The Next Looking North: British Strategy after Trump
Background: Britain’s Arctic Strategies
In February 2023, Britain published its latest Arctic strategy, titled Looking North: The UK and the Arctic. It followed two previous documents on the same subject: the 2013 Adapting to Change and the 2018 Beyond the Ice. Historically, these Arctic strategies have been released every five years, with their contents reflecting ongoing shifts in both the regional and international arenas. The 2018 strategy, for instance, featured references to “Global Britain,” a foundational concept among the pro-Brexit factions of the then-ruling Conservative Party.
The 2023 strategy, however, departs from its predecessors through its heightened emphasis on geopolitical dynamics. While previous papers focused primarily on climate change and environmental issues—areas toward which even the Conservatives demonstrated strong sensitivity—Looking North is centered on the geopolitical shifts triggered by the launch of the special military operation. Russia is explicitly singled out as a threat, whereas Canada is framed as Britain’s primary Arctic ally, owing to deep historical, cultural, and institutional ties. The United States and the Nordic countries are also highlighted as key partners.
Substantial geopolitical shifts have occurred since the publication of the white paper. The fourteen-year Conservative governance of Britain has ended. Donald Trump’s re-election to the White House has initiated a partial transition in US foreign policy from a multilateral “Western” framework to a strictly nationalistic mindset. Washington has laid territorial claims to Greenland and repeatedly raised the possibility of annexing Canada. Concurrently, Russia has not been defeated on the battlefield, contrary to the initial expectations of many British policymakers and military analysts, and the crisis in Ukraine remains ongoing. Furthermore, the Strait of Hormuz crisis has exposed critical logistical vulnerabilities. How have these cascading events affected Britain’s Arctic stance? This question forms the core of this analysis, which will demonstrate that, paradoxically, the 2024 British general election has been the least significant factor in shaping this strategic outlook.
Britain and Canada: A Friendship with Limits
Canada is the first country mentioned in Britain’s Arctic white paper. This is hardly surprising; Britain and Canada share the same cultural roots, the same monarch, and Canada is an offshoot of the British Empire rather than a nation that fought a war for independence. Consequently, Arctic cooperation between these two countries is highly intensive. Britain and Canada have conducted several military exercises in the Arctic, including in recent times, and British patrols have frequently participated in Operation NANOOK, an annual training series taking place in Canada’s High North. Scientific cooperation is also robust. An interesting example is Real Ice, a project funded by the UK government and successfully implemented in a small Inuit hamlet in the Canadian Arctic to slow down sea ice melting, albeit locally.
What this relationship lacks, however, is an exclusive political dimension. True, Britain and Canada cooperate across a number of multinational fora, but they mostly do so within Western or Anglo-Saxon frameworks that also include the United States and other Western partners. Following Brexit, some analysts and political activists have suggested that Britain form a supranational union with the other three main Commonwealth realms. Yet, while this idea faces no major opposition, Britain has merely signed a free trade agreement with Canada. Even Britain’s official reactions to Trump’s Canada claims, which I analyzed in a previous article, were notably mild.
Overall, Britain has been unable to serve as a counterbalance to the US for Canada. This is due partly to London’s limited military and economic clout—at least compared to the US, France, and Germany—and partly to a lack of political will. The British establishment tries to strike a fine balance between the EU and the United States; the recent US visit by the British monarch can be considered an attempt to sway Washington by using Britain’s most potent soft power tool. London and Ottawa will remain friends, and Canada is unlikely to become a republic anytime soon. However, much like the Alaska Boundary Dispute, recent geopolitics have taught Canada that if it wishes to avoid becoming a US subsidiary, it cannot rely heavily on Britain.
Scandinavia, the North of a Greater Intermarium
Britain’s ties with Northern Europe outweigh those with Ottawa. They matter not only for the region itself, but also as the northern anchor of a Greater Intermarium extending from the frozen shores of the Arctic Ocean to the warmer ones of the Mediterranean.
London and the Nordic capitals, after all, have converging strategic interests. On the one hand, many Nordic countries are wary of Russia, one of Britain’s long-standing continental adversaries. On the other hand, they are also fairly Euroskeptic. Finland, for instance, is the only Nordic country which has joined the Eurozone; Denmark has an opt-out, Sweden is theoretically compelled to adopt the euro, but it’s unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, while Norway and Iceland are even outside the EU.
Yet it is a common misconception that Brexit marked a shift towards isolationism. As former Prime Minister Theresa May famously noted:
“We may have voted to leave the EU, but not Europe.”
Britain’s core strategic concern remains to prevent anyone from achieving continental hegemony. In the contemporary context, this entails countering the birth of a German-led European superstate and driving a wedge between Russia and Western Europe. The natural synergy between Russia’s raw materials and Western Europe’s industry, after all, may turn into political convergence, and this is something vehemently opposed by London, since such an alliance would keep the Anglo-Saxons out.
To operationalize this grand strategy, the UK has spearheaded several security initiatives. In 2014 it established the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a British-led military formation encompassing the Nordic and Baltic states, alongside the Netherlands. This partnership was further bolstered in April 2026 by the establishment of the Joint Naval Force, based in Northwood and aimed at complementing NATO forces. British and Swedish manufacturers also co-produce advanced weapons, such as the NLAW anti-tank missile.
This engagement is rooted in long-standing historical ties, complemented by shared ancestry dating from the Viking era. But while a crisis is unlikely, there are structural limits, and British-led alternatives to Brussels have historically had limited pull. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), co-founded by London in 1960 for nations wary of surrendering sovereignty to supranational bodies and joined by most Nordic countries, never matched the gravitational force of the European Economic Community: the UK and several Nordic partners eventually sought membership of the latter instead.
Russia, the Perennial Adversary
Russia is singled out as the primary threat in the UK’s Arctic policy, an unremarkable choice given the historical trajectory of bilateral relations since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Although Britain and Russia were allied during both World Wars, the broader geopolitical picture reveals a pattern where the two nations cooperate during major global conflicts but revert to adversaries in peacetime.
Nevertheless, a degree of pragmatism endured in their relations until recently, particularly in the Arctic, as evidenced by the former TNK-BP joint venture and subsequent investments by BP in the Russian Arctic. Today, however, these Arctic commercial ties have disintegrated. While BP formally retains a 19.75% stake in Rosneft following the sale of its TNK-BP shares, it operates merely as a passive shareholder with no real influence, rendering the British conglomerate’s future role highly tenuous. Scientific cooperation has suffered a similar fate. Consequently, contemporary British interactions with Russia in the Arctic are almost exclusively focused on containment.
A cornerstone of this strategy is Operation Atlantic Bastion, which aims to strengthen anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the North Atlantic. Its main focus is the GIUK Gap, the de facto maritime gateway between the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. Launched in December 2025, the operation is projected to receive an additional £1.5 billion in the next four years. Furthermore, Britain actively participates in military exercises alongside Scandinavian and Baltic states, maintaining a clear anti-Russian—and anti-Chinese—focus. London’s staunch support for the NATO accession of Sweden and Finland can similarly be understood as a mechanism to inject strategic depth into the Alliance’s Arctic defense projection.
However, the most significant escalation over the past year is the crusade against the so-called “Shadow Fleet”—the fleet of vessels utilized by Moscow to export oil globally while bypassing Western price caps. Granted, both Starmer and his successor Andy Burnham lack Macron’s penchant for geopolitical bravado, and Britain historically prefers to delegate risky actions when possible. Yet, on June 14, London shifted from a supporting role to direct intervention, seizing a vessel transiting the English Channel. Although the systemic consequences of this campaign remain limited, the operational risks are profound. Just two days later, a Russian frigate escorting similar vessels fired a warning shot in the Channel near a British vessel, and on July 2 a Russian corvette repelled a German Coast Guard vessel attempting to impound a sanctioned tanker. Increasingly, these tankers are utilizing armed escorts to deter Western seizures.
Is direct military conflict inevitable? At present, an open war remains unlikely; however, the strategic landscape is volatile, and a direct kinetic clash could shatter long-standing taboos, triggering severe escalation. To be fair, British pragmatism has not vanished entirely: on May 19, for instance, London waived sanctions on Russian diesel and jet fuel refined in third countries. Yet, systemic tensions remain acute. Even if the crisis in Ukraine reaches a diplomatic settlement and limited economic or scientific channels reopen, Russia will likely remain Britain’s primary regional competitor. A fundamental alignment shift would occur only if London becomes concerned by Germany’s ambition to build “Europe’s strongest conventional army”. Scandinavia and Poland may prove insufficient to counterbalance a rearmed Germany, and historical precedents suggest that reaching out to Moscow could once again become a geopolitical necessity for Britain.
Ambition and Capability
Britain’s Arctic policy rests on a fundamental contradiction. London actively seeks a protagonist role in European security architecture, and the Arctic is a main focal point. At the same time, its military capabilities are limited. The British Army, which commanded 155,000 troops across four divisions in 1991, maintained just 75,000 troops across two divisions in 2025. Similarly, the Royal Navy, which historically ruled the waves, now fields just six operational combat units. While Britain remains the world’s sixth-largest military spender, its readiness is questioned even by mainstream analysts, and persistent concerns over the underfunding of the Armed Forces raise critical questions about London’s long-term capacity to act as a security guarantor in the High North. British policymakers are clearly aware of this, which explains their continued reliance on their transatlantic partner.
Conclusions
In August 2026, the calendar sits closer to the projected publication of the 2028 Arctic strategy than to the 2023 release of Looking North. Because the previous white paper was issued prior to the 2024 US presidential election, a new document reflecting these shifts may soon prove necessary. Yet, while specific strategic adaptations may occur, the broader geopolitical picture is likely to remain unchanged. Many political topics, such as the protection of the environment, remain broadly bipartisan, Reform UK’s opposition to net zero policies notwithstanding. The same applies to Britain’s core strategy. Since at least the seventeenth century, London’s primary objective has been to prevent the emergence of a continental hegemon. Regardless of who that potential hegemon may be, this overarching strategy will persist and will continue to determine friends and foes.
The next white paper will likely place even greater emphasis on relations with Scandinavia. Washington’s partial disengagement from Europe—a trend likely to outlive the current Trump administration—presents Britain with a window of opportunity. Conversely, Russia will almost certainly remain framed as the primary regional threat. Canada will remain a close partner and ally for the time being, but the scope of this relationship should not be overestimated. Britain’s grand strategy is chiefly focused on Continental Europe rather than North America, and Canada’s ability to help fulfill these European objectives is limited. Furthermore, since Britain will still do its best to “keep Americans in”, as shown by King Charles’s speech at the US Congress, London may choose to appease Washington rather than defend Ottawa in case of intense bilateral tensions, as it did in 1903.
Ultimately, the future of Britain’s Arctic outreach depends mostly on three elements: Washington’s future role in Europe, Britain’s military capabilities, and the political stability of Scotland and Northern Ireland—the Home Nations that grant Britain direct access to the High North. At the moment, the internal political front appears the most stable. In Scotland, polling reflects a close race between pro-independence and pro-union factions, making a new independence referendum unlikely without a sustained nationalist majority. Likewise, while the Protestant majority which triggered the 1921 partition of Ireland is gone, and France’s growing hold on Ireland could make Dublin more confident in advocating for Irish unity, polls show no pro-unity majority due to deep-seated economic and social welfare concerns. But the long-term territorial integrity of the United Kingdom remains difficult to predict.
