds in becoming a governing force in its strongholds, the party could find itself in a situation similar to that of the Italian Communist Party during the Cold War—governing at the local level (especially in the “Red Regions” of North-Central Italy) but almost permanently kept in opposition at the national level. Nonetheless, the AfD’s continuous successes in the former DDR might have a nationwide impact; according to some experts, it could lead to a marginalization of Merz within the CDU and to the rise of a new ruling class more open to the idea of governing with Alice Weidel.